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Essays on Culture and Economic Relationships
AĶňŉŇĵķŉ
Chapter two investigates whether insular cultures are less likely to adopt new
technologies. Combining GIS crop production data with unique language data, I
show that societies that are isolated on the language tree produce less of the crops that
required adoption, but not of the crops not requiring adoption. Endogeneity of
cultural isolation is addressed by exploiting ancestral migration route direction.
Cultural isolation persists due to the endogeneity of land seĨlement. Land selection
caused increased polarization and decreased fractionalization, a paĨern that is argued
to limit the incentives for cross-societal communication.
Chapter three uses contract level data on a portfolio of ǉǑǏ coﬀee washing stations
in ǉǐ countries to identify the sources and consequences of credit imperfections. Due
to moral hazard, default increases following increases in world coﬀee prices just
before the maturity date of the contract. Strategic default is deterred by relationships
with the lender and foreign buyers: the value of informal enforcement amounts to
Ǎǈƻ of the value of the sale contract for repaying borrowers. A RDD shows that ėrms
are credit constrained. Prices paid to farmers increase implying the existence of
contractual externalities along the supply chain.
Chapter four analyzes the eﬀect of interethnic trust on economic relationships in
Rwanda/Burundi. ĉe endogeneity of defaults impact on trust is dealt with by
exploiting the eligibility of respondents’ grandparents to coﬀee corvée in the colonial
era. Corvée contributed to Hutu-Tutsi tensions. Corvée eligibility is used as an
exogenous instrument for interethnic trust, measured using a unique dataset collected
in the ėeld. Grandparent eligibility for corvée reduces interethnic trust, and that low
trust increases the likelihood of being defaulted on. ĉe evidence suggests that
default becomes more likely among less trusting individuals due to adverse selection,
not moral hazard.
xiii
1
IntroduČion
Economic relationships drive economic development. ĉey form out of, and interact
with almost all environmental factors, and the nature of relationships diﬀer depending
on context. Cultural norms both cause, and are caused by economic relationships; the
relationship is incredibly complex. When economic relationships fail development
breaks down, and therefore cultural ineﬃciencies can have powerful eﬀects.
Culture, in many cases, seems far more slowly moving than most economic
outcomes. While it may respond rationally to context, the updating process takes
time. Furthermore, in some cases, cultural equilibria can form which may be
suboptimal. Because of these phenomena it is diﬃcult to overstate the importance of
economic history. History shapes culture, inĚuences economic relationships in
numerous ways, which in turn determines development. ĉis thesis is about that
process.
ĉe second chapter looks at insular cultures, and their propensity to adopt new
technologies. Technology adoption is a fundamental aspect of driving development,
and has been the most prominent feature of leading growth models over the past few
decades. ĉe chapter outlines how insular cultures are less able to adopt agricultural
crops for historical reasons. It tracks one tribe, the Bantu, from their origins along the
ǉ
Nigeria-Cameroon border at the beginning of the ėrst millennium. It shows how the
migration process shaped cultural isolation through skill development, and how the
eﬀect persisted for over Ǎǈǈ years aěer the seĨlement process had ended in ǉǍǈǈC.E.
ĉemigration process followed two distinct branches, one travelling through the
rainforest, and the other travelling around it. Because the group that went through the
rainforest had a much more specialized type of agriculture and hunting/ėshing, they
communicated less with other tribes around them. ĉis happened generation aěer
generation until they emerged from the rainforest ǉ,ǈǈǈ years later. At that point
cultures were very inward looking for those whose ancestors lived in the rainforest;
much more so than those whose ancestors travelled around it. Both groups ended up
living in the same regions in southern Africa by the end of the seĨlement process, but
the cultural divergence that took place impacted economic success.
ĉe cultural change had important economic consequences that impacted the long
run economic success of much of southern Africa. First, during the initial seĨlement
of southern Africa, the two migration branches preferred diﬀerent types of land. ĉe
group whose ancestors lived in the rainforest preferred to seĨle on land similar to the
rainforest, because they no longer knew how to produce in a non-rainforest
environment. ĉis knowledge was not passed down to them by their ancestors
because in the rainforest it was not important. ĉe land selection process inĚuenced
tribal neighbours. ĉe rainforest group travelled farther from the main migration
branch to ėnd the land they wanted, and as a result ended up with fewer tribal
neighbours, and the neighbours they did have were much more diﬀerent from them.
ĉis made communication much more diﬃcult for the already more insular
ancestors of rainforest migrants. With low levels of communication, observation of
new agricultural techniques were lower, and experimentation with new ‘technologies’
was lower as well. ĉis reduced technological adoption, which became especially
important during the slave trade.
With the large inĚux of western travel to southern Africa in the late ǉǎth century, a
host of new agricultural technologies were introduced to the region. Among the most
important were the introduction of maize and wheat, which were highly suitable to
the African climate, but were not native to the region. ĉe adoption of these crops
occurred quickly, but adoption was not uniform. ĉe rainforest migrants, who
communicated less with neighbours and experimented less with newmethods of
production were also less likely to adopt the new and proėtable crops. Over time the
reduced proėtability in agriculture in these regions caused a shiě away from
Ǌ
agricultural production and into diﬀerent industries. ĉe low rates of adoption
persisted until today. ĉere is still less production of all crops introduced during the
slave trade in regions seĨled by the descendants of rainforest habitants. ĉis is true
despite the fact that many of the new crops were highly suitable for a rainforest
environment, crops like sunĚower, groundnut and sugarcane. ĉis is only one
example of how culture inĚuences economic productivity through economic
interactions, or a lack thereof.
ĉe third chapter focuses more speciėcally on how and when economic
relationships can break down, and acts as a bridge to the fourth chapter, which deals
speciėcally with the interaction between culture and the breakdown of economic
relationships. ĉe focus of the third chapter is contractual default in the coﬀee
industry. ĉe chapter, coauthored with Dr. RoccoMacchiavello, discusses the
reasons and consequences of contractual default. It follows the clients of a particular
lending agent, who lends to the coﬀee sector around the world. We ėnd evidence that
clients default on contracts when it is most proėtable for them to delay repayment,
and show that these clients are more credit constrained, as implied by the higher
levels of default.
ĉe impact of default on economic relationships has a much larger impact than
may seem obvious at ėrst glance. High defaults mean that lenders will be more careful
with their money, and will risk less than they may in a world with lower default. Loans
are to processing stations, who buy coﬀee cherries from farmers. When the
processing stations receive lower loan amounts the price that the farmers receive for
cherries decreases. So default by one processing station negatively impacts not only
other processing stations, but other farmers as well.
Default is clearly related to the strength of the economic relationship. Default is
not going to happen in a strong economic relationship, because the risk of ending the
relationship is too great. ĉis point comes through in the data. Firms with lower
valuations of their relationship with the lender are more likely to default, highlighting
the importance of relationships for the economic development of a region.
Economic relationships are clearly not created randomly. Both chapters two and
three show that economic relationships are incredibly important for economic
success. While chapter two touches on insular cultures, and how they arise, the more
macro based approach doesn’t allow for the in depth analysis of any particular
relationship. Chapter three addresses the impacts of a single relationship type, but
addressing the origins and development of the relationship value which is crucial to
ǋ
the analysis is beyond the scope of the chapter.
ĉe fourth chapter is a micro level analysis of the cultural development of
economic relationships, as well as the economic outcomes. It draws on ėeld research
of farmers in Rwanda and Burundi. ĉe analysis is framed around the historical
encouragement of forced labour by Belgian colonists in the colonial nation of
RwandaUrundi. In the colonial era, the Hutu and Twa were subjected to forced
labour by the ruling Tutsi so that Tutsi could meet the strict coﬀee quotas imposed by
the Belgians. ĉe forced labour was considered a humiliation, and sparked the long
term resentment between the Hutu and the Tutsi in the region.
I surveyed Hutu, Tutsi and Twa farmers in regions where forced labour (corvée)
existed and where it didn’t, and I show that interethnic trust is at least in part
determined by the historical policy, and I show the consequences that this trust has
on contractual outcomes. Farmers that have lower interethnic trust experience more
default than those with high interethnic trust.
I show that it is low trust that causes farmers to be defaulted on and not that being
defaulted on causes low trust, which would be an equally plausible explanation. At
the time, whether someone was chosen into corvée was plausibly random. It had to
do with the land quality, speciėcally the suitability of the land to coﬀee, however this
was at a time when there was nearly no coﬀee being produced, so very few farmers
cared about how suitable their land was to coﬀee. Furthermore, only in areas where
coﬀee was not the most proėtable crop was corvée encouraged. Because of this I can
compare regions where coﬀee was very close to being the most proėtable crop but
wasn’t to regions where coﬀee was very close to not being the most proėtable crop,
but was. As the relative proėtability of other crops to coﬀee increased, the use of
corvée increased - as long as coﬀee wasn’t proėtable.
ĉe fourth chapter therefore pulls elements from the other two, by highlighting the
importance of culture, through interethnic trust, as well as the importance of
economic relationships on development. It does this in a way that tracks culture back
to its historic roots, and shows speciėcally how and why it impacts development.
Here, I show that contractual default arises from low trust through its impact on the
quality of business partner, rather than due to the general interest level of business
partners. ĉis is a somewhat surprising result. Many may have thought that if people
with low interethnic trust were defaulted on more, it would be because of a reduced
motivation to do business with that type of person, but there is no evidence to
support this information. Instead, the evidence shows that Hutu with low Tutsi trust
ǌ
habitually substitute out of business relationships with higher ability Tutsi partners
and do business instead with lower ability Hutu partners. ĉe lower ability Hutu
partners are more likely to default.
ĉe thesis, I hope, presents some interesting results that highlight the importance
of culture, and speciėcally how it interacts with long term relationships to shape
economic development. ĉe work in this area is growing, but is far from complete.
For me, the work has opened as many questions as it has answered, and has increased
my awareness of future work in the area that needs to be done. Future projects that
have arisen from this work are described in the conclusion.
Ǎ
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ĉeCultural Transmission of Knowledge:
Evidence from the Bantu Expansion
Ǌ.ǉ IłŉŇŃĸŊķŉĽŃł
Technology has long been considered crucial to explaining diﬀerences in living
standards and economic growth (Solow (ǉǑǍǎ)). Because of this, there is a long
literature studying technology adoption between societies. One ‘central puzzle’ in
this literature is why information does not diﬀuse between countries or societies
faster and more completely than it does (Spolaore andWacziarg (ǊǈǉǊ)).
In this paper we exploit one of history’s largest migration episodes–the Bantu
expansion–to make three contributions to our understanding of between-society
information diﬀusion¹. First, we test the Diamond (ǉǑǑǐ) technology hypothesis:
¹ĉe idea that technologies are more easily transmiĨed within groups than between groups has
been studied before. Conley and Udry (Ǌǈǈǐ) experiment with Ghanaian farmers and show inputs
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north-south axis orientation impairs information diﬀusion². Second, we show that
this diﬀusion failure does not immediately recover once information is made
available³. ĉis is surprising, as it would have been reasonable to expect, both from
the logical implications of Diamond’s hypothesis and from the broader literature on
between-society technology diﬀusion, that information availability was the key
constraint. ĉird though, we show that among the Bantu, larger cultural barriers are
associated with an ancestral north-south migration axis, and this additional cost to
acquiring information can account for up to a ǋǍƻ reduction in current agricultural
productivity.
ĉe Bantu expansion was one of the largest ever human migration movements.
Migration began near what is now the Nigeria/Cameroon border, and followed two
primary routes - south and east. Over many generations of migration large diﬀerences
in the suitability of dry crops emerged, as the southern branch migrated through the
rainforest in central Africa. ĉis lends itself well to the study of the Diamond (ǉǑǑǐ)
axis-orientation hypothesis which suggested that information travelled more
eﬃciently along an east-west axis than along a north-south axis. ĉis is because along
a north-south axis there is less beneėt to learning from neighbouring communities,
since the likelihood of two societies sharing similar agro-climactic conditions is lower.
ĉe typical challenge with studying this hypothesis is that it is diﬃcult to separate
change with the inputs of ‘information neighbours’, conditional on being geographic neighbours.
Also, Sanchez-Burks et al. (Ǌǈǈǋ) shows the vertical transmission of culture from parents to children
with respect to how literally messages are received. One paper by Algan et al. (ǊǈǉǊ) show that both
horizontal and vertical transmission of culture are important in baby naming conventions in France.
²A paper by Olsson andHibbs (ǊǈǈǍ) also study Diamond’s hypothesis by looking at the correla-
tion between biogeographic factors and productivity
³Analyzing the eﬀect of history on culture is now a preĨy mature literature. Nunn (Ǌǈǈǐ) and
Nunn andWantchekon (ǊǈǉǊ), for example, show the long run eﬀects of the slave trade and identify
the impact on trust as being particularly important in persistence and Alesina et al. (Ǌǈǉǉ) show that
the introduction of the plough caused decreases in women￿s rights. Other related works include Co-
hen et al. (ǉǑǑǎ), for example, show that a culture of honour in America is related to historic herding
rather than farming and Becker et al. (Ǌǈǉǈ) show that beĨer historical institutions can lead to higher
trust.
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between the direct eﬀect of agro-climactic conditions on technology decisions and
the information eﬀect associated with axis-orientation. In this sense the Bantu
context is ideal. ĉe north-south migrants went directly south, through the rainforest
but the east-west migrants went east until they reached the east coast of Africa, then
they went south, migrating around the rainforest. Both the east-west and north-south
migration branches rejoined aěer ǉǈǈǈC.E., and currently live in the same regions in
some parts of southern Africa. ĉis allows us to test the spirit of the Diamond (ǉǑǑǐ)
hypothesis, as agro-climactic conditions in the rainforest are much more diverse than
outside the rainforest. But, we don’t have to deal with the problem of comparing
communities in much diﬀerent agricultural environments. Because of this we focus
on cropping paĨerns in southern Africa, the region where the descendants of the
southern and eastern migrants now live in nearby communities, with access to the
same types of land and the same information from neighbours.
To study this we construct a new dataset, bringing together many types of data
from several diﬀerent sources. ĉey include: (ǉ) a newly constructed dataset on
Bantu language evolution, which is used to assign migration routes to ethno-linguistic
groups⁴, and to construct a measure of language barriers⁵. (Ǌ) SeĨlement locations
are taken from a tribal map of Africa (Murdock (ǉǑǍǑ)). ĉematched language,
seĨlement and migration data is then matched to (ǋ) GIS crop data which provides
current crop production for each crop in Africa. (ǌ) Historical land use data, which is
a panel estimating the allocation of each piece of land in Africa to either crops, pasture
or urban land. ĉis is then joined with (Ǎ) and (ǎ), historical population panel
datasets from two independent sources. And ėnally these ǎ data sources are matched
⁴ĉe Bantu language tree contains a partition, which is analogous to the east-south migration di-
vision, so groups with a ‘southern Bantu’ language are assumed to have followed a southernmigration
route.
⁵Desmet et al. (Ǌǈǉǉ) also use language tree data to examine the cultural distance between various
societies
ǐ
to (Ǐ) crop suitability data from the FAO, which provides the suitability of each piece
of land for each crop.
ĉe richness of this dataset allows us to analyze information diﬀusion in a number
of diﬀerent ways. In each of our empirical strategies we compare the descendants of
southern and eastern migrating Bantu, and therefore make the identifying
assumption that the initial ancestral decision to migrate east or south is orthogonal to
current cropping decisions. ĉere are two reasons that make this assumptions
reasonable. First, migration speed was so slow that for any single leg of migration
there were no substantial diﬀerences in land characteristics, so migrants simply went
where land was abundant (Vansina (ǉǑǑǈ)). Second, the crop decisions analyzed
here take place hundreds of years aěer the original migration decision took place, so
any small diﬀerences in comparative advantage that may have existed are very unlikely
to remain relevant.
Aěer checking the validity of this assumption, we use it to test three main
hypotheses. We start by documenting that axis-orientation maĨered for information
Ěows. We demonstrate this in two ways. First, we look at migration paĨerns as groups
entered and exited the rainforest. We interpret diﬀerences in migration speed at the
migration frontier as diﬀerences in agricultural productivity⁶, and show a drop in
migration speed as migrants both entered and exited the rainforest, indicating that the
same agricultural techniques that were previously useful, are no longer generating the
same levels of success. ĉis suggests that productivity decreased for the types of crops
that are suited to both the Bantu homeland and southern Africa but not the rainforest.
ĉis is consistent with the axis-orientation hypothesis, but as migration speeds are an
imperfect proxy for agricultural production, this can only be considered as suggestive
evidence that axis orientation maĨers for information diﬀusion.
⁶ĉis is standardpracticewhenconsideringpopulations facingMalthusian conditions (Ashraf and
Galor (Ǌǈǉǉa)).
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We then show similar trends for a more direct measure of information: land
devoted to livestock. Livestock was kept in the Bantu homeland, was not productive
in the rainforest because of the tsetse Ěy, and then was able to be kept again in
southern Africa. It is straightforward to examine whether livestock knowledge
survived rainforest migration. We ėnd that aěer seĨlement in southern Africa, less
land was devoted to livestock by the north-south migrants. We can look at the
dynamics of the re-acquisition of livestock knowledge as well. We ėnd no evidence
supporting the historical reacquisition of any livestock knowledge. We therefore
investigate the possibility that axis-orientation can lead to a permanent decrease in
information acquisition.
ĉe permanence of the axis-orientation eﬀect depends, at least in part, on the
endogeneity of the costs of information acquisition (e.g. language barriers,
geographic isolation). It may be that cultural driě is greater along a north-south axis
since as the potential beneėt to sharing and acquiring information is reduced, there
should be less interaction between neighbouring societies.
We begin to investigate the possibility that axis-orientation permanently reduced
information acquisition by looking at current diﬀerences between dry and wet crops
that are traditional to Africa. ĉe idea behind this strategy is that dry-crops were
produced in the Bantu homeland and in southern Africa, but information on how to
produce themmay have been lost in the rainforest where they could not be produced.
Since we have very detailed data on crop production, by crop, we can rule out several
alternate hypotheses by using wet-crop production as a falsiėcation test. We ėnd that
every dry crop that is traditional to Africa is less produced by communities with a
north-south migration ancestry relative to those with an east-west ancestry. However,
none of the wet crops traditional to Africa are similarly less produced by descendants
of north-south migrants.
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Concerned that this might be due to a comparative advantage for wet-crop
production, we also examine the crops introduced through the slave trade. All New
World crops, wet and dry, had to be acquired by both groups of migrants. So unlike
with the traditional African crops where we expect only dry-crops to have been
aﬀected, with NewWorld crops both wet and dry crops should be less produced by
north-south migrant descendants. Indeed, this is what we ėnd - all NewWorld crops,
wet or dry, are less produced by descendants of rainforest migrants indicating that
these communities are systematically acquiring less agricultural information than
communities with an east-west heritage.
Qualitative research suggests that this might be true for the Bantu because of
increased cultural barriers faced by those with a rainforest heritage (Guthrie (ǉǑǌǐ)).
Empirical evidence also suggests that variability in land characteristics can cause
ethnolinguistic diversity (Michalopoulos (Ǌǈǉǉ))⁷. We might consider these cultural
barriers as similar to a non-economic cost to acquiring new information, even when
information availability ceases to be the dominant constraint.
Following this logic it should be true that a north-south migration axis is
associated with more cultural driě. We show, in a number of ways, that this is true for
the Bantu. First, using a newmeasure of linguistic isolation based on language tree
data, we show that linguistic isolation is much greater for descendants of north-south
migrants. We can conėrm using non-language societal characteristics, that the
north-south group diﬀers on isolation based characteristics, but not characteristics
that are unrelated to isolation.
⁷Ashraf and Galor (Ǌǈǉǉb) also study the origins of diversity. Relatedly, the work is contributes
to the consequences of diversity. ĉe literature starts with a seminal work by Easterly and Levine
(ǉǑǑǏ) who show that racial fractionalization is negatively correlated with growth in cross-country
regressions. Collier and Gunning (ǉǑǑǑ) follow-up on the work, arguing that linguistic fractionaliza-
tion causes low social capital and less provision of public goods which limits the growth of nations.
Alesina et al. (Ǌǈǈǋ) conėrm results from both papers using more sophisticated and complete data.
Much of the literature has focused on public good provision, or other forms of institutional quality.
LaPorta et al. (Ǌǈǈǋ), Collier (Ǌǈǈǈ), and Alesina (Ǌǈǈǋ) all fall into this category.
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Finally, we look at why this cultural isolation may be permanent. Following one of
the insights of our simple theoretical framework, we investigate the correlation
between geographic and cultural isolation. We ėnd systematic diﬀerences in land
seĨlement selection of migrants leaving the rainforest. North-south migrants selected
land that was more similar to the rainforest, and this preference pulled them away
frommore heavily populated regions with a diversity of neighbours. ĉey therefore
seĨled in regions that were more geographically isolated which explains the
persistence of the cultural isolation. So the costs to information acquisition are
endogenous for potentially two reasons. ĉe ėrst is cultural isolation might create
barriers to adoption, and result from a failure of information to fully diﬀuse. Second,
the evidence supports the idea that geographic isolation responds to poor
information Ěows as well. We view the cultural and geographic isolation as part of the
same underlying mechanism, reinforcing each other. Because of this we are unable to
separately identify the importance these two eﬀects, but conclude that endogenous
isolation, in general, generates higher information acquisition costs of new
information.
Identifying the isolation mechanism, even without separating between the
respective importance of geography and culture, requires us to overcome several
identiėcation challenges. One concern is that some unobserved event or set of events
changed societal characteristics, and can explain diﬀerences in crop choices. One
possibility is that migrants travelling through the rainforest interacted with diﬀerent
types of natives. It’s unlikely that this would impact crop choices as both groups of
Bantu migrants introduced seĨled agriculture to the areas they seĨled - there was no
seĨled agriculture south of the Sahel prior to the arrival of the Bantu.
Regardless, we use the Altonji et al. (ǊǈǈǍ) test for assessing the plausibility of
confounding unobservables to address this concern. ĉe test examines the sensitivity
ǉǊ
of results to diﬀerent controls to measure howmuch unobservables would have to
impact estimates relative to observables to explain away the result. ĉis test is
powerful when the ability to observe relevant factors is high. Because we have such
rich data on land characteristics, which should account for most of the productivity
diﬀerences, the test is quite powerful in our case. Results suggest that unobservable
factors would have to be, as a lower bound, equally important as all land
characteristics are for crop production. As an upper bound, unobservables would
have to be Ǌǈ times more important. It seems unlikely that any factor would have a
larger inĚuence on crop production than land characteristics, so we interpret this as
strong evidence that the relationship is not driven by unobservables.
Another potential concern is that tastes are endogenous. Tastes have been shown
to impact production decisions in a developing economy context (Atkin (Ǌǈǉǋ)), and
it is possible that multigenerational migration had a lasting impact on tastes. Here the
NewWorld crops become important, since tastes had not been acquired for any of
these crops. If dry crops were less produced because a taste for wet crops developed
we should either see the same paĨern on the NewWorld crops, or we should see that
none of the NewWorld crops are less produced for north-south migrants.
ĉe remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we outline a
very simple model intended to make the mechanisms discussed in the empirical
section more concrete. In section ǋ we review the history of Bantu migration. Section
ǌ describes the data while section Ǎ outlines the empirical strategies used, and the
main results. Section ǎ concludes.
Ǌ.Ǌ CŃłķĹńŉŊĵŀ FŇĵŁĹŌŃŇĿ
ĉis section is intended to make mechanisms concrete by outlining a simple model
which formalizes Diamond’s insight. For a more formal treatment, see the appendix.
ǉǋ
ĉe framework is not meant to isolate these hypothesized mechanism from others
that may produce similar predictions. Instead the empirical sections aĨempt to
distinguish between potentially confounding mechanisms. Instead the goal here is to
establish ǋ conceptual points:
ǉ. ĉe availability of information to societies very far south may depend on its
beneėt to societies that are closer to the innovation.
Ǌ. If we could make information available to those it wasn’t previously available
to, we might see an immediate catch-up in knowledge. ĉis is true when the
cost of adoption is exogenous.
ǋ. If the cost of adoption is endogenous, permanently low adoption becomes
possible under some conditions. In this case, culture driěs apart as the
incentive to communicate decreases.
Ǌ.Ǌ.ǉ IłŉŊĽŉĽŃł
One key insight generating Diamond’s axis orientation prediction was that diﬀusion
between societies could be represented by a line network. While it’s clearly not
literally true that each society has only Ǌ neighbours from whom they can acquire
information, it can be thought of that way because agricultural conditions are so
highly correlated within latitudes that societies at each latitude behave the same. ĉe
implications for diﬀusion are drastic. If any one node along the line fails to ‘pass the
baton’, diﬀusion ends. ĉis does not occur in other network formations.
For example, consider the diﬀusion of a single piece of information in a line
network of three societies (A, B, C).ĉe information can either be useful to a society
or not.
ǉǌ
Figure 2.2.1: Network Eﬀects
.
A (discovers new info)
B (new info not useful)
C (new info highly useful)
(a) Line Network
. C (new info highly useful)
B (new info not useful)
A (discovers new info)
(b) Complete Network
Suppose society A discovers the information and C would greatly beneėt from the
information (ėgure ǉ(a)). For C to acquire the information, they need to discover it
from B, but B does not ėnd the information useful. If B doesn’t use the information, C
will never discover it, and won’t be able to apply it. Contrast this to a complete
network in ėgure ǉ(b) where it doesn’t maĨer whether B ėnds the new information
beneėcial, C can acquire it directly from A.
ĉe implications for diﬀusion are clear. ĉis highlights one important diﬀerence
between society-society diﬀusion as compared to within-society diﬀusion. While
within-society diﬀusion is arguably beĨer captured by ėgure ǉ(b), Diamond
(indirectly) argued that between-society diﬀusion was beĨer captured by ėgure ǉ(a).
ĉe key constraint in this set-up is the availability of information. It is
straightforward to see how an intervention making the innovation available to society
C would result in immediate adoption and would resolve the ineﬃciency. However, it
is possible that the experiencing low information availability could inĚuence the costs
of adoption. In this case it is not clear that an information based intervention would
immediately result in full adoption.
One example of that is the case where societies decide on whether or not to
maintain communicative ties with other societies. ĉe beneėts of doing so are that
they may observe some new agricultural technique that could be adopted and
increase eﬃciency on farmland at home. ĉe costs are that this requires occasional
ǉǍ
visits over potentially large geographic distances, meaning time spent away from own
crops, and as a result reduced agricultural proėts. However, communication
inĚuences adoption costs by keeping cultural distance low. If a society decides not to
maintain communication with others cultural driě occurs (e.g. language similarity),
increasing the diﬃculty of understanding how new innovations work, and thus
increasing the cost to adopt.
When societies live on very diﬀerent types of land, as they do along a north-south
axis, each visit to a neighbouring society is less likely to result in the discovery of an
applicable proėtable agricultural technique, so the beneėt of visiting is low. A lowered
beneėt to visiting causes the society to visit less, increasing cultural driě. ĉis further
increases the cost of communication, and the cost of visiting in the future. If the
beneėt to maintaining communication with other societies is low enough, it is
possible that the cultural driě could be so great that a discovered innovation that
would have otherwise been adopted from a neighbour is never adopted.
Ǌ.ǋ HĽňŉŃŇĽķĵŀ BĵķĿĻŇŃŊłĸ
Interested in the role of culture for information diﬀusion, we try to ėnd a natural
experiment that can distinguish between the main mechanisms. Ideally we would
have a treatment and a control group that started out the same with some randomly
assigned to travel along a north-south axis while the others go along an east-west axis.
One society comes close to this: the Bantu.
ĉe Bantu were a tribe that initially seĨled west Africa, on the Nigeria/Cameroon
border. Population was stagnant until about the start of the common era (Guthrie
(ǉǑǌǐ)). ĉis was a period in African history that was experiencing a transition. It
was the start of the iron era, and there were a number of technological advances being
made in neighbouring regions, especially by the Nilo-Saharans to the north, in the
ǉǎ
Figure 2.3.1: Migration routes during the settlement of Africa
ĉemap shows the two main branches of migration. ĉe branch that goes directly south migrates through the rainforest, while the branch that goes east then
south avoids the rainforest. Both migration routes end up in the southern region of Africa which is the study region for the analysis in the paper.
Sahel, which diﬀused south to the Bantu (Oliver (ǉǑǎǎ)).
ĉese technological advances caused large population boosts, and eventually
migration. Prior to the introduction of iron to the Bantu homeland, migration always
took place to the east (ėgure ??). ĉe west and north were already heavily populated,
so migration in either direction would have led to conĚict and seĨlement on smaller
plots of land. ĉey couldn’t migrate to the south, because to the south was the
rainforest, and cuĨing through the thicker landscape of the rainforest wasn’t yet
feasible. Land was freely available to the east, at least at ėrst, so for about ǉǈǈ years
that was the dominant direction of migration. ĉe introduction of iron caused a Ěood
of migration south as it allowed migrants to clear the thick rainforest brush. ĉe
rainforest featured drastically more precipitation so the agricultural yield was beĨer
than to the east (Vansina (ǉǑǑǈ)), and because nobody could clear land before the
introduction of iron, land was in abundance.
Despite the relative abundance of land to the south, the substitution away from dry
ǉǏ
crops would have initially inĚuenced productivity, and thus population growth and
migration speed. “￿ĉe situation suggests ėrst very slow rate of movement as people
were learning about new aquatic habitats followed by a dash once they had achieved
mastery of their new environments” (Murdock (ǉǑǍǑ)).
ĉe technological advancement of iron therefore led to two distinct groups of
Bantu migrants: those who started east and those that started south. ĉe eastern
migrants though, didn’t strictly travel east; they ended up travelling around the
rainforest. ĉey went east until they reached the east coast, then travelled south down
east-Africa. Notably though, the agro-climactic conditions to the east of the rainforest
are similar to those just north of the rainforest, and certainly not as diﬀerent as
through the rainforest (ėgure ??). Both groups eventually went south, and were
reintroduced to each other in southern Africa, ǐǈǈ years later.
To study the impact that the orientation of the migration axis had on information
Ěows, we examine agricultural production and technologies used. ĉere are a number
of agricultural products that are very useful along the borders of the rainforest but are
not able to be grown in the rainforest. ĉe ėrst of these are livestock. Animals were
very diﬃcult to keep in the rainforest because of the tsetse Ěy, but were well kept just
outside of the rainforest (Klein Goldewijk et al. (Ǌǈǉǈ)). Similarly dry-crops were
not suitable for the rainforest, but were grown well just outside the rainforest. Dry
crops included: sorghum/millet, coĨon, barley, wheat, maize and soy (FAO). On the
other hand, wet crops were grown in both the rainforest and just outside the
rainforest, but were grown especially well in the rainforest. Wet crops were grown
about equally well as dry crops in the moderate climate just outside the rainforest.
Wet crops included: rice, pulses, oils, sunĚower, groundnut, sugarcane (FAO).
ĉe timing of the introduction of each crop is very important. Many of the crops
listed above were introduced well aěer migration took place, during the slave trade.
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ĉese are new world crops that were successful in central and south America that
were brought over on slave boats to be sold to Africans, who lived in similar climates.
Maize, soy, sunĚower, groundnut and sugarcane all fall in this category. Another set of
crops are traditional to Africa - in that they were either native to Africa or were
discovered in the fertile crescent, and were adopted by Africans well before contact
with the west. Included in this category are sorghum andmillet, coĨon, barley, wheat,
rice, pulses and oils.
Traditional crops and use of livestock are both more appropriate to study if we’re
looking solely at the Ěow of information from the Bantu homeland to the ėnal
seĨlement locations, but the slave trade crops can be very useful in examining
endogenous barriers to adoption. If information Ěows were compromised along the
north-south axis then it is likely that the knowledge of how to produce dry-traditional
crops did not survive the (multi-generational) journey through the rainforest. ĉe
eastern migrants, able to produce both wet and dry crops continuously, are likely to
have kept their knowledge of both classes of crops.
ĉe new world crops on the other hand only inform adoption of new crops aěer
seĨlement. One of the hypotheses advanced was that when information Ěows are
compromised, cultural driě becomes more likely, impairing future acquisition of
information. ĉis hypothesis can be tested by looking at the acquisition of the New
World crops. If cultural/language barriers are endogenous to information Ěows, then
the southern migrating Bantu would have adopted less of all new world crops.
Ǌ.ǌ Dĵŉĵ
Data to test the threemain predictions outlined in the conceptual framework, we need
data from several sources. We use GIS data on historical seĨlements, and combine
this with ethnicity maps and language tree data to identify migration paĨerns. ĉis
ǉǑ
data is combined with data on agricultural practices to measure information Ěows.
Ǌ.ǌ.ǉ HĽňŉŃŇĽķ PŃńŊŀĵŉĽŃł DĹłňĽŉŏ Dĵŉĵ
All tests involving historical population paĨerns use a ǉ by ǉ cell because of the
higher uncertainty with the historical data. Two datasets are used independently to
determine historic population density, McEvedy (ǉǑǏǐ) and Klein Goldewijk et al.
(Ǌǈǉǈ). ĉeMcEvedy (ǉǑǏǐ) data was geocoded for each period from ǉC.E. to
ǉǍǈǈC.E. (ėgure Ǌ.Ǐ.Ǎ). It provides population data for various regions of Africa. To
get the data at the ǉ by ǉ cell level, a technique designed⁸ speciėcally to increase the
precision of population data, byMoon and Farmer (Ǌǈǈǉ), was used to smooth the
data. ĉis technique smoothes the data in a two step process, ėrst determining the
most likely regions for population using land quality, and second smoothing the data
to the level desired. ĉe aggregate population count within the initial regions, as
deėned byMcEvedy (ǉǑǏǐ) is preserved under this method, but the end result is that
the data is disaggregated using a well known, and generally accepted methodology.
ĉeMcEvedy (ǉǑǏǐ) data oﬀers the advantages of having been constructed prior
to Diamond’s hypothesis being published, and being the most familiar and popular
population dataset used in economic research. However, the drawback is that the
dataset must be processed as described above to achieve the required resolution. An
alternate dataset is available which can be used without any processing, but which was
published aěer the Diamond hypothesis was published. ĉe concern is that
Diamond’s theory may have informed historic population estimates in the generation
of the data. However, the hope is if consistent estimates are obtained between the two
datasets, both the data processing issue and the publication date issue can be ruled
out as possible alternate explanations.
⁸called pychnophylactic interpolation
Ǌǈ
ĉeKlein Goldewijk, Beusen, and Janssen data comes at a Ǎ’ by Ǎ’ resolution, and
is aggregated to the ǉ by ǉ level. ĉis data relies on historical sources and
anthropological ėndings, along with probability models based on land quality and
proximity to water to make historic estimates of population density and land use.
In addition to the population data, land use data from Klein Goldewijk, Beusen,
and Janssen is also used. ĉis data provides, for each cell, the kmƦ of each cell that is
devoted to either crop production or pastoral activities. ĉis land use data also comes
in a Ǎ’ by Ǎ’ resolution, and is aggregated to the ǈ.Ǎ by ǈ.Ǎ level.
Ǌ.ǌ.Ǌ LĵłĻŊĵĻĹ TŇĹĹ Dĵŉĵ
Assigningmigration routes to cells was accomplished using the ethnolinguistic map of
Murdock (ǉǑǍǑ). For each group on the map, the associated language was identiėed
and matched to the Ethnologue (Lewis (ǊǈǈǑ)). Each group is traced back along the
Ethnologue language trees, which at one level provides an east-south language split
analogous to the migration split. ĉis split is used to assign migration routes.
An example is presented in ėgure ?? to illustrate the technique. In the example, the
Kissama society is located on theMurdock map. Each cell within the borders
determined by this map are assigned to one of either a ‘not Bantu’ or ‘rainforest Bantu’
or ‘non-rainforest Bantu’ value. ĉese values are determined using the language trees
from the Ethnologue. ĉe language associated with the Kissama is identiėed and
located on the Ethnologue tree. If the language is traced back to a Bantu root, it is
assigned either a ‘rainforest Bantu’ or ‘non-rainforest Bantu’ value. ĉe language tree
diﬀerentiates between these values at the second level from the root of the tree. In this
case, the Kissama would be assigned to the southern route.
ĉe language tree data is also used to derive a measure of cultural isolation.ĉe
measure considers linguistic similarities as a proxy for cultural connectedness. Using
Ǌǉ
language trees to measure cultural diﬀerences is an idea ėrst implemented by Desmet
et al. (Ǌǈǉǉ), and a related measure is adopted here.
A ėxed point is taken on the language tree, and the number of connections one
group can make using this ėxed point as a root is measured. ĉe choice of the level to
ėx as the root level was made by taking the coarsest possible level at which some
tribes would still be completely isolated (e.g. Hǌǈ in ėgure Ǌ.ǌ.ǉ). Going ėner than
this would bias the measure by making very isolated tribes appear less isolated than
they are, and going coarser than this would reduce variance in the measure. Many
connections implies a low level of isolation. Figure Ǌ.ǌ.ǉ shows an example for
sub-group H. Denoted in brackets are the number of tribes that end if that branch of
the tree is followed. ĉere are ǉǈ tribes in the data with H.ǉǈ as a root, so a
connectedness score of ǉǈ is assigned.
ĉe idea is that ėxing cultural distance by ėxing a point on the language tree allows
for an interpretation of the measure where societies have a high or low number of
connections for some ėxed level of cultural distance.
Ǌ.ǌ.ǋ CŇŃń SŊĽŉĵĶĽŀĽŉŏ Dĵŉĵ
FAOCrop suitability data was acquired to control for selection on land characteristics
(ėgure Ǌ.Ǐ.Ǌ). ĉe data provides a suitability measure ranging from ǉ-ǐ for each major
crop of Africa. ĉis data comes, again, at the ǈ.Ǎ by ǈ.Ǎ level. In each cross-section
analysis (where cell ėxed eﬀects are not possible) suitability for each crop is included
as a ėxed eﬀect. ĉis controls for the suitability of each crop considered, as well as its
substitutes and compliments. If each crop is being produced eﬃciently by both
groups, there should be no diﬀerences in production, controlling for suitability and
land quality.
ǊǊ
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Ǌǋ
Ǌ.ǌ.ǌ CŃłŉĹŁńŃŇĵŇŏ Dĵŉĵ Ńł CŇŃń PŇŃĸŊķŉĽŋĽŉŏ
Data on contemporary production of the major crops grown in Africa is used to show
gaps in productivity (Leﬀ et al. (Ǌǈǈǌ) ). In this dataset, the continent is divided into
ǈ.Ǎ by ǈ.Ǎ cells and provides, for each cell and each major crop, the percentage of
the cell devoted to the production of that crop.
ĉis data also includes a measure of land quality, which is used as a control in each
relevant speciėcation. ĉe land quality data also comes at the ǈ.Ǎ by ǈ.Ǎ level. ĉese
ǈ.Ǎ by ǈ.Ǎ cells are used as the unit of observation for all tests involving speciėc crop
estimates.
Ǌ.Ǎ EŁńĽŇĽķĵŀ RĹňŊŀŉň
We aim to test the three main predictions of the conceptual framework. For each of
the three predictions, we show evidence using two diﬀerent empirical designs. ĉis
improves identiėcation, as diﬀerent designs use diﬀerent identifying assumptions,
and it also helps to alleviate concerns over measurement error, which should be taken
very seriously given that much of the historical data is imputed and smoothed by the
data creators, to best approximate historical conditions.
First, we establish that information historically did not diﬀuse along the
north-south axis as eﬃciently as it did along the east-west axis. ĉis conėrms
Diamond’s key hypothesis that the availability of information depends on its beneėt
to societies close to the innovation.
Second, we show that there was not an immediate catch-up in information when
the southern societies neighbours all of a sudden had access to beneėcial information.
In fact, we show that low adoption appears to be permanent. ĉis establishes one of
the main contributions of the paper, which is to demonstrate that cultural barriers are
Ǌǌ
endogenously determined by information diﬀusion.
Finally, we oﬀer evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the low permanent
adoption is related to cultural isolation. We show (i) that southern migrants had a
lower preference for integration, and (ii) that societal characteristics of north-south
migrating societies are diﬀerent with respect to isolation based measures, but not
other measures.
Ǌ.Ǎ.ǉ IłĺŃŇŁĵŉĽŃł DĽĺĺŊňĽŃł ĵłĸ AŎĽň OŇĽĹłŉĵŉĽŃł
We begin by demonstrating that axis-orientation maĨers for information Ěows. ĉis
result follows fromDiamond’s key insight that high diﬀusion information between
societies depends on the usefulness of the information to all societies, not only the
adopting societies.
We show this two diﬀerent ways. First, using two diﬀerent sources of population
data, we show that migration paĨerns are consistent with lower transmission of
information along the north-south axis. Second, we show that information on
keeping livestock did not survive along the north-south route as well as it did along
the east-west route. ĉis is consistent with the axis-orientation hypothesis, as
livestock is not proėtable in the rainforest due to the presence of the tsetse Ěy.
MĽĻŇĵŉĽŃł SńĹĹĸ PĵŔĹŇłň
We begin by looking at migration speed paĨerns as migration speed is related to
agricultural productivity. In a Malthusian environment productivity generates higher
births, more population pressure and faster rates of migration. We therefore interpret
diﬀerences in migration speed at the migration frontier as diﬀerences in agricultural
productivity.
ĉis relates to information diﬀusion in two ways. First an initial drop in migration
ǊǍ
speed as migrants entered the rainforest indicates that the same agricultural
techniques that were previously useful, are no longer generating the same levels of
success. ĉis establishes the relevancy of the exercise in testing the axis-orientation
hypothesis. We expect migration speed to fall as migrants adapt to the new
agricultural techniques required for rainforest agriculture.
Second, we can observe changes in migration speed as migrants exit the rainforest.
South of the rainforest, the same dry crops that were produced just north of the
rainforest in the Bantu homeland, once again become suitable for production. If the
information necessary to produce these crops well survived the multigenerational
migration through the rainforest, then there should be no reduction in migration
speed leaving the rainforest, as migrants should be well prepared for the agricultural
environment in southern Africa.
ĉe speciėcation used to test this hypothesis is:
Frontierct = βƤ + βƥSouthRoutec  Postt + βƦSouthRoutec + βƧPostt + Γc + ε (Ǌ.ǉ)
c is a cell and t is a unit of time. Post refers to the second period of any two-period
panel analyzed. So for example, we look for a decrease in migration speed upon
entering the rainforest between year Ǌǈǈ-ǌǈǈC.E., and construct a dataset of
population by cell which includes year Ǌǈǈ and ǌǈǈ. Post refers to observations taking
place at year ǌǈǈ in this case.
ĉe outcome Frontiermeasures whether a geographic cell belongs to the migration
frontier, and if so, takes the distance of this cell from the Bantu homeland. ĉe
frontier is deėned as any cell with hunter/gatherer density in the ‘before’ period, and
seĨler level population density in the ‘post’ period. βƥ therefore measures the
diﬀerential in migration speed in km=ƦƤƤyears, with faster migration speeds.
Table Ǌ.Ǐ.Ǌ shows the speed of the migration frontier throughout time in km/Ǌǈǈ
Ǌǎ
years. ĉe individual estimates are less informative than the paĨern formed by the
estimates, which is most easily seen in ėgure Ǌ.Ǎ.ǉ. ĉere must be drop in migration
speed both entering and exiting the rainforest for the results to be consistent with the
hypothesis that axis orientation is important for information Ěow.
ĉe top and boĨom panels of ėgure Ǌ.Ǎ.ǉ use diﬀerent datasets but also produce
very similar paĨerns. ĉe Klein Goldewijk, Beusen, and Janssen data shows the
migration into the rainforest occurring about ǉǈǈ years earlier than theMcEvedy and
Jones data, in both cases there is a drop in migration speed within the ǉC.E.-ǋǈǈC.E.
time range that iron working is known to have arrived in the Bantu homeland. ĉis
implies that there was an adaptation period where dry-crops were phased out, as
described in the history literature. In both cases there is complete convergence until
ǉǈǈǈA.D.ĉis is also important as it rules out the possibility that migration was
slower in the rainforest simply because it was inherently more diﬃcult to navigate.
ĉe panels on the right show the change in migration speeds exiting the rainforest
for the north-south migrants relative to the east-west migrants. ĉere is a second drop
in migration speed at the time the migration frontier is known to have exited the
rainforest, although convergence occurs much faster in the Klein, Goldewijk, Beusen
and Janssen data. ĉe decline in speed upon exiting the rainforest is signiėcant in
both datasets.
ĉis general trend can also be seen in table Ǌ.Ǐ.Ǌ. Migration speeds dropped by
between ǉ-ǌkm per year upon entering the rainforest (column(Ǌ)), small but
signiėcant eﬀects. Upon exiting the rainforest, speeds dropped again, but by less. ĉe
speed of the frontier declined by roughly ǉ/ǌ to ǉ/Ǌ a km per year exiting the
rainforest (column (ǎ)-(Ǐ)). ĉis is consistent with Diamond’s axis orientation
theory, suggesting that information on how to produce dry-crops was beĨer retained
along the east-west axis than along the north-south axis.
ǊǏ
HĽňŉŃŇĽķĵŀ Lĵłĸ UňĹ: PĵňŉŊŇĹ Lĵłĸ
Of course, the migration speed paĨerns represent a very indirect measure of
information and likely contain considerable measurement error. So we test the same
hypothesis using a diﬀerent measure: land devoted to livestock. Livestock is not kept
in the rainforest with the same frequency as just outside the rainforest because of the
tsetse Ěy. It has the advantage of more directly reĚecting information through actual
agricultural practices. We expect that upon exiting the rainforest there is still less land
devoted to livestock, if the knowledge of how to keep livestock was not maintained
during rainforest migration.
Land devoted to livestock is available every century starting in ǉǍǈǈC.E., so we can
test whether livestock was less used by the north-south migrants than the east-west
ones at the time seĨlement ended. Additionally, we can begin to examine whether
there was a catch-up in knowledge once east-west migrants and north-south migrants
were neighbours again. Aěer seĨlement ended, information on how to keep livestock
was available from neighbours of north-south migrants, and under constant and
exogenous cost of adoption we would expect immediate catch-up. Under endogenous
barriers to adoption based on cultural factors, immediate catch-up is not necessary.
To test these hypotheses, we rely on the following empirical speciėcation:
Livestockij =βƤ + βƥBantu  Southij + βƦBantuij + βƧLandQualityij (Ǌ.Ǌ)
+ ΓSuitabilityFE+ τj + θf(Coordinates) + εij
Subscript j denotes regions and i denotes cells. βƥ is the variable of interest,
providing an estimate of historical livestock production for the rainforest Bantu
relative to the non-rainforest Bantu. If knowledge of livestock was less successfully
transmiĨed along the north-south axis, then βƥ < Ƥ at least for the year ǉǍǈǈC.E. If
Ǌǐ
the rainforest migrants failed to re-acquire the information about keeping livestock,
even when it was available from their neighbours, we should expect βƥ < Ƥ for the
years ǉǎǈǈC.E., ǉǏǈǈC.E. and ǉǐǈǈC.E. as well.
Table Ǌ.Ǐ.Ǎ shows estimates of the adoption of livestock over time by the southern
migrating Bantu. Less livestock is used by southern Bantu, consistent with previous
estimates using contemporary data. ĉe eﬀect is remarkably stable. In fact the
estimates slightly decrease over time - though there is no statistically signiėcant
diﬀerence in any of the ǌ estimates. ĉe estimate in column (ǉ) of table Ǌ.Ǐ.Ǎ is
consistent with Diamond’s conceptual contribution, while the stability of the
estimates in columns (Ǌ)-(ǌ) suggests permanently low information acquisition.
Permanently low acquisition is possible when language and cultural barriers are
endogenous to information Ěows, but it requires a combination of few neighbours, a
high heterogeneity in historical environment and diﬃcult assimilation.
One concern with this result is that the livestock data relies on modelling by
geographers, and based on anthropological ėndings. It is possible therefore, that very
few anthropological ėndings dating to between the ǉǎth and ǉǑth centuries is
interpreted by modellers as liĨle progress. Because of this, the estimate in column (ǉ)
which refers to livestock in ǉǍǈǈC.E. is taken more seriously than the dynamics.
However the implications of the stability of the estimates is not ignored. We
investigate the possibility of permanently low adoption further in the sext section.
Ǌ.Ǎ.Ǌ PĹŇŁĵłĹłķĹ Ńĺ LŃŌ AĸŃńŉĽŃł
We now turn to the possibility that information acquisition was permanently
impaired by the low information transmission associated with rainforest migration.
Again, two diﬀerent approaches are taken.
First we look at the current production of crops using GIS satellite data of southern
ǊǑ
Africa. We look at diﬀerences between dry and wet crops that are traditional to Africa
to get test whether any lost information of dry crop production was ever re-acquired.
We also examine the crops introduced through the slave trade. We expect diﬀerent
adoption paĨerns between these crop types to conėrm the permanently low adoption
hypothesis, and the two crop types taken together allow us to rule out competing
explanations.
Next we examine the introduction of Maize much more closely. ĉe introduction
of Maize was a signiėcant technological shock to southern Africa as it is now one of
the most frequently grown crops in the region. We look at diﬀerential increases in
land devoted to agriculture in regions seĨled by migrants along each route. If the
availability of information about Maize did not increase the fraction of land devoted
to agriculture, even controlling for the suitability of maize and all of its substitutes and
compliments, then this information was unlikely to have been acquired. In this case
the implication is that there is a deėciency in the general acquisition of new
information associated with a north-south axis. ĉis prediction follows from costs to
acquiring information being endogenous to the eﬃciency of information diﬀusion,
but not otherwise.
CŊŇŇĹłŉ PŇŃĸŊķŉĽŃł Ńĺ CŇŃńň
We examine whether the information about the seemingly lost knowledge of dry
crops among north-south migrants ever caught up to that of their neighbours, the
east-west migrants. ĉe issue is theoretically ambiguous, but a failure to catch-up is
not possible under exogenous costs of information acquisition. To separate diﬀerent
possible mechanisms we investigate three crop types.
ĉe three crop types are: (ǉ) dry-traditional crops which can not be produced in
the rainforest, and would have had to be readopted by rainforest migrants in southern
ǋǈ
Africa. (Ǌ)Wet-traditional crops which were produced in the rainforest and would
not have had to be readopted by rainforest migrants. ĉis falsiėcation test helps to
rule out alternate explanations like selection on ability. (ǋ) New world crops, which
were introduced aěer the Bantu seĨlement, and which would have had to have been
adopted by all Bantu migrants regardless of migration route.
ĉis third group is helpful in ruling out alternate explanations like endogenously
changing tastes, since tastes had not been acquired for any of the new crops by either
group. It also helps to rule out selection into migration route based on wet-crop
comparative advantage - since we expect diﬀerences in the production of both the wet
and dry new world crops, not just the dry crops.
Groups are compared south of the rainforest⁹ in a diﬀerence-in diﬀerences
speciėcation.
log(CropProduction)ij =βƤ + βƥBantu  Southij + βƦBantuij + βƧLandQualityij
(Ǌ.ǋ)
+ ΓSuitabilityFE+ τj + θf(Coordinates) + εij
Subscript j denotes regions and i denotes cells. βƥ is the variable of interest,
providing an estimate of the relative production of each crop by those whose
ancestors migrated through the rainforest to those whose ancestors migrated around
it. If knowledge of dry-traditional crops failed to be re-adopted by the rainforest
migrants, then βƥ < Ƥ for all dry crops, but none of the wet ones. We also consider
NewWorld Crops. For these, all crops, wet or dry, are expected to produce an
estimate of βƥ < Ƥ. ĉis would indicate that migration through the rainforest caused a
change in the way societies learn about cropping techniques.
⁹below ǑS
ǋǉ
βƦ diﬀerentiates between Bantu of either type from the other groups in the region.
βƧ estimates the impact of land quality. ĉis is important because the measure of
agricultural output is the percentage of a cell devoted to cropping any particular crop.
It shouldn’t be the case that lower productivity of some crops is due to less of all crops
being produced in the cell. ĉe land quality controls for this general level of
suitability for agriculture. Γ estimates a vector of suitability ėxed eﬀects. ĉis is
diﬀerent from the more general land quality measure because it provides the
suitability for each crop speciėcally rather than the suitability for general agricultural
output. τ is a vector estimating the regional ėxed eﬀects included in the speciėcation
which ensure that contextual factors like institutions or infrastructure¹⁰ are the same
between comparison groups. It also further ensures that comparisons are made
between societies on similar land. θ controls for the eﬀect of latitude and longitude.
Table Ǌ.Ǐ.ǌ presents the relationship between migration and cropping paĨerns split
by crop type. In panels A and B crops traditional to the Bantu homeland are
considered. Panel C and D considers NewWorld crops introduced through the slave
trade.
ĉe results between panels A, C, and D are not substantially diﬀerent. In Panel A,
the largest eﬀect can be seen in column (ǉ) which shows that the combined eﬀect of
knowledge loss and ineﬃcient re-adoption accounts for a ǋǍƻ gap in current sorghum
production. In panel C, the largest eﬀect is on maize, which is about ǋǊƻ less
produced by those whose ancestors migrated through the rainforest. Considering the
other crops, table Ǌ.Ǐ.ǌ shows that every crop that had to be adopted at some point
throughout southern Bantu history is less produced for descendants of southern
relative to eastern migrants. ĉe eﬀect ranges from less than ǉƻ (wheat) to ǋǍƻ
(sorghum).
¹⁰transport costs, etc.
ǋǊ
ĉe placebo wet-traditional crops in panel B are also important as they can rule out
some alternate explanations. For example, it seems unlikely that south migrating
farmers have smaller plots, or are of lower general agricultural ability based on the fact
that wet crop farmers are equally productive between migration routes. It also
demonstrates that the results aren’t driven by imperfect suitability controls. All
estimates are positive, but not signiėcant. Magnitudes are much smaller than the ǋǍƻ
gap estimated for some other crops, but still, diﬀerences in rice and oil palm are
slightly less than Ǎƻ. ĉis isn’t surprising, as some substitution should be expected.
While north-south societies produce less of every crop that required adoption the do
not produce less of any crop not requiring adoption.
HĽňŉŃŇĽķĵŀ Lĵłĸ UňĹ: TļĹ IŁńĵķŉ ŃĺMĵĽŐĹ
One of the ways that we demonstrate the general nature of the consequences of the
low information diﬀusion along the north-south axis is to look at the eﬀect on the
adoption of information which was not impacted by the north-south axis. ĉis was
the spirit of the investigation of NewWorld crops above, and here we look in more
detail at one of those crops, using a diﬀerent source of data.
We analyze whether there was a relative change in the allocation of land to crop
production around the time of the introduction of maize to southern Africa. Maize
increased the proėtability of crop production in general, and any societies exposed to
the new crop would have allocated more resources to agriculture. If east-west
societies were beĨer able to adopt new information in general, this would have led to a
higher increase in allocation to crop land for those who migrated around the
rainforest than for those who migrated through the rainforest.
ĉe history literature places the introduction of maize to southern Africa¹¹, the
¹¹Evidence exists on the time it was introduced to the Cape regions
ǋǋ
most widely produced of the new world crops, at sometime between the mid to late
ǉǎth century and the early to mid ǉǏth century. ĉese two centuries were used as the
treatment periods while the next two centuries were used as a placebo. Nomajor
shocks to agricultural productivity occurred during these centuries, so there should
be no reason to see a relative diﬀerence in the growth or contraction of land allocated
to crops.
ĉe hypothesis is tested with the following model:
LandUseit = βƤ + βƥBantuSouth  Post+ βƦBantusouth+ βƧBantu+ γt + εit (Ǌ.ǌ)
If the descendants of eastern migrating Bantu were more likely to adopt New
World crops, the expectation should be that βƥ < Ƥ for the ǉǎth and ǉǏth centuries,
but not for other centuries. If southern migrating Bantu were more likely to adopt
NewWorld crops, βƥ > Ƥ and if they were equally likely, βƥ = Ƥ.
Table Ǌ.Ǐ.ǌ shows that south migrating Bantu increased their crop use by Ǌǌƻ less
than as eastern migrating Bantu aěer the introduction of maize (columns (ǉ) and
(Ǌ)). ĉe estimate is similar to contemporary estimates which are between Ǎ-ǋǈƻ
(Table Ǌ.Ǐ.ǌ). Historically, knowledge acquisition among the descendants of
southern migrating Bantu failed to adopt new technologies.
Ǌ.Ǎ.ǋ CŊŀŉŊŇĵŀ IňŃŀĵŉĽŃł, GĹŃĻŇĵńļĽķ IňŃŀĵŉĽŃł ĵłĸ PĹŇňĽňŉĹłķĹ
We’ve seen that a north-south axis seems to have led to a failure of the full diﬀusion of
information, and that this eﬀect has had long lasting implications for the acquisition
of all types of information. It has been argued that the mechanism driving the
generality of the eﬀect is the increase in isolation, endogenously arising from low
incentive to maintain relationships with other societies.
We now present evidence consistent with this argument. We show ėrst that
ǋǌ
language barriers between societies are larger for those whose ancestors migrated
through the rainforest. ĉe conceptual framework predicts that an increase in cultural
isolation should be correlated with an increase in geographic isolation as well (v in the
model). We therefore test the evolution of both cultural and geographic isolation
resulting from poor information diﬀusion. We ėnd evidence which supports the
theoretical prediction that geographical and cultural isolation are correlated.
ĉe evidence suggesting endogenous geographic isolation provides an explanation
for why the linguistic barriers have not been eroded over time. On the other hand
though, because both geographic and cultural isolation seem endogenous to
information diﬀusion, it means that neither can be identiėed separately from the
other. We conclude that isolation, in general, is responsible for the persistence of the
impaired ability of rainforest migrant descendants to adopt new information.
AŎĽň OŇĽĹłŉĵŉĽŃł ĵłĸ LĽłĻŊĽňŉĽķ IňŃŀĵŉĽŃł
First we provide some evidence that language barriers are greater for societies with a
history of rainforest migration. We use the same model as before, now to test the
eﬀect of axis orientation on our measure of linguistic isolation. We interpret a society
without any languages that are similar to it as one that has experienced substantial
cultural driě, and one with a high cost of acquiring information from other societies.
In this way, our measure of linguistic isolation represents the variable c from the
conceptual framework. Recall that the endogeneity of cwas necessary to generate the
permanence of the axis orientation eﬀect.
As a direct test of whether c is endogenous to information Ěows and axis
ǋǍ
orientation, we use the following speciėcation:
LinguisticIsolationij =βƤ + βƥBantu  Southij + βƦBantuij + βƧLandQualityij (Ǌ.Ǎ)
+ ΓSuitabilityFE+ τj + θf(Coordinates) + εij
ĉemodel is the same as in previous tables, with βƥ representing the diﬀerential
eﬀect of axis orientation on language barriers. ĉe estimate can be interpreted as the
eﬀect of axis orientation on the number of other societies with whom a linguistic
similarity was maintained.
ĉe results are found in table Ǌ.Ǐ.ǎ. We ėnd that on average a north-south axis
orientation results in maintaining communication with ǋ fewer societies. ĉemean
number of connections is ǎ.ǌǍ and the standard deviation is ǋ.ǌǉ. So a North-South
axis represents nearly half of a standard deviation in linguistic isolation. ĉis is an
economically meaningful eﬀect, and one that is consistent with the large estimates on
agricultural productivity.
AŎĽň OŇĽĹłŉĵŉĽŃł ĵłĸ GĹŃĻŇĵńļĽķ IňŃŀĵŉĽŃł
One remaining question is why did language barriers develop when information Ěows
decreased, but did not erode aěer seĨlement in the south, when information became
available again? ĉe conceptual framework suggests one possible answer, the
endogeneity of geographic isolation. In the case of the Bantu, who were constantly
choosing new seĨlements, it is reasonable to think that their selection of land to seĨle
was inĚuenced by both their their cultural isolation and their expected future beneėt
of new information. Reducing geographic isolation becomes less aĨractive because
cultural isolation is high and there is liĨle incentive to invest in reducing cultural
isolation because geographic isolation is high. Societies are stuck in an isolated
ǋǎ
equilibrium which reduces the acquisition of new information.
To test this we look at seĨlement locations chosen by southern and eastern
migrants in southern Africa. We expect that southern migrants will be more likely to
seĨle on land that is similar to their what they know how to do, so we expect them to
seĨle on land more similar to the rainforest. On the other hand, this land is not
particularly valuable to the eastern migrants, so if these selection mechanisms are
taking place, we expect that the distance to dry-crop information is increased for
southern migrants relative to what it would otherwise would be.
To test this hypothesis, we develop an index of similarity of a piece of land to the
rainforest. ĉe index is:
Indexi = ƪƨ 
ƬX
i
(suitic   suitcr) (Ǌ.ǎ)
Where ic represents suitability of crop c in cell i, and cr denotes the suitability of
crop c in a rainforest cell. ĉe index takes the maximum value of the second term, ǎǌ,
and subtracts from that the sum of the diﬀerence between the suitability of any crop in
the cell of interest from the average suitability of that same crop in the rainforest. ĉis
provides a measure of the diﬀerence of any given cell to the average rainforest cell. To
facilitate interpretation by avoiding the diﬃculties in interpreting estimates based on
an arbitrarily scaled index, the variable included in regressions is an indicator taking a
value of ǉ when the index is above it median, and a value of ǈ otherwise¹².
ĉis index is included in a slightly diﬀerent diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciėcation
¹²ĉe speciėcation was tested as a binary and a continuous variable, and it makes liĨle diﬀerence
to the precision of the estimates.
ǋǏ
to what has previously been used.
Popi =βƤ + βƥSouthRoutei  Indexi + βƦBantuxSouth+ βƧIndexi (Ǌ.Ǐ)
+ βƧBantui + βƨLandQualityi + ΥSuitabilityFE+ θf(Coordinates) + εi
βƥ > Ƥ is still the variable of interest. ĉemodel provides an estimate of the
diﬀerence in population between those with and without a rainforest history, on land
which is similar to the rainforest. Because those who migrated through the rainforest
knowmore about land similar to the rainforest, they should be able to support a
higher population when they seĨle on that type of land. Each of the other controls is
the same as before. Land quality is a general suitability for agriculture variable,
suitabilityFE gives a Ěexible control for crop speciėc suitability, and latitude and
longitude coordinates are included Ěexibly.
Using population data and theMurdock map we can verify the prediction that
sorting on land took place according to the agricultural knowledge at the time. If the
southern migrating Bantu were more likely to seĨle on land similar to the rainforest,
and had higher population growth on the land, it indicates that a knowledge gap
existed historically, and this knowledge gap generated diﬀerences in geographic
isolation.
Table ǌ.ǎ.ǐ shows the results for both the Klein Goldewijk, Beusen, and Janssen
data and theMcEvedy and Jones data. Both datasets produce consistent estimates.
Migrants with skills suited for rainforest crops were more likely to seĨle on this land
than eastern migrants who hadmore diversity in production skills. Southern migrants
were Ǒƻmore likely to seĨle on land that was similar to the rainforest. By the end of
the Bantu seĨlement of southern Africa there were about ǋ.ǎ times more southern
migrants in areas similar to the rainforest than eastern migrants.
ǋǐ
ĉe draw to this type of land seems to have reduced the number of eastern
neighbours encountered by southern migrants, which may have prevented
communication and assimilation to take place. As suggested by the conceptual
framework, the reduced information diﬀusion along the north-south axis impacted
several dimensions of isolation, which combined, reduced incentives to acquire new
information. As a result, the descendants of southern migrating Bantu have not
acquired new information, throughout history, with the same regularity as
descendants of eastern migrating Bantu.
Ǌ.ǎ RŃĶŊňŉłĹňň ĵłĸ AŀŉĹŇłĵŉĹ EŎńŀĵłĵŉĽŃłň
TĵňŉĹň ĵłĸNŊŉŇĽŉĽŃł
One alternate explanation for diﬀerent crops being produced by diﬀerent societies
may be based on tastes. Atkin (Ǌǈǉǋ) provides evidence that Indian farmers consume
fewer calories per rupee because of a cultural preference for certain foods. In the
Bantu context, it could be that dry-traditional crops are ineﬃciently produced
because of a cultural preference for wet-traditional crops rather than an inability to
adopt new crops. ĉis argument does not hold for the NewWorld crops however.
ĉere could not have been a cultural preference for these crops since all societies were
introduced to them at the same time.
Furthermore, both the eastern and southern migrants would be substituting away
from a crop that they had developed tastes for. ĉe substitutions in most cases were
more costly for the non-rainforest migrants. As an example, consider the introduction
of wheat, which is a NewWorld crop that was less heavily by rainforest migrants.
Wheat, nutritionally, is a substitute for sorghum and rice. However, sorghum has
signiėcantly more nutritional advantages over wheat than rice does, and would
ǋǑ
therefore have been costlier for non-rainforest migrants to switch based on nutritional
proėle. ĉe only advantage that rice has over sorghum is that protein from rice is of
higher quality, although this beneėt is eliminated once rice is cooked, and is fairly
insigniėcant since each of rice, wheat and sorghum are very poor protein sources.
Sorghum contains the highest levels of fat, and has far more calories per cup (ǎǍǈ
sorghum; ǊǍǈ rice; ǎǈǈ wheat¹³).
IłňŉĽŉŊŉĽŃłň
Another alternate explanation is that precolonial institutions may be related to
geographic environment, and may have changed diﬀerentially for the two migration
branches. However, institutions are also clearly related to culture, and we might
expect more insular cultures to have more insular political institutions. Both of these
hypotheses can be tested. Precolonial institution data is available fromMurdock
(ǉǑǍǑ). Data exists on institutional hierarchy at, and beyond, the local level, as well as
on property rights. If cultural isolation changed institutions but nothing else did, we
expect that political institutions beyond the local level will be smaller, but that
property rights and hierarchy at the local level will be unchanged.
To test this the main speciėcation used in equation (ǉ) was applied to the ǎ
diﬀerent outcomes: jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local level; jurisdictional
hierarchy at the local level, property rights (general), land rights, moveable asset
rights and inheritance norms. Only the ėrst of the ǎ can be considered a part of the
‘insular culture’ mechanism. ĉe rest act as a falsiėcation test.
ĉe ėrst robustness check is on the cultural connectedness measure. It is a novel
measure, so it should be shown that it is consistent with other measures that might
typically used in its place. It is reasonable to expect cultural isolation to result in a
¹³nutritional information from wolframalpha.com accessed August Ǌǉ, Ǌǈǉǋ
ǌǈ
speciėc set of political institutions. Low levels of hierarchy will exist outside of the
locality when migration is low, and interaction with other societies is limited.
However, hierarchy within the locality should not be impacted by this cultural
change. Migration through the rainforest will be associated with lowered hierarchy
beyond the local level, but not at the local level if cultural isolation increased
throughout migration.
At the same time other institutions should not have been altered by migration
through the rainforest. ĉemost concerning institutional diﬀerence which would
plausibly impact productivity and knowledge adoption is property rights. Low land
rights would limit the incentive to make investments in the productivity of the land,
and this could include investment in knowledge acquisition.
ĉe results are presented in table Ǌ.Ǐ.ǐ and Ǌ.Ǐ.Ǒ. Estimates show that jurisdictional
hierarchies are less developed beyond the local level, but not at the local level in
societies with rainforest histories. ĉe falsiėcation test results are presented in table
Ǌ.Ǐ.Ǒ. Each of the estimates is close to ǈ and insigniėcant, meaning that property
rights were unaﬀected by rainforest migration.
OķķŊńĵŉĽŃł
One robustness check on the ineﬃcient adoption hypothesis is that if agriculture is
ineﬃcient for one migration branch, it should be true that these people substitute
away from the agricultural industry over time. ĉis can be tested for a subset of
countries using the DHS.
ĉeDHS is used to determine the occupations of individuals of various ethnicities.
In each case the most recent version was used, the dates of the surveys range from
ǉǑǐǐ to Ǌǈǈǎ. Seven surveys from southern Africa (south of the rainforest) were
combined: Malawi, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Lesotho. South
ǌǉ
Africa was not used because one of the required variables was missing. Unfortunately
many of the controls previously available are not available here because the DHS is
not always geocoded. Because of this the speciėcation is extremely basic, and should
be considered only as a suggestive, supporting piece of evidence to that above. A
binary dependent variable for agricultural occupation is analyzed in the following
speciėcation.
AgrOccupation = βƤ + βƥBantu+ βƦBantu  South+ ΓCountryFE+ ε (Ǌ.ǐ)
Here, βƦ is the variable of interest. ĉe expectation is that if the previously
identiėed barriers to adoption existed, there would be diﬀerential exit from the
agricultural sector among southern migrants. ĉe results can be found in table Ǌ.Ǐ.ǉǈ.
ĉe results indicate that Bantu speakers with a rainforest history are about Ǌƻ less
likely to become agriculturalists than Bantu speakers whose ancestors went around
the rainforest. ĉis is consistent with the previous results, using a diﬀerent dataset
and suggests at least some of the eﬀect seen previously is due to extensive margin
diﬀerences.
SĹŀĹķŉĽŃł ŃłUłŃĶňĹŇŋĵĶŀĹň
ĉe issue of conditional random allocation of migrants to southern migration and
eastern migration is critical. ĉe view of the history literature is that selection did not
take place, but the issue has not been examined formally.
To do this we look at the Altonji et al. (ǊǈǈǍ) method of assessing selection on
unobservables using selection on observables. ĉe intuition behind the test is to
measure how strong the selection on unobservables must be relative to the selection
on observables in order to explain away the eﬀects. ĉis strategy relies on a
comparison between a regression run with potentially confounding factors controlled
ǌǊ
for, and one without.
Let βc denote the estimate with controls, and βnc denote the estimate without
controls. ĉe Altonji ratio is jβc=(βnc   βc)j. When selection on observables does not
signiėcantly impact the estimate, the denominator is small, increasing the ratio.
When the estimate itself is large, the ratio is large, because the numerator is large. ĉe
smaller is the impact of observables on the estimate, the larger the impact of
unobservables has to be to reduce the eﬀect. ĉe larger the estimate itself, the larger
the pull of selection needs to be to reduce the eﬀect to ǈ. ĉe rule of thumb outlined
in Nunn andWantchekon (ǊǈǉǊ) is that any ratio above ǉ is acceptable, as it indicates
that selection on unobservables must be larger than selection on observables in order
to explain the eﬀect. Of course this depends on the explanatory power of the
observables, but in our case, given our abundance of soil and climactic data, this
seems reasonable.
Table Ǌ.Ǐ.ǉǉ shows the ratios of each of the main estimates. ĉe ‘full’ speciėcation
is the same regression as in table Ǌ.Ǐ.ǌ while the ‘restricted’ speciėcation drops the
controls for land quality, index of similarity to the rainforest, and all of the FAO crop
speciėc suitability ėxed eﬀects. Only the variable of interest (Bantu x South), the
Bantu term and the latitude and longitude controls remain¹⁴. For every estimate in
which there was a precise result in the full speciėcation, the Altonji ratio is well above
the rule of thumb number of one, indicating that there is liĨle concern that selection
on unobservables is driving the result.
MĹĵňŊŇĹŁĹłŉ EŇŇŃŇ ĵłĸ AŀŉĹŇłĵŉĽŋĹ DĵŉĵňĹŉň
ĉemain evidence uses the best available data, but in many cases the best available
data is still questionable. ĉeMcEvedy and Jones data has been criticized on a
¹⁴removing the latitude and longitude controls makes liĨle diﬀerence
ǌǋ
number of dimensions. ĉe production data is based on remote sensing images which
are known to have a diﬃcult time identifying some crops, especially when
intercropped, and is almost certainly subject to some measurement error. While in
each case, classical measurement error would work against the ėndings, not with
them, it is still prudent to test the robustness of the ėndings with other sources of
data. Because the robustness checks are themselves using even worse data (otherwise
they would be presented as the main results) these results should not be considered in
isolation, but solely as a check that the paĨerns in the main estimates are not due to
measurement error.
ĉe robustness check used the Afrobarometer data. ĉe entire Afrobarometer was
geocoded, and matched to an alternative source of crop production data, You et al.
(Ǌǈǈǎ). ĉe unit of observation for this test was at the individual level. A seĨlement
group was assigned to the observation based on the language spoken by the
respondent in the Afrobarometer survey. All respondents in the same village were
assigned to the same You et al. (Ǌǈǈǎ) cell, so all analyses were clustered at the village
level.
ĉere are a number of advantages and disadvantages to this approach over the
estimates used in the main results. First, information exists on individual farmers, so
additional individual level controls became available. ĉese included gender,
education, exposure to the slave trade (taken fromNunn who also uses the
Afrobarometer) and age. ĉe ability to control for formal education was perhaps the
main advantage. A number of other controls were added to this framework, to control
for other potential explanations in the literature. Unfortunately data on every crop
used in the main analysis was not available, so instead the main, or second to main,
crop from each category was used as a representative. For dry-traditional crops,
sorghum was used; rice was used for wet-traditional; maize was used to represent the
ǌǌ
dry recently introduced crops, and groundnut was used for the wet-recent crops.
Table Ǌ.Ǐ.ǉǊ shows the results of this robustness check. ĉe traditional dry-crop,
sorghum, is still signiėcantly less produced by individuals whose ancestors migrated
south. Each of the two recently introduced crops are signiėcantly less produced as
well, while the rice estimate is statistically insigniėcant and close to ǈ. ĉis general
paĨern is very similar to the results found in the main analysis.
ĉis robustness check also reassures that the main results are not driven by recent
migration. It might have initially been worrisome that precolonial seĨlement data was
being matched with current production data. ĉe concern may have been that initial
seĨlement was basically used as an exogenous proxy for current location, however no
correlation between the two could be shown. Using survey data alleviates this
concern, as it examines the current location of respondents rather than their historic
seĨlement. ĉere are pros and cons to this choice however. Current location is a
choice variable of the individuals currently producing, so this leaves the estimates
more open to selection criticisms. ĉe initial seĨlement location is arguably a beĨer
measure to use as it is outside the control of current producers and so it suﬀers from
fewer endogeneity issues.
Ǌ.Ǐ DĽňķŊňňĽŃł ĵłĸCŃłķŀŊňĽŃł
ĉis paper investigates the key insight made by Jared Diamond with respect to
information diﬀusion between societies, as well as some of the conceptual
implications of the assumption. We ėnd support for the idea that a north-south axis
impairs information Ěows. We also ėnd evidence that the low information acquisition
is permanent, with evidence supporting the hypothesis that a north-south axis is
associated with an increase in language barriers as well as an increase in geographic
isolation, both of which make acquiring information from other societies more
ǌǍ
diﬃcult.
We make three main claims. First, a north-south dominant axis impairs
information diﬀusion. Second, information acquisition does not immediately
recover, even when information becomes available. ĉird, the reason for the long
lasting eﬀect is the endogeneity of isolation: when the incentives to acquire new
information is reduced, societies becomemore isolated which increases the costs of
acquiring new information in the future.
ĉese ėndings are important for our understanding of how information Ěows
between societies. In particular the endogeneity of isolation to the eﬃciency of
information diﬀusion has direct policy implications. Under exogenous costs of
acquiring information, we would conclude that the only barrier to increasing
technology adoption between societies is the availability of information. However,
these results suggest that this isn’t the case. Societies with a history of unavailable
information may need additional incentives to adopt new information to account for
the larger language barriers they are likely to face. In other words, a history of
ineﬃcient information diﬀusion reduces the net beneėt of new information.
We conclude that between-society information diﬀusion can have large impacts on
productivity. But eﬀorts to reduce both geographic and cultural isolation are likely
more promising avenues for increasing technology adoption between some societies
than policies aimed solely at increasing technological visibility or discovery.
ǌǎ
TĵĶŀĹň
Table 2.7.1: Summary Statistics
VARIABLES Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum
PANEL A: Population (people per cell)
Population ǈ Ǌ.Ǐǎ Ǎ.ǎǊ ǈ ǉǊǏ.Ǒǈ
Population Ǌǈǈ Ǎ.Ǐǐ Ǒ.ǋǐ ǈ ǉǍǍ.ǋǊ
Population ǌǈǈ ǐ.ǐǍ ǉǌ.ǏǑ ǈ ǉǏǈ.ǌǎ
Population ǎǈǈ ǉǊ.ǉǐ Ǌǈ.ǐǈ ǈ ǊǍǋ.ǑǊ
Population ǐǈǈ ǉǎ.ǉǐ ǊǏ.ǋǊ ǈ ǋǋǏ.Ǌǐ
Population ǉǈǈǈ ǉǑ.ǍǍ ǋǋ.Ǎǐ ǈ ǌǊǉ.ǋǍ
Population ǉǉǈǈ Ǌǌ.ǌǏ ǌǈ.ǎǈ ǈ Ǎǉǈ.ǌǐ
Population ǉǊǈǈ Ǌǐ.ǏǍ ǌǏ.ǎǉ ǈ ǎǈǈ.ǉǌ
Population ǉǋǈǈ ǋǋ.Ǌǎ Ǎǌ.ǎǎ ǈ ǎǐǑ.Ǐǋ
Population ǉǌǈǈ ǋǐ.ǋǉ ǎǉ.Ǐǈ ǈ ǏǏǑ.ǉǍ
Population ǉǍǈǈ ǌǋ.ǋǑ ǎǐ.ǐǈ ǈ ǐǎǐ.ǎǋ
PANEL B: Crop Production (percentage of cell devoted to production)
Maize Ǌ.ǈǐ ǌ.ǉǏ ǈ ǌǉ.ǌ
Sorghum&Millet .ǎǎ ǉ.ǎǎ ǈ Ǌǋ.ǑǍ
Cassava .Ǎǉ ǉ.ǉǌ ǈ ǉǈ.ǐǏ
Groundnut .Ǌǉ .ǌǊ ǈ ǋ.ǌǍ
Rice .Ǌǈ .ǐǎ ǈ ǉǌ.ǎǈ
CoĨon .ǉǍ .ǋǍ ǈ ǋ.ǐǈ
SunĚowers .ǉǍ .ǌǉ ǈ Ǎ.ǉǈ
Pulses .ǉǋ .ǋǈ ǈ ǌ.ǉǈ
Oil Palm .ǈǐǑ .ǋǋ ǈ Ǐ.Ǒǈ
Soybean .ǈǋǑ .ǉǈ ǈ .Ǒǈ
Sugarcane .ǈǈǑǊ .ǈǍ ǈ ǉ.ǈ
Population statistics are for Bantu regions only. Crop production statistics are for the southern region of Africa (south of -Ǒ degrees
latitude)
ǌǏ
Table 2.7.2: Diﬀerences in the Speed of the Migration Frontier by Route (in km/200 years)
Panel A: Klein Goldewijk, Beusen, and Janssen Data
ǉǈǈǈb.c.-ǈ ǈ-ǉǈǈ ǉǈǈ-Ǌǈǈ Ǌǈǈ-ǌǈǈ ǎǈǈ-ǐǈǈ ǐǈǈ-ǉǈǈǈ ǉǈǈǈ-ǉǊǈǈ
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ) (Ǎ) (ǎ) (Ǐ)
Post x South -ǉǎ.ǐǌǍ -Ǌǈǋ.ǍǑǋ** ǉǉǏ.ǐǏǊ -ǉǋ.ǋǌǌ -ǋǊ.ǏǌǊ -ǎǐ.ǌǈǐ -Ǐǋ.ǈǌǌ**
(ǉǌ.ǏǌǍ) (ǉǈǉ.ǐǐǏ) (ǉǈǋ.ǉǉǌ) (ǌǏ.ǈǏǎ) (ǋǎ.ǈǑǌ) (ǌǊ.ǊǏǉ) (ǋǉ.ǋǑǌ)
R-squared ǈ.ǈǉǐǍ ǈ.ǈǊǊǎ ǈ.ǈǈǌǏ ǈ.ǈǈǎǉ ǈ.ǈǉǊǈ ǈ.ǈǋǊǏ ǈ.ǈǎǋǐ
Panel B: McEvedy and Jones Data
ǈ-Ǌǈǈ Ǌǈǈ-ǌǈǈ ǌǈǈ-ǎǈǈ ǎǈǈ-ǐǈǈ ǐǈǈ-ǉǈǈǈ ǉǈǈǈ-ǉǊǈǈ ǉǊǈǈ-ǉǌǈǈ
Post x South -ǌǑ.ǌǎ -ǐǏǋ.Ǐ*** -ǎǐ.ǌǏ*** -Ǌ.ǉǉ -Ǌ.ǋǋ -ǋǏ.ǎǌ** -ǌǊ.Ǎǈ***
(ǌǏ.ǎǑ) (ǉǏǐ.Ǐ) (ǊǊ.ǋǐ) (ǉǋ.Ǐǌ) (ǏǍ.ǐǉ) (ǉǎ.ǎǋ) (ǉǍ.ǈǑ)
R-squared ǈ.ǈǎǍ ǈ.ǊǌǏ ǈ.ǈǋǈ ǈ.ǈǉǉ ǈ.ǈǌǋ ǈ.ǈǉǏ ǈ.ǈǉǊ
Observations ǋǑǊǎ ǋǑǊǎ ǋǑǊǎ ǋǑǊǎ ǋǑǊǎ ǋǑǊǎ ǋǑǊǎ
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by region. Migration partition as described in Flight
(ǉǑǐǈ) is used ({ABCHKLR:DEFGMNPS.}). Year dummies and cellFE are also included as
controls.***p<ǈ.ǈǉ,**p<ǈ.ǈǍ,*p<ǈ.ǉ.
Table 2.7.3: Historical Land Use
Panel A: Historical Use of Land for Pasture
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
ǉǍǈǈC.E. ǉǎǈǈC.E. ǉǏǈǈC.E. ǉǐǈǈC.E.
Bantu x South -ǈ.ǎǎǎ** -ǈ.ǎǑǏ*** -ǈ.ǏǊǈ*** -ǈ.Ǐǉǉ**
(ǈ.Ǌǎǌ) (ǈ.ǊǎǍ) (ǈ.Ǌǎǎ) (ǈ.ǊǏǏ)
Bantu ǈ.ǉǐǎ ǈ.Ǌǉǌ ǈ.ǊǊǌ ǈ.ǊǉǏ
(ǈ.ǊǊǏ) (ǈ.ǊǊǐ) (ǈ.Ǌǋǉ) (ǈ.Ǌǌǐ)
Observations ǋǏǎǋ ǋǏǎǋ ǋǏǎǋ ǋǏǎǋ
R-squared ǈ.ǏǌǍ ǈ.ǏǍǌ ǈ.Ǐǎǈ ǈ.ǏǏǍ
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by ǊxǊ region. Migration partition as de-
scribed in Flight (ǉǑǐǈ) is used ({ABCHKLR:DEFGMNPS.}). Dependent vari-
able has been transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Con-
trols include regionFE, crop suitabilityFE, land quality, coordinate polynomials,
similarity to the rainforest, desert and distance to market. Pasture land units are
kmƦ per .Ǎx.Ǎ cell. ***p<ǈ.ǈǉ,**p<ǈ.ǈǍ,*p<ǈ.ǉ.
ǌǐ
Table 2.7.4: Modern Crop Production by Migration Route
Panel A: Dry Crops Traditional to Africa
log(Sorghum) log(CoĨon) log(Barley) log(Wheat)
South x Bantu -ǈ.ǋǌǐ*** -ǈ.ǉǉǉ** -ǈ.ǈǊǈǐ** -ǈ.ǈǈǊǋǑ**
(ǈ.ǈǏǏǈ) (ǈ.ǈǌǎǉ) (ǈ.ǈǈǑǌǐ) (ǈ.ǈǈǈǑǍǈ)
Bantu ǈ.ǈǍǎǌ ǈ.ǈǐǎǐ*** ǈ.ǈǉǍǌ ǈ.ǈǈǉǏǉ
(ǈ.ǈǏǊǋ) (ǈ.ǈǋǈǐ) (ǈ.ǈǉǈǌ) (ǈ.ǈǈǉǈǏ)
Observations ǌǍǊǌ ǌǍǊǌ ǌǍǊǌ ǌǍǊǌ
R-squared ǈ.ǍǌǏ ǈ.ǎǉǋ ǈ.ǌǏǌ ǈ.ǌǏǋ
Panel B: Wet Crops Traditional to Africa
log(Rice) log(Pulses) log(Oil Palm)
South x Bantu ǈ.ǈǈǉǎǉ ǈ.ǈǋǑǌ ǈ.ǈǋǈǑ
(ǈ.ǈǋǌǑ) (ǈ.ǈǋǍǐ) (ǈ.ǈǊǈǑ)
Bantu -ǈ.ǈǈǈǐǈǊ -ǈ.ǈǉǉǑ -ǈ.ǈǈǐǋǑ
(ǈ.ǈǉǎǎ) (ǈ.ǈǊǉǐ) (ǈ.ǈǈǐǑǑ)
Observations ǌǍǊǌ ǌǍǊǌ ǌǍǊǌ
R-squared ǈ.Ǎǎǎ ǈ.ǌǑǉ ǈ.ǋǌǉ
Panel C: Dry Crops Introduced During Slave Trade
log(Maize) log(Soy)
South x Bantu -ǈ.ǋǊǍ*** -ǈ.ǈǋǍǐ*
(ǈ.ǈǑǍǋ) (ǈ.ǈǉǑǏ)
Bantu ǈ.ǋǉǍ*** ǈ.ǈǋǏǌ***
(ǈ.ǈǏǎǉ) (ǈ.ǈǉǋǍ)
Observations ǌǍǊǌ ǌǍǊǌ
R-squared ǈ.Ǐǐǈ ǈ.ǍǊǌ
Panel D: Wet Crops Introduced During Slave Trade
log(SunĚower) log(Groundnut) log(Sugarcane)
South x Bantu -ǈ.ǉǉǌ*** -ǈ.ǈǑǌǊ* -ǈ.ǈǍǋǎ**
(ǈ.ǈǋǎǊ) (ǈ.ǈǍǎǈ) (ǈ.ǈǊǊǈ)
Bantu ǈ.ǉǈǊ*** ǈ.ǈǑǊǏ*** ǈ.ǈǌǉǏ*
(ǈ.ǈǋǋǋ) (ǈ.ǈǋǋǏ) (ǈ.ǈǊǉǐ)
Observations ǌǍǊǌ ǌǍǊǌ ǌǍǊǌ
R-squared ǈ.Ǎǎǋ ǈ.ǎǏǉ ǈ.Ǎǉǉ
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by ǊxǊ region. Migration partition as described in Flight (ǉǑǐǈ) is used
({ABCHKLR:DEFGMNPS.}). Dependent variable has been transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation. Controls include regionFE, crop suitabilityFE, land quality, coordinate polynomials, similarity
to the rainforest, desert and distance to market.***p<ǈ.ǈǉ,**p<ǈ.ǈǍ,*p<ǈ.ǉ.
ǌǑ
Table 2.7.5: Historical Land Use
Use of Land for Crops before and aěer Maize
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
ǉǍǈǈ-ǉǎǈǈ ǉǎǈǈ-ǉǏǈǈ ǉǏǈǈ-ǉǐǈǈ ǉǐǈǈ-ǉǑǈǈ
Year x South -ǈ.Ǌǌǋ*** -ǈ.ǊǏǈ*** ǈ.ǈǑǌǈ -Ǌ.ǌǊǈ
(.ǈǎǐǈ) (ǈ.ǈǐǈǎ) (ǈ.ǋǋǊ) (ǉ.ǐǋǑ)
Year (post) ǈ.ǋǊǌ*** ǈ.ǋǐǊ*** ǉ.ǈǋǍ*** Ǐ.Ǐǎǐ***
(ǈ.ǈǎǋǊ) (ǈ.ǈǏǌǌ) (ǈ.Ǌǉǉ) (ǉ.ǋǍǌ)
Observations ǉǈǋǈǌ ǉǈǋǈǌ ǉǈǋǈǌ ǉǈǋǈǌ
R-squared ǈ.ǈǋǌ ǈ.ǈǋǎ ǈ.ǈǊǏ ǈ.ǈǌǏ
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by ǊxǊ region. Migration partition as de-
scribed in Flight (ǉǑǐǈ) is used ({ABCHKLR:DEFGMNPS.}). Dependent variable
has been transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Controls in-
clude regionFE, crop suitabilityFE, land quality, coordinate polynomials, similarity to
the rainforest, desert and distance to market. Pasture land units are kmƦ per .Ǎx.Ǎ
cell. ***p<ǈ.ǈǉ,**p<ǈ.ǈǍ,*p<ǈ.ǉ.
Table 2.7.6: Impact of Axis Orientation on Language Barriers
Dependant Variable: Linguistic Similarity
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
Bantu x South -ǋ.ǍǉǑ*** -ǋ.Ǎǌǋ*** -ǋ.ǈǎǏ*** -Ǌ.ǐǏǍ***
(ǈ.ǌǌǐ) (ǈ.ǌǌǎ) (ǈ.ǌǉǏ) (ǈ.ǋǏǑ)
Distance to Major Market NO YES YES YES
Land Quality NO YES YES YES
Latitude and Longitude NO NO YES YES
Suitability FE (all crops) NO NO NO YES
Observations ǍǈǏǎ ǍǈǏǎ ǍǈǏǎ ǍǈǏǎ
R-squared ǈ.ǋǈǍ ǈ.ǋǏǐ ǈ.ǋǑǌ ǈ.ǌǋǐ
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by ǊxǊ region. Migration partition as described in
Flight (ǉǑǐǈ) is used ({ABCHKLR:DEFGMNPS.}). Dependent variable has been transformed
using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Controls include regionFE, crop suitabili-
tyFE, land quality, coordinate polynomials, similarity to the rainforest, desert and distance to
market.***p<ǈ.ǈǉ,**p<ǈ.ǈǍ,*p<ǈ.ǉ.
Ǎǈ
Table 2.7.7: Sorting into Regions Similar to Rainforest
Panel A: Klein Goldewijk, Beusen, and Janssen Data
Dependent Variable: Population per cell
ǉǈǈǈ ǉǉǈǈ ǉǊǈǈ ǉǋǈǈ ǉǌǈǈ ǉǍǈǈ
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ) (Ǎ) (ǎ)
Bantu South x Similarityǌǈǉǉ.ǉ*** ǌǉǋǊ.Ǒ*** ǍǉǊǏ.ǌ*** ǍǉǈǊ.ǉ*** ǎǌǎǎ.ǎ*** ǏǉǑǌ.ǎ***
(ǉǊǏǌ.ǉ) (ǉǌǊǉ.ǎ) (ǉǎǐǉ.Ǌ) (ǉǐǉǐ.ǌ) (Ǌǉǐǋ.ǐ) (ǊǌǍǎ.ǉ)
Similarity Index -ǎǐǏ.ǎǉ -ǍǈǑ.ǋ -Ǒǉǐ.Ǌ -ǎǏǎ.Ǐ -ǉǉǋǌ.ǎǉ -ǋǋǈ.Ǎ
(ǍǑǉ.ǎ) (ǎǍǌ.ǉ) (ǏǍǎ.ǐ) (ǐǊǑ.Ǌǋ) (Ǒǎǎ.Ǎ) (ǉǈǑǈ.ǎ)
R-squared ǈ.ǊǊǐǈ ǈ.ǊǍǌǋ ǈ.ǊǎǎǏ ǈ.ǊǐǑǍ ǈ.ǊǑǋǌ ǈ.ǊǌǑǌ
Panel B: McEvedy and Jones Data
Dependent Variable: Population per cell
ǉǈǈǈ ǉǉǈǈ ǉǊǈǈ ǉǋǈǈ ǉǌǈǈ ǉǍǈǈ
Bantu South x Similarity ǉǑǎ.ǉ ǋǍǉ.ǎ ǌǏǌ.Ǎ* ǎǈǐ.ǎ* ǏǏǎ.ǈ* ǑǋǏ.ǐ**
(ǉǏǉ.Ǐ) (ǊǊǎ.ǉ) (ǊǏǐ.ǋ) (ǋǋǈ.Ǐ) (ǋǑǊ.ǐ) (ǌǍǋ.ǌ)
Similarity Index ǉǎǏ.Ǒ ǉǐǉ.ǈ ǉǐǍ.Ǌ ǉǑǉ.ǈ ǊǈǊ.Ǎ ǊǉǊ.ǌ
(ǉǈǐ.Ǒ) (ǉǌǈ.Ǌ) (ǉǏǊ.Ǌ) (Ǌǈǌ.ǐ) (ǊǋǏ.ǐ) (ǊǏǉ.ǉ)
R-squared ǈ.ǉǊǎ ǈ.ǉǋǐ ǈ.ǉǍǎ ǈ.ǉǏǈ ǈ.ǉǏǍ ǈ.ǉǐǉ
Observations ǑǋǍ ǑǋǍ ǑǋǍ ǑǋǍ ǑǋǍ ǑǋǍ
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by region. Migration partition as described in Flight (ǉǑǐǈ)
is used ({ABCHKLR:DEFGMNPS.}). Controls include language subgroup FE, land characteristics
controls and coordinate polynomials.***p<ǈ.ǈǉ,**p<ǈ.ǈǍ,*p<ǈ.ǉ
TļĹŃŇĹŉĽķĵŀ FŇĵŁĹŌŃŇĿ
To formalize: let someone from society C earn some beneėt ic from the info, aěer
adopting it at some cost c. Assume for now that the cost of adoption is the same for
all. ĉeir utility would beUc = ic   c if they adopt, and ǈ if they don’t. Since here we
assume that ic > cwe can formalize the utility function for society C as:
Uc =
(
ic   c; if iB > c
Ƥ; otherwise
(Ǌ.Ǒ)
Ǌ.Ǐ.ǉ DĽĺĺŊňĽŃł Ńĺ ĽłĺŃŇŁĵŉĽŃł: ŉŌŃ ķĵňĹň
ĉe beneėt of i to a society may therefore depend on the number of network nodes
between the innovation the society. Let the number of nodes and the nodal distance
from the innovation be x. So, the innovation occurs at x = Ƥ and any direct
neighbours of the innovator have x = ƥ; neighbours of neighbours have x = Ʀ, and so
on.
Following Diamond, consider two possibilities:
Ǎǉ
ǉ. Information is equally valuable across all nodes between the innovation and x
8x. ĉis is Diamond’s east-west axis.
Ǌ. ĉe beneėt of information is quadratic in x. ĉis is like a north-south axis. It’s
not that beneėcial to people in the middle, but quite beneėcial to those very
close to and very far from the innovation.
Ǌ.Ǐ.Ǌ CĵňĹ ǉ: Eĵňŉ-WĹňŉ
Suppose ix = i 8x. Diﬀusion of information is trivial. Everyone gets beneėt i. Either
everyone in the network acquires the information (i  c), or nobody does (i < c).
Ǌ.Ǐ.ǋ CĵňĹ Ǌ: NŃŇŉļ-SŃŊŉļ
Along the north south axis, we have a technology discovered in the north which
becomes less useful near the equator, and which becomes more useful again south of
the equator. We can describe the beneėt of the information as a quadratic function, to
see how far down the network a piece of information will get.
Let ix = (zx  y)Ʀ. ĉe info will be adopted by all x for which ix  c. In this
equation z represents the diﬀerence in the environment between each node (e.g.
vastness of land, or something similar), and y represents the nodal distance to the
innovation from the median x (e.g. network size). Diﬀusion stops when some society
x no longer ėnds adoption worthwhile. ĉat is,Ux = Ƥ. All societies less than x
adopt, where x is:
Ƥ = (zx  y)Ʀ   c (Ǌ.ǉǈ)
x = y
p
c
z
x = y 
p
c
z
ĉe lower value is taken since we want the lesser of the two beneėt-cost
intersections. ĉe low-x intersection is where diﬀusion stops, the high-x intersection
is where it would start again if it could. We’re more interested in the former.
ĉis equation represents Diamond’s key insight: availability of information for any
society (xi) depends on the beneėt of that information by all societies closer to the
innovation (all x < x).
High-x societies are more likely to have available information in larger networks
(y), or if the diﬀerence between plots of land (z) is really low. Also, for obvious
reasons increasing the cost of adoption decreases the number of societies that end up
adopting.
ǍǊ
Ǌ.Ǐ.ǌ CŃňŉň Ńĺ ĵĸŃńŉĽŃł ĵň ĹłĸŃĻĹłŃŊň ķŊŀŉŊŇĵŀ ĶĵŇŇĽĹŇň
ĉink of the cost of adoption (c) being endogenous, and representing a language
barrier. So that it’s more diﬃcult to acquire information from someone who speaks a
more diﬀerent language.
Societies can maintain linguistic similarity by exploring and communicating with
neighbours or they can abandon exploration and driě apart culturally, making
discovery of new innovations more diﬃcult. So, maintaining cultural similarity just
requires exploring at some cost v. When a society communicates with neighbours, it
reduces the cultural distance by some factor (α). ĉis is important to societies
because with some probability ρ an exploration trip (E) will result in the discovery of
a new innovation (ix).
TļĹ Eĵňŉ-WĹňŉ CĵňĹ
In the east-west case, even though c is endogenous everyone is the same. In other
words, c doesn’t depend on x. ĉis is straightforward to see.
We have some beneėt of exploration B and societies decide how frequently they
want to explore:
B = Eρ(i  cx)  vE+ αcxE (Ǌ.ǉǉ)
δB
δE
= Ƥ = ρ(i  cx)  v+ αcx
cx =
v  ρi
α   ρ
Since cx doesn’t depend on x there is no variation in language barriers ( δcxδx = Ƥ).
Everyone simply chooses to maintain a linguistic distance of v ρiα ρ . In this case the
more people would beneėt from new information the closer they’ll stay, culturally
( δcxδi < Ƥ). ĉis is intuitive, there is a large literature arguing that maintaining
relationships can be valuable, and this prediction is consistent with that.
One interesting feature of this equation is that the higher the cost of exploration
(v), the greater the language barriers ( δcxδv > Ƥ). ĉis prediction applies to both the
wast-west and the north south cases, and is particularly relevant since it’s testable. ĉe
implication is that geographic and linguistic isolation should be positively correlated
in equilibrium. It seems intuitive that when the linguistic distance is high the beneėt
of maintaining geographic distance is low and vice-versa. Making both geographic
distance and linguistic distance endogenous is beyond the scope of this paper, but the
relationship between c and v suggested by equation (Ǌ.ǉǉ) will be tested in the
empirical section.
Finally, as expected, when assimilation (α) is easier, they’ll remain culturally closer
( δcxδα < Ƥ) and since
δcx
δρ =
 (v+αi)
(α ρ)Ʀ < Ƥ, the greater the probability of making a
discovery on any given exploration trip, the closer societies remain culturally.
Ǎǋ
TļĹNŃŇŉļ-SŃŊŉļ CĵňĹ
ĉeNorth-South case is only slightly more complicated. Now we simply let i depend
on x. Otherwise the beneėt function is the same. Recall that ix = (zx  y)Ʀ. Since ix is
not a function of cx we can just substitute i for (zx  y)Ʀ into the equation for cx above.
cx =
v  ρ(zx  y)Ʀ
α   ρ (Ǌ.ǉǊ)
Everything is the same as before, except now δcxδx 6= Ƥ. δcxδx > Ƥ if ρ > α and δcxδx < Ƥ
if ρ < α.
ĉis means that If α < ρ, we would expect an increase in cultural similarity as we
get farther away from an innovation, so in this case, if at any point in the future the
information was able to get to the south, we would see immediate adoption, as in the
case of exogenous adoption costs.
But under the condition α > ρ it may be possible that a failure of any information
to diﬀuse may be permanent, even if all of a sudden the information did become
available to the high x societies, who ex ante would have deėnitely adopted. Because
with endogenous cost of adoption the low probability of diﬀusion associated with
having a high x causes the language barrier to rise. In the next subsection we explore
how high this barrier would need to get to make diﬀusion failure permanent.
Ǌ.Ǐ.Ǎ PĹŇŁĵłĹłŉ DĽĺĺŊňĽŃł FĵĽŀŊŇĹ
Given that it’s possible for the high x societies to culturally driě far away from their
neighbours, it is possible that this driě can be so great that the information wouldn’t
ever diﬀuse, even if it did reach a societies neighbours.
For permanent diﬀusion failure, it would need to be true that x < ƥ. So from
equation (Ǌ.ǉǈ) and (Ǌ.ǉǊ):
ƥ 
y 
q
v ρ(z y)Ʀ
α ρ
z
(Ǌ.ǉǋ)
z  y  ( ƥ)
s
v  ρ(z  y)Ʀ
α   ρ
(z  y)Ʀ  (+ƥ)v  ρ(z  y)Ʀ
α   ρ

(y  z)Ʀ  v
α
So a diﬀusion failure can be permanent if the rate of assimilation (α) is low, if the
cost of exploration (v) is high, if the distance to the most diﬀerent society (y) is low
or if the proximity of each society (z) to each other is high.
Ǎǌ
Mĵńň
Figure 2.7.2: FAO Suitability Data
(a) Sorghum (b) CoĨon
(c) Rice (d) Oilpalm (e) Maize
(f) Soy (g) SunĚower (h) Cassava
(i) Groundnut (j) Sugarcane (k) LegendǍǍ
Figure 2.7.3: Klein Goldewijk, Beusen, and Janssen population data at each period: darker regions
are more populated
(a) ǉǈǈǈ B.C.E. (b) ǈ C.E. (c) ǉǈǈ C.E.
(d) Ǌǈǈ C.E. (e) ǌǈǈ C.E.
(f) ǎǈǈ C.E. (g) ǐǈǈ C.E. (h) ǉǈǈǈ C.E.
(i) ǉǊǈǈ C.E.
Ǎǎ
Figure 2.7.4: Historic crop and pastoral land allocation from Klein Goldewijk, Beusen, and Janssen:
darker regions are more suitable for pastoral land
(a) Crops ǉǍǈǈC.E. (b) Crops ǉǎǈǈC.E. (c) Crops ǉǏǈǈC.E.
(d) Crops ǉǐǈǈC.E. (e) Crops ǉǑǈǈC.E. (f) Pastoral Land ǉǍǈǈ
(g) Pastoral Land ǉǎǈǈ (h) Pastoral Land ǉǏǈǈ (i) Pastoral Land ǉǐǈǈ
(j) Pastoral Land ǉǑǈǈ
ǍǏ
Figure 2.7.5: McEvedy and Jones Population data at each period: darker regions are more popu-
lated
(a) ǉ C.E. (b) Ǌǈǈ C.E. (c) ǌǈǈ C.E.
(d) ǎǈǈ C.E. (e) ǐǈǈ C.E. (f) ǉǈǈǈ C.E.
(g) ǉǉǈǈ C.E. (h) ǉǊǈǈ C.E. (i) ǉǋǈǈ C.E.
(j) ǉǌǈǈ C.E. (k) ǉǍǈǈ C.E.
￿
Ǎǐ
Figure 2.7.6: Example demonstrating how migration routes are assigned to cells
ĉis is an example of assigning migration routes to cells using the Kissama tribe. ĉe Kissama are located on the west coast of tropical Africa and in this example
all geographic cells within this region are assigned to the southern route. ĉis is because if we locate the Kissama on the language tree (ǋrd from the leě on the
boĨom branch shown) and trace back the lineage to the second level of the tree we see a language split analogous to the migration split (East/South). Since the
Kissama speak a language most similar to southern migrants, we assume that their ancestors initially migrated south.
ǍǑ
RŃĶŊňŉłĹňň TĵĶŀĹň
Table 2.7.8: Impact of a rainforest history on jurisdictional hierarchy
Jurisdictional Hierarchy Jurisdictional Hierarchy
Beyond Local Level At Local Level
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
Bantu x South -ǈ.ǑǌǊ** -ǈ.ǑǑǌ*** ǈ.ǈǋǏǌ ǈ.ǉǊǎ
(ǈ.ǋǍǎ) (ǈ.ǋǎǉ) (ǈ.ǋǐǉ) (ǈ.ǋǏǈ)
Region FE Y Y Y Y
Crop Suitability FE Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Observations ǉ,ǐǑǍ ǉ,ǐǑǍ Ǌ,ǉǌǐ Ǌ,ǉǌǐ
R-squared ǈ.ǐǈǏ ǈ.ǐǉǉ ǈ.ǍǍǈ ǈ.ǍǏǈ
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by ethnicity. Migration partition as described in Flight (ǉǑǐǈ) is used
({ABCHKLR:DEFGMNPS.}).‘Controls’ includes land quality, coordinate polynomials, similarity to the
rainforest, desert and distance to market.***p<ǈ.ǈǉ,**p<ǈ.ǈǍ,*p<ǈ.ǉ.
Table 2.7.9: Impact of a rainforest history on property rights
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
Property Rights (general) Land Rights Movable Asset Rights Inheritance Norms
Bantu x South ǈ.ǈǏǎǎ -ǈ.ǉǏǑ ǈ.ǈǏǎǎ ǈ.ǈǐǏǉ
(ǈ.ǈǍǉǊ) (ǈ.ǉǉǈ) (ǈ.ǈǍǉǊ) (ǈ.ǈǎǐǑ)
Region FE Y Y Y Y
Crop Suitability FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations ǌ,ǍǊǌ ǌ,ǍǊǌ ǌ,ǍǊǌ ǌ,ǍǊǌ
R-squared ǈ.Ǌǐǋ ǈ.Ǎǋǈ ǈ.Ǌǐǋ ǈ.Ǌǐǋ
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by ethnicity. Migration partition as described in Flight (ǉǑǐǈ) is used ({ABCHKLR:DEFGMNPS.}).Controls
include regionFE, crop suitabilityFE, land quality, coordinate polynomials, similarity to the rainforest, desert and distance to
market.***p<ǈ.ǈǉ,**p<ǈ.ǈǍ,*p<ǈ.ǉ.
Table 2.7.10: Likelihood of agriculture being occupational choice by migration route
Dependent Variable: Agriculture as Occupational Choice
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
Bantu x South -ǈ.ǈǈǋǊǎ*** -ǈ.ǈǈǍǐǌ** -ǈ.ǈǊǋǌ** -ǈ.ǈǊǋǑ**
(Ǎ.Ǎǉe-ǈǍ) (ǈ.ǈǈǉǑǌ) (ǈ.ǈǈǑǉǌ) (ǈ.ǈǈǑǊǉ)
Country Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Age N Y Y Y
Education N N Y Y
Gender of HHHead N N N Y
Observations ǉǐǌǌǏ ǉǐǌǌǏ ǉǐǌǌǋ ǉǐǌǌǈ
R-squared ǈ.ǉǋǉ ǈ.ǉǋǑ ǈ.ǉǎǐ ǈ.ǉǎǐ
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by region. Migration partition as described in Flight (ǉǑǐǈ) is used
({ABCHKLR:DEFGMNPS.}).***p<ǈ.ǈǉ,**p<ǈ.ǈǍ,*p<ǈ.ǉ.
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Table 2.7.11: Altonji Ratios Assessing Selection on Unobservables
Estimate Estimate Altonji
Crop (full) (restricted) Ratio
Sorghum -ǈ.ǏǑǈ -ǈ.ǑǎǏ ǌ.ǌǎ
CoĨon -ǈ.ǊǍǐ -ǈ.ǋǊǏ ǋ.Ǐǌ
Soy -ǈ.ǈǍǊǋ -ǈ.ǈǏǋǑ Ǌ.ǌǊǉ
Maize -ǉ.Ǒǐ -ǋ.ǉǍǎ ǉ.ǎǐǌ
SunĚower -ǈ.ǉǌǌ -ǈ.Ǌǐǈ ǉ.ǈǍǑ
Cassava -ǈ.ǌǉǋ -ǈ.ǋǑǊ ǉǑ.ǎǎǏ
Groundnut -ǈ.ǋǋǍ -ǈ.ǋǑǏ Ǎ.ǌǈǋ
Sugarcane -ǈ.ǈǎǍǍ -ǈ.ǈǐǉǑ ǋ.ǑǑǌ
*ĉe results of the full sample are reported in table Ǌ.Ǐ.ǌ
*ĉe restricted sample includes controls for latitude and
longitude as well as Bantu and the variable of interest:
Bantu x Southern Route (reported)
Table 2.7.12: Robustness Check: Modern Crop Production by Crop Class Representative
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
VARIABLES Sorghum Rice Maize Groundnut
(dry-traditional) (wet-traditional) (dry-post colonial) (wet-post colonial)
Bantu x South -Ǌ.ǉǊǏ*** -ǈ.ǋǍǌ -ǉ.Ǐǈǎ*** -Ǌ.ǏǏǎ***
(ǈ.ǌǌǉ) (ǈ.ǌǊǉ) (ǈ.ǎǈǏ) (ǈ.ǌǎǎ)
Latitude and Longitude controls YES YES YES YES
Education Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Suitability Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Age and Gender Controls YES YES YES YES
Distance to Metropolitan Centre YES YES YES YES
Exposure to Slavery YES YES YES YES
Observations ǐǍǍǋ ǐǍǍǋ ǐǍǍǋ ǐǍǍǋ
Number of Clusters Ǐǉǐ Ǐǉǐ Ǐǉǐ Ǐǉǐ
R-squared ǈ.ǍǑ ǈ.ǌǎ ǈ.ǌǑ ǈ.ǎǈ
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by village. Migration partition as described in Flight (ǉǑǐǈ) is used
({ABCHKLR:DEFGMNPS.}).***p<ǈ.ǈǉ,**p<ǈ.ǈǍ,*p<ǈ.ǉ.
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Figure 2.5.1: Speed of Migration Frontier Entering (left) and Exiting (right) the Rainforest Using Klein
Goldewijk, Beusen, and Janssen (top) and McEvedy and Jones (bottom) Data
ǎǊ
Figure 2.7.1: Diﬀusion depends on axis-orientation
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(a) Case ǉ: East-West Axis
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(b) Case Ǌ: North-South Axis
Description: ix represents the beneėt of acquiring information and c represents the cost. x is the nodal location of a society. ĉe grey regions actually acquire
the information and beneėt from it. ĉe dashed-gray region would beneėt from the information, but it is not available to them so they do not acquire it.
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Tropical Lending: International Prices,
Strategic Default andCredit Conﬆraints
amongCoﬀeeWashing Stations
ǋ.ǉ IłŉŇŃĸŊķŉĽŃł
DĹŋĹŀŃńĽłĻ countries are poorer largely because they are less eﬃcientat allocating factors of production across diﬀerent uses (Banerjee andDuĚo (ǊǈǈǍ) and Hsieh and Klenow (ǊǈǈǑ)). Imperfections in the
credit markets, in particular, are believed to be an important source of misallocation
of capital both across sectors (see, e.g., Buera et al. (ǊǈǈǑ)) as well as across ėrms
within sectors (see, e.g., Banerjee andMunshi (Ǌǈǈǌ)). Consistently with this view,
an active empirical literature has documented high and extremely heterogeneous
returns to capital among microenterprises in a variety of contexts (see, e.g., DeMel
et al. (Ǌǈǈǐ), Fafchamps et al. (Ǌǈǉǉ), Kremer et al. (Ǌǈǉǈ), Karlan et al. (ǊǈǉǊ)).
To fully understand the role of credit market imperfections in constraining
ǎǌ
eﬃciency in developing countries and provide guidance to design appropriate policy
responses, however, the existing evidence must be complemented in two important
ways. First, sources of imperfections must be identiėed in speciėc seĨings (see, e.g.,
Paulson et al. (Ǌǈǈǎ)).¹ Second, the relevance of credit constraints must be assessed
among larger ėrms, where most capital is invested. Relative to the empirical literature
discussed above, however, progress in both directions has been signiėcantly more
limited. Disentangling sources of credit market imperfections requires exogenous
variation in incentives (see, e.g., Karlan and Zinman (ǊǈǈǑ)) while testing for credit
constraints requires exogenous variation in capital (see, e.g., Banerjee and DuĚo
(Ǌǈǈǐ)). Both sources of variation are rarely available to the econometrician,
particularly since experimental approaches are impractical when studying large ėrms.
ĉis paper contributes to our understanding of the sources and consequences of
credit constraints among large ėrms in developing countries using coﬀee washing
stations as a sector study. ĉe paper exploits comprehensive data from an
international lender on a portfolio of working capital loans to around two hundreds
coﬀee washing stations in eighteen countries. Besides the richness of the data, the
sector provides an ideal set-up to overcome the challenges highlighted above. First,
the stark separation in the timing at which contracts are signed (pre-harvest), loans
disbursed (during harvest) and sales realized (post harvest) can be combined with
unanticipated Ěuctuations in international coﬀee prices to test for, and distinguish,
ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard. Second, knowledge of the relatively simple
technology of coﬀee washing stations enables a transparent test for credit constraints.
¹ĉe theoretical literature on sources of credit market imperfection is vast. Stiglitz and Weiss
(ǉǑǐǉ) is the classical reference on adverse selection. Holmstrom and Tirole (ǉǑǑǏ) and Burkart and
Ellingsen (Ǌǈǈǌ) emphasize ex-ante moral hazard in the form of private beneėts (eﬀort) and loan di-
version respectively.Lacker and Weinberg (ǉǑǐǑ) and Ellingsen and Kristiansen (Ǌǈǉǉ) emphasize
ex-post moral hazard: due to costly monitoring and/or contract incompleteness borrowers strategi-
cally default on loan obligations. Besley (ǉǑǑǍ) and Ghosh et al. (Ǌǈǈǈ) provide useful discussion in
a development context.
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ĉe test is based on a regression discontinuity design in which essentially identical
loan applications end up with loans of diﬀerent size.²
Aěer describing the sector and the data sources, we present a simple theoretical
framework of the lending model used by our lender to extend working capital loans to
coﬀee washing stations. ĉe lender provides working capital loans to coﬀee washing
stations around the world based on a system of account receivables in which sales
contracts with foreign buyers are used as collateral.³ ĉemodel emphasizes limited
contract enforcement and uncertainty over output prices, two salient features of the
environment under consideration. ĉemodel shows that unanticipated ex-post
increases in world prices increase the likelihood of default only if ex-post moral
hazard, i.e., strategic default, is present. ĉe associated incentive compatibility
constraint clariėes how contract level data on loans and sales can be combined to
quantify the value of informal enforcement.
ĉe empirical analysis is divided in two parts. First, we investigate the
determinants of loan default and ėnd evidence of strategic default (ex-post moral
hazard). Unanticipated increases in international coﬀee prices just before the loan
maturity date signiėcantly increase the likelihood of delayed payments and defaults.
Consistently with the predictions of the model, price increases lead to defaults when
the station has entered ėxed price contracts with the foreign buyer and when there is
no previous history with the lender. ĉese results hold across a number of diﬀerent
speciėcations and samples, including an event-study methodology.
Given the evidence of ex-post moral hazard, we provide a simple calibration of the
²Besides the advantages from a research design point of view, the coﬀee sector is important in its
own right. Coﬀee is produced by an estimated ǋǈ million farmers in more than thirty low income
countries, for which is oěen one of themain sources of exports. ĉe sector provides an ideal canvas to
study aspects that are relevant in the ėnancing of other export oriented sectors in developing countries
(e.g., coĨon, pineapple, vanilla, cocoa, cashew).
³ĉe lender is well aware of the diﬃculties of extending loans to large ėrms based in rural areas of
developing countries. See next section for details.
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associated ex-post incentive compatibility constraint to assess the importance of
informal enforcement, intended as the value of the relationship with the lender and
foreign buyer. We derive lower (upper) bounds to the value of informal enforcement
for repaying (defaulting) borrowers. We ėnd this value to be large: it is at least (most)
Ǎǌƻ (Ǌǉƻ) of the value of sales for repaying (defaulting) borrowers on average.
Despite the lending arrangements put in place by our lender, evidence of strategic
default implies that borrowers are likely to be credit constrained. ĉe second part of
the empirical section implements a regression discontinuity design to test for the
presence of credit constraints. Discontinuity in the assignment of loan applications to
a summary score category induces exogenous variation in loan size among otherwise
identical loan applications. We ėnd that stations use the additional funds to purchase
more inputs from farmers rather than substituting other, potentially more expensive,
sources of loans. We estimate mean returns to capital to be in the order of ǋǊƻ, well
above the interest rate charged by lenders (about ǉǈƻ). ĉese two pieces of evidence
conėrm that ėrms in the sample are severely credit constrained. We ėnd that the
relationship with the lender accounts for roughly a half of the value of informal
enforcement. Furthermore, we also ėnd evidence that larger loans lead to higher
prices paid to farmers supplying the stations. ĉis implies the existence of contractual
externalities and a possibly sub-optimal level of integration along the value chain.
In sum, the study provides evidence on the sources (ex-post moral hazard) and
consequences (credit constraints along the supply chain) of credit market
imperfections among relatively large ėrms in developing countries. As further
discussed below, the contractual practices adopted by our lender already mitigate
sources of credit market imperfections, including those for which we ėnd direct
evidence. ĉerefore, our study identiėes a lower bound to the cost of credit market
imperfections. We discuss policy implications of all these ėndings in the concluding
ǎǏ
section.
Related Literature
ĉis paper contributes to the literature on credit markets and ėrms in developing
countries. ĉemost closely related contribution is Banerjee and DuĚo (Ǌǈǈǐ) who
exploit records from an Indian bank and natural experiments induced by changes in
priority-lending regulations to identify credit constraints. ĉe regression
discontinuity design test for credit constraints in our paper is similar in spirit to their
approach. However, in this paper we also identify sources of credit market
imperfections and quantify the value of informal enforcement.⁴
ĉe seĨing of our study brings this paper close to an emerging literature on the
ėnancing of export transactions (see, e.g., Paravisini et al. (Ǌǈǉǉ) andManova
(Ǌǈǉǋ)). ĉemost closely related work is Antras and Foley (Ǌǈǉǉ) who study
contractual credit terms between a large exporter of frozen food and foreign
distributors. Banerjee and DuĚo (Ǌǈǈǈ), Macchiavello (Ǌǈǉǈ) andMacchiavello and
Morjaria (Ǌǈǉǋ) also study contractual relationships in export markets and
emphasize the importance of reputation and informal enforcement in a variety of
diﬀerent contexts. In contrast to these papers, we simultaneously consider
relationships with both buyers and lenders and document contractual externalities
along the value chain.⁵;⁶
⁴ĉe literature on testing for asymmetric information has been mostly developed in the context
of insurance markets (see, e.g., Chiappori and Salanié (ǊǈǈǊ) for an early review). In the context of
credit markets, Karlan and Zinman (ǊǈǈǑ) provide an experimental study of personal loans in South
Africa while Adams et al. (ǊǈǈǑ) study the subprime lending in the U.S.
⁵ĉe corporate ėnance literature has studied several aspects that characterize our environment.
For example, Klapper (Ǌǈǈǎ) examines factoring while Klapper et al. (ǊǈǉǊ) examine a large sample
of trade credit contracts. ĉe paper is also related to a literature on the relationship between risk
management and credit constraints. Rampini et al. (Ǌǈǉǉ), for example, provide an empirical analysis
for the case of airlines.
⁶Nunn and Dragusanu (Ǌǈǉǋ) study the impact of fair trade certiėcation in the Costa Rica coﬀee
sector. de Janvry et al. (Ǌǈǉǈ) provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of fair trade certiėcation
using data from a secondary cooperative in Guatemala. Adhvaryu et al. (Ǌǈǉǋ) examine the impact of
international price Ěuctuations on farm activity in Tanzania. Casaburi and Reed (Ǌǈǉǋ) study price
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ĉe rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section Ǌ describes the coﬀee industry,
its contractual practices, and the data. Section ǋ introduces the model and derives
testable predictions. Section ǌ presents the empirical results. Sections Ǎ discusses
policy implications. Finally, Section ǎ oﬀers some concluding remarks. Proofs,
additional results and further information on the data are relegated to the Appendix.
ǋ.Ǌ BĵķĿĻŇŃŊłĸ
Coﬀee Washing Stations
ĉe coﬀee cherry is the fruit of the coﬀee plant. ĉe cherries are ripe when they
change colour from green to red, at which point they should be harvested. ĉe
harvest season typically lasts for three to four months. ĉe timing of the harvest
season varies by country and, within country, by region depending on altitude, soil
and rainfall paĨerns. Most coﬀee-growing countries have only one major harvest a
year. In most countries, the coﬀee cherries are picked by hand, a labor-intensive and
diﬃcult process.
ĉe pulp of the coﬀee cherry is removed leaving the seed or bean which is then
dried to obtain parchment coﬀee. ĉere are essentially two processing methods to
obtain parchment coﬀee: the dry method and the washed method. ĉe dry method,
also known as unwashed or natural, has the entire cherry ėrst cleaned and then placed
in the sun to dry on tables. ĉis process is done by farmers. In the washed method,
instead, farmers bring coﬀee cherries immediately aěer harvest to a washing station,
the ėrms that are the objects of our study. ĉe washed method requires speciėc
equipment and substantial quantities of water. Aěer the cherry skin and some of the
pulp are removed with a pressing machine, cherries are then sorted by immersion in
water. ĉe bean is then leě to ferment, typically for around ǋǈ hours, to remove the
pass-through with an experiment in the Sierra Leone cocoa sector.
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remaining skin. ĉe fermentation process has to be carefully monitored to ensure that
the coﬀee doesn’t acquire undesirable, sour Ěavours. When the fermentation is
complete, the coﬀee is thoroughly washed with clean water in tanks or in special
washing machines. ĉe beans are then dried in the sun (and sometime with the
further help of machines). Coﬀee dried in the sun is spread out in rows on large tables
or on patios where it is frequently turned by hand or raked. Drying coﬀee on tables
improves quality but increases cost and labor signiėcantly. Aěer the drying process
the parchment skin is easily removed in the hulling process. Essentially all coﬀee is
hulled before shipment.
ĉemethod used to process the cherries has a signiėcant eﬀect on the Ěavour of
coﬀee once roasted and brewed. ĉe wet method delivers higher consistency and
quality which is reĚected in prices. Data from Rwanda available to the authors, for
example, reveal that washed coﬀee is sold at two and half to three times higher price
than dry coﬀee both as parchment in the domestic market and as green coﬀee at the
export stage.
Despite having seasonal activities tied to the coﬀee harvest season, coﬀee washing
stations are large ėrms by developing country standards. In our sample, stations
average over Ǌ.ǌ million dollars a year in sales, hold almost ǉ.ǌ million in total assets
(see Table ǌ.ǎ.ǉ) and receive an average loan size of around ǋǌǍ,ǈǈǈ dollars from our
lender.⁷
An important aspect of our environment is the relatively simple, and known,
relationship between input and output. ĉe quantity of output (parchment coﬀee) is
a constant share, ranging between one ėěh and one seventh, of the quantity of input
(coﬀee cherries). ĉat is, within the capacity limits imposed by the ėxed assets
invested in the station (e.g., the pulping machine, drying tables), there is a constant
⁷By comparison, the ėrms in the sample in Banerjee and DuĚo (Ǌǈǈǐ) average ǉǌǈ,ǈǈǈƮ in sales
and ǉǏ,ǈǈǈƮ in loan amout.
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return relationship between coﬀee input and output. Disbursement to purchase
coﬀee cherries from the farmers during the harvest season are, by far, the largest
source of variable costs. ĉese, generally, account for sixty to seventy percent of the
overall costs. Other costs include labour, transport, electricity, marketing and, of
course, costs of ėnance. Large volumes of working capital need to be mobilized over
short periods of time in environments characterized by institutional
underdevelopment. Furthermore, the environment is characterized by signiėcant
uncertainty, particularly with respect to Ěuctuations in international prices.
Contractual Practices I: Loans
We obtained access to the internal records of an international lender specialized in
providing working capital loans to coﬀee washing stations. ĉe data cover all loans
ever disbursed by the lender over a period of twelve years for a total of ǏǍǎ loans, of
which ǎǎǑ are for working capital. ĉe one hundred ninety seven coﬀee washing
stations are located in eighteen countries, with Peru, Mexico, Nicaragua, Rwanda and
Guatemala accounting for the majority of loans.
ĉe lender is highly aware of the diﬃculties in extending working capital ėnance to
large, seasonal, business operating in rural areas of developing countries, oěen
characterized by a relatively poor institutional environment. Consequently, the
lending model is explicitly designed to cope with issues of adverse selection and
moral hazard. In particular, our lender utilizes a comprehensive scoring system to rate
loan applications and decide the size of the loan disbursed. ĉe lender also disburses
loans progressively and actively monitors the use of the loans. More importantly,
from the point of view of the research design, lending is based on account receivables
as explained in detail below.
ĉe borrowers in the sample mostly supply the coﬀee specialty market. In this
segment, coﬀee washing stations supply coﬀee directly to foreign buyers (which
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might be roasters or traders) with whom they develop informal relationships. ĉe
lending model, which is based on an account receivable system, is structured as
follows. First, before the harvest begins the buyer signs a contract, or a leĨer of intent,
with the station for the delivery of a certain amount of coﬀee of pre-speciėed quality
at a later date. ĉe lender, who has a relationship with the buyers, then advances a
share of the value of the contract with the buyer to the station. ĉe share depends on
a scoring system. ĉe scoring systems aggregates continuos sub-scores based on a
large number of station and loan characteristics into discrete categories (B, A, AA).
ĉe share extended to the station typically varies between ǌǈƻ and Ǐǈƻ of the value
of the contract with the buyer. Upon delivery of the coﬀee, the foreign buyer notiėes
the lender which is then repaid (typically directly by the buyer).
ĉis lending system is not unusual.⁸ ĉe arrangement used by our lender is
essentially identical to invoice discounting in which the receivable is used as collateral
for the loan.⁹ Because the credit provided by the lender is explicitly linked on a
formula basis to the value of a supplier’s accounts receivable (in addition to the
supplier’s overall creditworthiness), the system allows relatively high-risk exporters in
developing countries to borrow against the value of their contracts with high-quality
buyers in developed importing countries. By establishing direct contractual
relationships with the buyers, our lender ensures that the loan is repaid if the coﬀee is
delivered to the buyer. In other words, in order to default on the loan, the station also
⁸Bank loans secured by accounts receivable are the primary source of SME ėnancing for working
capital in the US. Beck et al. (ǊǈǈǊ) note that credit between buyers and suppliers is relatively more
prevalent in countries with weak legal environments and we, therefore, conjecture that account re-
ceivables (or similar contractual arrangements) are an extremely common source of ėnance for SMEs
in developing countries.
⁹Invoice discounting is similar, but diﬀerent from, factoring. ĉekeydistinction is that in factoring
a business sells its accounts receivable to a third party (called the factor). ĉe factor provides ėnancing
in the form of a cash advance (oěen Ǐǈ-ǐǈƻ of the purchase price of the accounts), with the balance
of the purchase price paid, net of the factor’s fee and other charges, upon collection from the account
client. Around the world, factoring is a growing source of external ėnancing for small and medium-
size enterprises (SMEs) (Klapper (Ǌǈǈǎ)).
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has to default on the sale contract with the foreign buyer. While formal enforceable
contracts are typically not used, the loss in reputation and future sales from the buyer
is a powerful deterrent towards this type of default.¹⁰
Contractual Practices II: Sale Contracts
Given the lending arrangement used by our lender, it is important to describe the
basic incentives associated with sales contracts. ĉe international trade in coﬀee is
based upon a number of standard contractual forms. ĉe twomost frequently used
are those issued by the European Coﬀee Federation (ECF) and by the Green Coﬀee
Association (GCA) in the United States. ĉe basic conditions of sale are easily
covered by stipulating the applicable standard form. Parties ėll the standard form
with the remaining important details of the individual transaction (quantity, quality,
price, ...). From the point of view of our research design, the key distinction is
between trade at ėxed (or ‘outright’) price versus trade at a ‘diﬀerential’ (or ‘price to
be ėxed’ (PTBF)).
Before active futures markets came into being coﬀee was bought and sold at ėxed
prices, meaning purchase and sale contracts would show a simple amount per pound
or per ton. Fixed price contracts expose parties to signiėcant price (and counterpart)
risk. An importer who buys coﬀee that has not already been sold (bought long) hopes
that the price will stay the same or go up. An exporter who sells coﬀee that has not
already been bought (sold short) hopes that the price stays the same or goes down.
With the development of future markets coﬀee has increasingly been bought and
sold on a ‘diﬀerential basis’ (or PTBF contract). In this type of sale, the seller (buyer)
commits to deliver (take) a certain amount of coﬀee not at a ėxed price but at a
¹⁰It is common practice for exporters of agricultural commodities in developing countries to enter
into pre-ėnancing arrangements with importers (see, e.g., Larson andVarangis (Ǌǈǈǎ)). For example,
survey data available to the authors reveal that loans from large domestic exporters represent the only
source of working capital ėnance for ǌǈƻ of Rwandese coﬀee washing stations (see,Macchiavello and
Morjaria (Ǌǈǉǋ) for details).
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diﬀerence to a basis price. ĉeoretically the basis price can be any published price in
the coﬀee business but, in practice, almost all diﬀerential contracts are signed against
futures markets (i.e., Robusta coﬀee is traded against the London LIFFE Contract
while Arabica coﬀee, the object of this study, is traded against the New York ICE ‘C’
Contract). ĉemain advantage of future markets is their liquidity which allows prices
to be ėxed anytime these markets are open for trading. Trading on a ‘diﬀerential’ basis
changes price risk from ‘outright’ price to ‘diﬀerential’ price risk. Although
‘diﬀerential’ price risk is inherently lower, it is important to note that PTBF contract
does not eliminate price risk.¹¹
An important aspect of the PTBF contract is the date at which the buyer and seller
can ėx their respective prices. In the context of our analysis, which focuses on direct
exports from coﬀee washing stations to foreign buyers without the intermediation of
traders, exporters typically do not have access to future markets. As a result, the
PTBF contracts tend to stipulate a ‘seller’s call clause according to which the seller
calls the date at which the price ought to be ėxed. In principle, this allows the
exporter to achieve grater insurance by ėxing the price shortly aěer the purchase of
the coﬀee cherries necessary to fulėll the sale contract.¹²
Descriptive Characteristics: Firms, Loan and Sale Contracts
ĉe loans data begins in Ǌǈǈǈ and ends in ǊǈǉǊ, totalling ǏǍǋ loans from ǉǑǏ
clients. ĉe lender decides on loan terms using a scoring system. Scores are assigned
to multiple sub-groups, which are aggregated into category scores, which themselves
are aggregated into overall numerical scores which is the basis for the assignment of a
¹¹ĉe Coﬀee Export’s Guide published by the International Trade Centre, for example, describes
how in Ǌǈǉǈ some Colombian coﬀees which had been trading at around ICE ‘C’ plus ǉǍ cts/lb, went
up to ICE ‘C’ plus ǐǈ cts/lb. Diﬀerential price risk is relatively stronger in the specialty coﬀee segment
of themarket, where diﬀerentials are ėne tuned to relatively narrower origins with less liquidmarkets.
¹²Stations can, however,misuse and aĨempt speculation by either i) ėxingPTBF contractswithout
actually having bought the physical coﬀee, or ii) delaying ėxing until long aěer the physical coﬀee was
bought hoping for a price recovery.
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leĨer score (B, A, AA).ĉe lender has disaggregated score data starting late Ǌǈǈǐ.
Prior to Ǌǈǈǐ the numerical score data was calculated and used in the same way, but
not stored systematically. As a result, there are ǊǑǉ loans for which disaggregated
score data exists.
Whenever a loan is given the lender assembles income sheet and balance sheet
data for the client for the previous three years. From this data we constructed a panel
of ėnancial information at the station level which yields ǎǍǏ station-year
observations. ĉe panel includes the three years prior to the closing year for all loans.
For clients that received loans in later years it includes ėnancial information for a
number of years aěer the loan was dispersed, depending on whether the client signs
loan agreements with the lender in subsequent years.
Table ǌ.ǎ.ǉ displays descriptive statistics for both the loan level data and the
client-loan panel. ĉe average loan in the sample is just over ǋǌǈ,ǈǈǈ USD, while the
average interest rate is about Ǒ.ǐƻ, ranging from Ǐƻ to ǉǐƻ. About ǋǈƻ of loans in the
sample are repeat clients, and default rates are low. On average only ǋƻ of loans are
wriĨen oﬀ, while about ǎƻ are either wriĨen oﬀ, restructured or signiėcantly late
with payment. ĉe world coﬀee price increased over the majority of the sample
period. ĉe price rose from about ǉǎǍ USD in late Ǌǈǈǌ to about ǋǌǈ USD in late
ǊǈǈǑ. ĉe price reaches a high of ǎǋǎ.Ǎǌ USD in late Ǌǈǉǉ and declines slightly in
ǊǈǉǊ. On average the price in our sample period was just under ǋǍǈ USD and
increased by nearly ǉǌƻ over the life of the average contract.
Firms in our sample are very large by developing countries standards. Mean total
assets are over ǉ.Ǎ million USD, however median total assets are about half of that, so
we have a few extremely large ėrms in the sample. Most ėrms receiving loans from
our lenders have other loans from either other ėnancial institutions or buyers.
Income is high, over Ǌ.Ǎ million, but cost of goods sold is about ǐǍƻ of total income.
ǏǍ
Firms employ about ǉǋǍ people in a year on average, nearly three quarters of which
are seasonal employees.
ǋ.ǋ TļĹŃŇŏ
ǋ.ǋ.ǉ SĹŉ Uń
We consider the relationship between a coﬀee washing station (station), a lender and
a foreign buyer modeled to capture the most salient features of our environment. ĉe
station has capacity to process, and produce,Q units of coﬀee:We denote with qc the
quantity that the station commits to deliver to the buyer. ĉe price, pc; is discussed
later. We assume that the only source of cost for the station is the purchase of cherries
from the farmers. ĉe price of cherries is denoted pƤ and is ėxed and known to all
parties. For simplicity, we set the risk-free interest rate to zero and denote by L the
amount lent to the station and byD the amount the station commits to repay. ĉe
station is subject to limited liability, i.e., at all dates the payoﬀ of the station must be
positive. A delivery failure imposes an arbitrarily high penalty K on the buyer.
ĉe timing of the game is as follows:
ǉ. ĉe buyer and the station agree on the sale contract: qc  Q and the price (to
be speciėed later). We assume that the buyer has all the ex-ante bargaining
power and makes a take-it-or-leave it oﬀer to the station. If the station rejects
the oﬀer, the station can still produce using internal funds I and sell in the
market as described below.
Ǌ. ĉe station then negotiates the loan terms (L andD) with the lender. ĉe
station now has all the bargaining power and the lender is subject to a zero
proėt constraint.
Ǐǎ
ǋ. ĉe loan is disbursed and the station decides whether to divert the loan, or use
it to purchase the cherries necessary to fulėll the sale contract.
ǌ. Fourth, the price in the international market, p; is realized. ĉe price in the
market at the time of sale is drawn from a continuos distribution F(p);with
p = E[pjpƤ] =
R1
Ƥ pdF(p):
Ǎ. ĉe station decides whether to execute the sale and repay the loan or whether
to search for an alternative buyer who pays price p0 = p and avoid repayment.
Conditional on search, an alternative buyer is found with probability μ: If a
buyer is not found, the ėrm can still sell to the original buyer and repay the loan
with a delay.
ǋ.ǋ.Ǌ BĹłķļŁĵŇĿ: FĽŇňŉ BĹňŉ
We consider ėrst the case in which all contracts are perfectly enforceable. Without
loss of generality, let’s focus on a ėxed price contract pc and solve the game backward.
ĉe realization of the price p has no eﬀect on the execution of the sale.¹³ Assuming
the station has been able to ėnance the production of a quantityQp  Q; the
revenues of the station are given by
Π (qc; pc; p) =
8><>: q
cpc + p (Qp   qc) w.p. μ
qcpc w.p. (ƥ  μ)
: (ǋ.ǉ)
In either case, the station repays the amountD to the lender, or the entire value of
the sales if this is lower. For the lender to make zero proėts in expected terms, we
¹³ĉe costs incurred by the buyer for a delivery failure, K; are assumed to be larger than
μqc (p  pc) ; the expected gains of searching for an alternative buyer.
ǏǏ
must have
L  qcpc + μ (Qp   qc) p: (ǋ.Ǌ)
Given a contract qc and pc and internal funds Iwe also have
I+ L  pƤQp: (ǋ.ǋ)
ĉe station borrows to produce at full capacity if
μp  pƤ (ǋ.ǌ)
which we assume to be the case. ĉe station, therefore, borrows L = pƤQ  I: At
time of contracting with the buyer, therefore, the station’s outside option is given by
uƤ =
 
μp  pƤ

Q:
In order for the buyer to enter any contract, it must be that its willingness to pay,
v (qc) ; is higher than μp for at least some quantity qc:To simplify, we assume that
v (Q)  μp and hence pc = μp and qc = Q:
ǋ.ǋ.ǋ FĽŎĹĸ PŇĽķĹ CŃłŉŇĵķŉ
When contracts are not enforceable, incentive compatibility considerations must be
taken into account. We begin by considering the case in which a ėxed price contract
has been signed and, again, solve the game backward. We focus on the case in which
the amount lent by the lender is lower than the face value of the contract with the
buyer, i.e., qcpc  D:Upon observing the realized value of p, the station repays
Ǐǐ
without further delays if
qcpc D+μp (Qp   qc)+δV  μ pQp + δUD+(ƥ  μ) qcpc   D+ δUL (ǋ.Ǎ)
whereV is the discounted value of future expected proėts when continuing the
relationship with the buyer and the lender,UD is the discounted value of future
expected proėts following a default andUL is the discounted value of future expected
proėts when paying late. We assumeUD = U andUL = σV+ (ƥ  σ)Uwhere σ is
the probability the loan is renewed following a late payment. ĉe second assumption
implies that i) the continuation value following a late payment only depends on
whether the loan is renewed or not and ii) conditional on no future loan, the
continuation value does not depend on loan default. We leaveV andU unmodeled.
ĉe incentive compatibility constraint can be rewriĨen as
δ (V  U) 

μ
ƥ  σ (ƥ  μ)

 (D+ (p  pc) qc) : (ǋ.ǎ)
ĉe station decides to search for an alternative buyer and default for i) lower value
of the relationship with the buyer and lender, ii) higher values of debtD; and iii)
higher value of the realized market price p:ĉis positive dependence of the likelihood
of default on ex-post market price realization provides the test for strategic default.¹⁴
ĉe probability of a default, therefore, is given by
Φd (D; pc; qc) = P(p  pd) = μ

ƥ  F

δ (V  U)  D+ pcqc
μqc

(ǋ.Ǐ)
Loan diversion is easier to be deterred for i) lower debt levelsD; ii) higher prices
paid by the buyer pc, and iii) higher values of expected future prices p (sinceQp  qc
¹⁴To examine the dependence of the likelihood of default on qc we need to consider that D also
depends on qc.
ǏǑ
by deėnition).¹⁵
ǋ.ǋ.ǌ SŊŁŁĵŇŏ Ńĺ PŇĹĸĽķŉĽŃłň
ĉemain implications we bring to the data are:
Test ǉ: [Ex-anteMoral Hazard] Sudden increases in expected future prices at the time
of contracting reduce the likelihood of default;
Test Ǌ: [Ex-postMoral Hazard] In the presence of strategic default, suﬃciently large
unanticipated increases in ex-post world prices lead to higher likelihood of default;
Test ǋ: [Informal Enforcement]Data on the face value of debt D; sale contracts pc
and qc and world prices μ can be used to recover lower (upper) bounds to the value
of the relationship δ (V  U) for repaying (defaulting) borrowers using (ȗ.Ț).
ǋ.ǌ EŁńĽŇĽķĵŀ RĹňŊŀŉň
ĉe empirical section is divided into two parts. ĉe ėrst section exploits the impact of
international coﬀee price movements to test for the presence of moral hazard. ĉe
section mainly focuses on ex-post moral hazard, i.e., strategic default, and provides a
simple calibration of the ex-post incentive compatibility constraint (ǋ.ǎ) to bound
the value of informal enforcement in this market. ĉe second section implements a
regression discontinuity design to test for the presence of credit constraints.
¹⁵ĉe contract must also satisfy the ex-ante incentive compatibility constraint: the station must
prefer to invest the borrowed amount rather than diverting the loan. It is easy to show that sudden
increases in the expectation of future prices immediately aěer contracting time increase the incentive
to use the loan to produce.
ǐǈ
ǋ.ǌ.ǉ SŉŇĵŉĹĻĽķ DĹĺĵŊŀŉ
Cash Flows and Contract Timing
ĉe typical cash Ěow proėle for a station during a year is illustrated in Figure ǋ.ǎ.ǉ
(using the case of Rwanda as an example). Sales and loan contracts are typically
negotiated and signed around the beginning of the harvest season (in the Rwanda
case, aroundMarch). ĉe loan is then disbursed, possibly in multiple instalments, to
cover the costs of purchasing cherries from the farmers. During the harvest season,
stations buy cherries from farmers and process them. ĉe contract typically matures
aěer the end of the harvest season (i.e., aěer July).
An important advantage of the seĨing is that the timing of the harvest season is not
synchronized across countries (and, to some extent, even across regions within
countries). For example, most contracts in Peru (which represents ǋǌƻ of the loans in
the sample) are closed in the periodMay to June while in Nicaragua (which accounts
for ǉǉƻ of the loans in the sample) most contracts are closed in October to
December. In Rwanda (which accounts for ǐƻ of the loans in the sample) most
contracts are closed aroundMarch to April. Figure ǋ.ǎ.Ǌ shows seasonality paĨerns in
the closing and maturity dates of loan contracts in the sample. ĉe closing date (blue
lines) refers to the month in which the loan contract is signed. ĉematurity date (red
line) refers to the date at which the loan is supposed to be repaid (which typically falls
at or close to the delivery date in the sale contracts). ĉe Figure illustrates the
bimodal distribution of both closing and maturity dates with two peaks in each
distribution driven by asynchronous coﬀee harvest seasons across countries.
Variation in the timing of the harvest seasons and, therefore, of closing and maturity
dates across countries allows us to control for time ėxed eﬀects in a Ěexible way in all
the empirical speciėcations.
ǐǉ
Baseline Test for Strategic Default
Figure ǋ.ǎ.ǋ presents a graphical approach to test for the presence of ex-post moral
hazard. Recall that the key test for strategic default is that unanticipated increases in
the world price of coﬀee before the maturity date increase the likelihood of default. A
distinctive advantage of the set up is given by the presence of liquid future markets.
Futures prices quoted at the time of the closing date for the maturity date provides an
unusually good proxy for parties expectations of future prices. Figure ǋ.ǎ.ǋ shows the
relationship between unanticipated increases in international coﬀee prices and loan
defaults. ĉe red line shows the distribution of the ratio of New York ‘C’ Arabica
coﬀee price at the maturity date divided by the future price for delivery closest to the
maturity date at the time the contract was closed. ĉis is the ratio of the realized price,
p; over the expected price, p:During the sample periods international coﬀee prices
have tended to increase, i.e., relatively more contracts have ratios above one. ĉe blue
line plots the density of loan defaults conditional on a given price ratio. Consistently
with the presence of ex-post moral hazard, defaults are disproportionately
concentrated among contracts that have witnessed sharp unanticipated price
increases.
A possible objection to Figure ǋ.ǎ.ǋ is that managers of coﬀee washing stations in
developing countries might not form expectations based on futures market prices.
Figure repeats the exercise proxying unanticipated price increases as the ratio of
prices at maturity over price at closing, normalized by the same ratio over the same
period a year earlier. ĉe results of the test are qualitatively very robust to this
alternative formulation.
Table ǋ.ǎ.Ǌ provides an econometric investigation of the strategic default test. ĉe
econometric investigation allows us to control for a number of factors that might be
driving the paĨerns identiėed in Figure ǋ.ǎ.ǋ. Speciėcally, Table ǋ.ǎ.Ǌ reports results
ǐǊ
from the speciėcation
Φdlst = αƤ + αƥplst + αƦplst + βZls + μt + "lst (ǋ.ǐ)
where Φdlst is a dummy taking value equal to one if station s defaults on loan l closed at
time t:¹⁶ĉemain regressor of interest is plst; the realized price at the loan maturity
date. To control for expectations about future prices, the speciėcation includes plst;
the futures price quoted at closing for the maturity date, as a control.¹⁷ Furthermore,
we include an extensive vector of station and loan controls Zls as well as time of
closing ėxed eﬀects μt ("lst is an error term).¹⁸
Table ǋ.ǎ.Ǌ reports results from diﬀerent speciėcations. Column ǉ presents OLS
estimates on the full sample. ĉe estimates show that an unanticipated ten percent
increase in the world coﬀee price over the life of the contract is associated with a ǉƻ
increase in the default rate. Column Ǌ shows the same speciėcation, but presents the
probit estimates instead of the linear probability model in Column ǉ and obtains
qualitatively similar results. Column ǋ restricts the sample to the later loans where we
have data on both numerical and leĨer scores. Columns ǌ and Ǎ show the same results
with varying levels of controls to analyze the sensitivity of the results to various
speciėcations. ĉe point estimates are extremely robust across a variety of samples
and speciėcations.
Strategic Default: an Event Study Approach
ĉe average upward trend in world coﬀee prices during the sample period
potentially poses a threat to the results in Table ǋ.ǎ.Ǌ : loans with longer maturity
¹⁶A loan is in default if it is wriĨen-oﬀ, restructured or has no payments aěer ninety days from its
maturity dates. Alternative deėnitions of default yields qualitatively similar results.
¹⁷Speciėcations in which the ratio plst=plst is considered, as in Figure , yields identical results.
¹⁸Controls in Zls are country ėxed eﬀects, a measure of the history of the relationship between the
lender and station, and leĨer scores ėxed eﬀects interacted with all other controls.
ǐǋ
might witness larger price increases and also have a higher propensity to default for
reasons unrelated to strategic default.¹⁹ On the other hand, the linear speciėcations in
(ǋ.ǐ), might underestimate the importance of strategic default: while world price
increases may increase default through ex-post moral hazard, decreases in prices
might also increase default simply by limiting borrower’s ability to repay the loan.
To overcome these concerns, we implement an ‘event study’. ĉe event study takes
the largest ǊǍ monthly price increases during the sample period, to examine strategic
default. We compare default rates of contracts maturing just before a large price
increase (when there is no opportunity for default in response to the shock) with
default rates of contracts maturing just aěer a large price increase (when ėrms do have
an opportunity to respond to the shock).
Table ǋ.ǎ.ǋ presents the results of simple t-test comparisons in average default rates
in the two samples of contracts. ĉe table investigates speciėcations that vary with
respect to the deėnition of default as well as with respect to the length of the time
window considered for the event study. In all speciėcations, we ėnd results consistent
with strategic default and that are both qualitatively and quantitatively consistent
with the OLS estimates in Table ǋ.ǎ.Ǌ. Contracts that mature in the month aěer a
large price increase are ǌ.ǐƻ-ǎ.ǋƻmore likely to default. Relative to the price change
in the same month the year prior, the average price change is about ǉǈƻ. So the
appropriate interpretation of the t-test is that a price increase of ǉǈƻ beyond
expectations increases default by about Ǎƻ on average.
Table ǋ.ǎ.ǌ checks the robustness of the result in Table ǋ.ǎ.ǋ using an RD
speciėcation (see Figure ǋ.ǎ.Ǎ for the corresponding graph). ĉe RD speciėcation is
almost the same methodology as the t-test but it controls for anything else which may
¹⁹Sincewe include closing dates ėxed eﬀects, the available variation doesn’t allow toĚexibly control
for the length of the loan and, at the same time, identify strategic default out of realized prices at
maturity dates. ĉis problem is similar to the well-known fact that it is not possible to Ěexibly identify
cohort, time and age eﬀects (see, e.g., Deaton (ǉǑǑǏ)).
ǐǌ
vary continuously between the before and aěer groups. Indeed in table ǌ the results
are very similar to the results in table ǋ.ǎ.ǋ, ranging from about ǋ.ǐƻ to Ǒ.ǐƻ for the
same set of price increases. ĉis speciėcation also lends itself naturally to testing
robustness to diﬀerent bandwidths, and varying the bandwidth does liĨle to change
the estimates. As a baseline estimate we use the optimal bandwidth as described by
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (ǊǈǉǊ) and test robustness using ǏǍƻ and ǉǊǍƻ of this
bandwidth.
Heterogeneity: Relationship’s History and Contract Types
ĉe results presented are consistent with ex-post moral hazard being an important
determinant of default rates. To further investigate the logic behind strategic defaults,
Table ǋ.ǎ.Ǎ explores heterogeneity in the relationship between unanticipated price
increases and defaults along the lines suggested by the ex-post incentive constraints
(ǋ.ǎ). Table ǋ.ǎ.Ǎ also reports results from nonparametric regression discontinuity
design speciėcations, focusing at the discontinuity in the interaction between the
distance to a large price increase and the heterogeneity dimension of interest. Each
speciėcation controls for both the price increase and the heterogeneity variable
separately.
Column ǉ focuses on the role played by the history of the relationships between
the lender and the borrower, as a proxy for δ (V  U) : Although the model has leě
unspeciėed the determinants of continuation valuesV andU; it is plausible that the
value of the relationship increases in the age of the relationship between the borrowers
and the lender.²⁰ ĉe value of the relationship is likely to be increasing with the age of
the relationship for two reasons. First, there are selection eﬀects: relationships with
higher value are, everything else equal, more likely to survive. Second, there might be
²⁰SeeMacchiavello andMorjaria (Ǌǈǉǋ)for a detailed empirical exploration of this idea in the con-
text of Kenya rose exports.
ǐǍ
learning eﬀects. During the course of the relationship the lender acquires information
about the borrower and, conditional on relationship survival, oﬀers beĨer loan terms.
We proxy the age of the relationship in a rather crude way, using a dummy for whether
parties have had a previous loan or not. ĉe results conėrm the intuition of the
incentive compatibility constraint and underscore the importance of informal
enforcement: stations are about Ǐ.Ǎƻmore likely to engage in strategic default when
given the opportunity if no prior relationship exists with the lender.
Column Ǌ focuses on heterogeneity with respect to the type of contract. Although
‘diﬀerential’ contracts do not completely eliminate price risk, the theoretical section
highlighted how ėxed price contracts are signiėcantly more vulnerable to strategic
default. ĉe results conėrm that strategic default appears to be signiėcantly more
relevant in the sample of loans based on ėxed price sale contracts.²¹;²²
ĉe Value of Relationships: A Quantitative Exploration of IC Constraints
ĉe evidence reported above is consistent with the logic of the ex-post incentive
compatibility constraint (ǋ.ǎ). We now use the incentive compatibility constraint to
get a measure of the value of the relationship with the lender and the buyer,
δ (V  U) ; for each station in the sample. ĉere are two aspects that are worthy of
note. First, the right hand side of the incentive constraint (ǋ.ǎ) depends on the face
value of debt,D; the sale contracts qc and pc; and the likelihood of ėnding an
alternative buyer, μ: All of these variables are (directly) observable in the data.
²¹ĉe sale contract type is endogenous implying that results could be driven by selection. For
example, “worse” borrower are both more likely to default and to have a higher demand for insurance
(and end up with a ėxed price contract). On the other hand, buyers aware of counterpart risk might
bewilling to award ėxed price contracts only to “good” exporters which are less likely to default. If this
is the case, our results are downward biased. Some preliminary evidence suggest the laĨer hypothesis
to be more consistent with the data.
²²It is worth noting that, due to the diﬃculties in coding sales contract types, this last result is very
preliminary. First, it is performed on a limited sample of loan contracts. Second,measurement error is
induced by having coded contracts very conservatively aĨributing a ėxed price rather than a variable
price when in doubt. We are in the process of re-coding sale contracts.
ǐǎ
Second, in the data we observe both loan repayments as well as defaults. ĉis implies
that we can compute lower (upper) bounds to the value of the relationship for
repaying (defaulting) borrowers alike.
To take full advantage of the data, we slightly extend the logic of the incentive
compatibility constraint (ǋ.ǎ). Upon observing the realization of the world price p;
the station has two options: i) to repay the loan, or ii) to search for a new buyer. In
the second case, if the station ėnds a new buyer, there is default. Otherwise, we
assume that the station repays the loan with a three months delay. Furthermore, the
data reveal that not all relationships are continued, even conditional on loan
repayment. Denote by ρR the probability to obtain a loan in the following season
conditional on repayment and letUR be the net present value of future proėts
conditional on repayment but not having the loan renewed. With the new
formulation, the payoﬀ from repaying the loan is given by
ΠR(ρR) = pcqc   D+ δ  ρRVR + (ƥ  ρR)UR : (ǋ.Ǒ)
ĉe lender informally punishes default by limiting the probability of future loans
aěer default. Denoting with ρL the probability of a loan renewal following a late
payment, we can express the payoﬀ associated with searching for an alternative buyer
as
ΠS = μΠD + (ƥ  μ)ΠR  ρL (ǋ.ǉǈ)
where ΠD is the payoﬀ following default and ΠR(ρL) is the payoﬀ following a late
repayment. Note that the formulation implicitly assumes that the continuation values
following a repayment,VR andUR; do not depend on whether the loan was repaid or
not (i.e., all punishments come from a lower probability of loan renewal). Denoting
with ρL the probability of a loan renewal following a default, the payoﬀ associated
ǐǏ
with default is given by
ΠD = pqc + δ(ρDVD + (ƥ  ρD)UD): (ǋ.ǉǉ)
Table ǋ.ǎ.Ǒ reports estimates for the probability of loan renewal conditional on
timely repayment, ρR; late repayment, ρL; and default, ρD:²³ĉe data suggest that
ρR ' Ʀ=Ƨ; ρL ' ƥ=Ƨ and ρD = Ƥ:Moreover, an estimate for μ; the probability of
ėnding a buyer, is given by the proportion of defaults conditional on stations paying
late or defaulting. ĉe data give an estimate of μ ' ƥ=Ʀ:
We assumeUƤ = UD; i.e., the continuation value conditional on the loan not being
renewed does not depend on whether the loan was defaulted upon or not.²⁴ Recall
that the value of the loan is a certain proportion, denoted λ; of the value of the
contract. As an approximation, we haveD = λ  qcpc  (ƥ+ r);where r is the
interest rate on the loan.²⁵
Substituting the values into the incentive constraints and normalizing the bound
by the nominal value of the sale contract, qcpc;we obtain, aěer some manipulation,
the following representation of the incentive compatibility constraint for a particular
loan ‘i’
δ (VR   UR)
qcipci


pi
pci
  (ƥ  λi(ƥ+ ri))

: (ǋ.ǉǊ)
²³ĉe table shows decreasing punishments for decreasing severity of default. Clients that have
contracts wriĨen oﬀ or restructured are about Ǐǈƻ less likely to receive a future loan from the lender.
Loans that are wriĨen oﬀ, restructured or no payment is made for Ǒǈ days aěer maturity are ǋǍƻ
less likely to receive a loan in the future from the lender, while loans wriĨen oﬀ, restructured or no
payment is made for only ǋǈ days aěer maturity are only Ǌǎƻ less likely to receive a future loan from
the lender.
²⁴ĉis is a strong assumption. Unfortunately, given the nature of our data we do not observe what
happens to borrowers to which loans are not renewed. Note, however, that the relationship between
UƤ and UD is ambigous. If there are reputational losses associated with default, UD < UƤ: On the
other hand, by defaulting, the borrower obtains higher current periodmonetary payoﬀwhich canhelp
relaxing ėnancial constraints in the next period. In this case,UD > UƤ:
²⁵For loans in earlier yearswe donot observe λ:Tomaximize sample size and consistency, we proxy
λ using the theoretical assignment based on the leĨer score, i.e., λ takes value equal to ǈ.ǌ for score
leĨer B, ǈ.ǎ for leĨer A and ǈ.Ǐ above that.
ǐǐ
Figure ǋ.ǎ.ǎ plots the distribution of the right hand side of (ǋ.ǉǊ) for both repaying
and defaulting loans. Two aspects are worth of aĨention. First, the Figure clearly
shows that the estimated (lower bound to the) value of the relationship for repaying
borrowers is signiėcantly larger than the estimated (upper bound to the) value of the
relationship for defaulting borrowers: informal enforcement is an eﬀective
mechanism to deter strategic default. Second, we ėnd the value of informal
enforcement associated with the lending arrangement to be very high. On average, it
amounts to Ǎǌƻ of the nominal value of the sale contract for which the loan is given
on the sample of repaying borrowers. In other words, borrowers forego monetary
gains worth a half of the sale contract to preserve a good relationship with the buyer
and the lender. Conversely, defaulting borrowers must be given an additional gain
worth at least Ǌǈƻ of the sale contract in order to trigger a default.
Are these estimate large or small? To answer this question we need a benchmark. If
rents necessary to sustain these relationships are dissipated through ex-ante
competition then these estimates can be compared to estimates of the ėxed costs of
exports. More closely to our set up, Macchiavello andMorjaria (Ǌǈǉǋ) apply a similar
methodology to estimate the value of informal relationships with foreign buyers in
the context of Kenya rose exports. Macchiavello andMorjaria (Ǌǈǉǋ) quantify the
value of the relationship for Kenya rose exporters with foreign buyers to be at least
ǉǈƻ of sales in the relationship. In the next Section we document that borrowers are
credit constrained and make relatively large proėts from the loans disbursed by the
lender. Taken together, these facts suggest that maintaining a good relationship with
the lender, not just the buyer, is an important aspect of informal enforcement in this
market.
Suppose we agree these are large numbers. What do they mean? Broadly speaking,
if we think of commercial relationships as assets, all relationships with positive net
ǐǑ
present value should take place. Large estimates suggest that, due to severe
contractual frictions, many valuable relationships do not emerge in equilibrium. In
the narrower context of our sample, we can try to understand the source of the value
from the relationship with buyers and the lender. To do so, we need to look at credit
constraints and returns to capital.
ǋ.ǌ.Ǌ CŇĹĸĽŉ CŃłňŉŇĵĽłŉň: EŋĽĸĹłķĹ ĺŇŃŁ RDDĹňĽĻł
ĉe Test for Credit Constraints
Given the evidence above, it would be tempting to infer that borrowers in our
sample are likely to be severely credit constrained. First, we have shown evidence of
ex-post moral hazard. Ex-post moral hazard limits the borrower’s pledgeable income
and implies that proėtable investment opportunities may not be undertaken for lack
of funds. Second, the data show that borrowers derive signiėcant value from
preserving good relationships with the lender, suggesting that borrowers ėnd it
diﬃcult to replace the lender with alternative sources of credit. To quantitatively
assess the importance of credit constraints, however, a more rigorous analysis must
nevertheless be developed. First, given relatively low default rates, evidence of ex-post
moral hazard is consistent with relatively low levels of credit constraints for few
borrowers. Second, the value of the relationship with the lender could stem simply
from cheaper loans relative to alternative sources of ėnance.
Testing for credit constraints, however, poses signiėcant empirical challenges. By
deėnition, a ėrm is credit constrained if its marginal product of capital is larger than
the (marginal) interest rate at which it can borrow, i.e.,
MPKi > (ƥ+ ri) : (ǋ.ǉǋ)
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ĉe fundamental challenge is that the marginal product of capital,MPKi; is not
directly observable and hard to estimate econometrically in the absence of exogenous
variation in the amount of capital invested. (see, e.g., Keniston (Ǌǈǉǉ)).
In this section we take advantage of data from the internal rating system of our
lender to implement a regression discontinuity design on the eﬀects of larger working
capital loans. In an important paper, Banerjee and DuĚo (Ǌǈǈǐ) develop a test for
credit constraints based on a natural experiment that changed the availability of credit
to ėrms of a certain size. ĉe logic of the test is both powerful and elegant. When
oﬀered extra credit at the same interest rate, a credit constrained ėrm will absorb the
extra credit to increase investment, input purchase and, ultimately, production. A ėrm
that is not credit constrained might also absorb the additional credit and, potentially,
expand production if alternative sources of credit to the ėrm are more expensive than
the newly available one.²⁶ When this is the case, however, the ėrm will substitute
existing sources of credit at least to a certain extent and completely if production
increases. In other words, ėrms are credit constrained if in response to an exogenous
increase in the supply of capital that hold constant the interest rate:
ǉ] Production Response: Purchases of inputs and sales increase (PR),
Ǌ] No Loan Substitution: ĉe additional capital is not used to substitute existing, more
expensive, sources of credit (NLS).
ĉe test for credit constraints is valid under two additional conditions. First, the
decision inĚuenced by the availability of credit must be ‘at the margin’, i.e., the
availability of credit shouldn’t aﬀect the decision of whether the ėrm continues to
operate or not. Second, the ėrmmust be able to use the extra loan to pay-down
existing loans at no additional costs. ĉese two conditions are hard to verify in
²⁶In which case, the ėrm is said to be rationed by the lender oﬀering cheaper credit but not credit
constrained, sinceMPKi = (ƥ+ ri) :
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general and, ideally, their validity should be assessed on a case by case. A distinctive
advantage of our seĨing is that both are satisėed. First, recall that we focus on working
capital loans to purchase a perfectly divisible input (cherries from the farmers). ĉat
is, ėrms can adjust at the margin in response to an increased availability of working
capital. Second, working capital loans in our environment are signed before the
beginning of the harvest season and mature well within a year, i.e., before the
following harvest season. ĉe loans in our portfolio, therefore, are negotiated at a time
in which the station can still costlessly adjust on other margins by borrowing less from
other suppliers of funds (typically large exporters or domestic ėnancial institutions).
Regression Discontinuity: Design and Loan Outcomes
ĉe credit scores determine the percentage of the contract that is funded, which
typically ranges from ǌǈƻ to Ǐǈƻ. ĉe scores are assigned based on a numerical grade
based on an in depth look at the ėrms ėnancial statements. Numerical grades range
from ǉ-Ǎ. Grades below Ǌ.Ǐ receive a grade of C. Firms with a C score do no receive a
loan, and do no show up in our sample. However we’re told by the lender that there
are very few of these, as ėrms don’t apply without a leĨer of intent from a buyer,
which would be diﬃcult to get for poor ėrms. Most ėrms receive either a B, which is
any score between a Ǌ.Ǐ and ǋ.ǋǍ, or an A which is any score between ǋ.ǋǍ and ǌ.ǋǍ.
Some ėrms receive a AA, which is a score above ǌ.ǋǍ. We use the discontinuities
around both the ǋ.ǋǍ and the ǌ.ǋǍ thresholds.
Table ǋ.ǎ.ǎ shows the impact of receiving a numerical score just above a threshold
on contract terms. We run three speciėcations. One in which we take the distance to
the nearest threshold as the running variable for each loan, and then we also run the
distance to each threshold separately. We ėnd an overall diﬀerence of about Ǐǈƻ in
the pooled sample which may bias upwards the estimate as it compares B loans to AA
loans in some cases. However this source of bias is not large, as we get estimates of
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about ǎǍƻ when we look at each threshold individually.²⁷
ĉe average loan amount at the pooled threshold is about ǋǈǈ,ǈǈǈ USD.ĉis
means that ėrms just above the pooled threshold are receiving loans of about ǌǈǍ,ǈǈǈ
USD while ėrms just below the threshold are receiving loans of about ǉǑǍ,ǈǈǈ USD
for a diﬀerence of about Ǌǉǈ,ǈǈǈ USD.ĉis is a very large diﬀerence in credit access
for ėrms of this size. However, while diﬀerences in loan amounts given are very large
on either side of the threshold there is no diﬀerence in the interest rates given on
either side of the threshold. On average interest rates are slightly lower for the more
highly scored ėrms, but the diﬀerence is generally only around ǉƻ, and is estimated
very imprecisely.
Manipulation of the assignment of observations around the threshold at which the
discontinuity is estimated is the main threat to the validity of the regression
discontinuity design. Although conversations with the lender suggest that
manipulation is unlikely, it is worth conducting more formal tests. Figure ǋ.ǎ.Ǐ
reports the results from theMcCrary (Ǌǈǈǐ) test. ĉe test compares the density of
observations of the assignment variable around the discontinuity. If there is a
discontinuity in the density of the assignment variable at the threshold, then this may
suggest that the assignment of some observations might have been manipulated. ĉe
Figure clearly shows that no such discontinuity is observed in the data.
In our context, however, there might be incentive to manipulate assignment of
observations in either directions: loan oﬃcers might want to ‘push up’ particularly
worthy loan applications and ‘push down’ particularly unworthy ones. Table ǋ.ǎ.ǐ
takes advantage of the rich nature of our data to explore the relevance of these
concerns. ĉe numerical score is based on ǋǈ sub-scores, each ranging between ǉ and
²⁷ĉe results are fairly consistentwith thedescriptionof theprocess as explained tousby the lender.
ĉe lender claimed that a ǏǍƻ diﬀerence in loan amount between grades was normal, as they would
provide around ǌǈƻ of the amount needed to ėll the contract for a low graded ėrm and about Ǐǈƻ for
a high graded ėrm.
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Ǎ. Each sub-score has, therefore, liĨle impact on the overall score. Table ǋ.ǎ.ǐ shows
that out of the thirty sub-scores, in only one case we can detect a discontinuity in the
sub-score at the threshold of interest. ĉe evidence, therefore, appears to be
inconsistent with manipulation of the assignment.
Impact of Larger Loans
ĉe evidence above suggests that the regression discontinuity design approximate
an ideal experiment in which (essentially) identical loans applications are given
diﬀerent amounts of working capital at the same interest rate. We use this variation in
access to credit to test for credit constraints.
Table ǋ.ǎ.Ǐ reports the results. Column ǉ explores whether the additional loan was
used to purchase more inputs. Firms indeed used the additional money to buy
cherries. Spending on coﬀee cherries increased by about ǌǈƻ if we take the average
estimate at the ǋ diﬀerent bandwidths. ĉe total money spent on purchases at the
threshold is about ǍǊǐ,ǈǈǈ USD, meaning that if ǌǈƻ of that was the additional
amount spent on cherries, the diﬀerence in the additional loan amount and the
diﬀerence in cherry purchases are less than ǉƻ apart from each other (Ǌǉǉk versus
Ǌǉǈk). Column Ǌ explores the eﬀect of the larger loans on sales and ėnds an increase
of about Ǌǈƻ. Column ǋ considers labour and, consistently with stations operating
below capacity, fails to detect a signiėcant impact on the amount of labour used.
Taken together, therefore, Columns ǉ,Ǌ and ǋ show that condition (PR) in the test for
credit constraints is satisėed: ėrms absorbed the additional loans to increase input
purchases and expand production.
Column ǌ considers other working capital loans. We ėnd no evidence that ėrms
used the additional loan from our lender to substitute other sources of working
capital. In order to compare the eﬀects on other working capital loans with the
additional loan, we report results in level. Column ǌ shows that the eﬀect on other
Ǒǌ
loans is not only imprecisely estimated, but also signiėcantly smaller than the Ǌǈǈ,ǈǈǈ
USD additional loan in all the speciėcations. Column ǌ, therefore, shows that
condition (NLS) in the test for credit constraints is also satisėed: ėrms did not use
the additional loans to substitute other, more expensive, sources of credit. In sum, the
evidence suggests that borrowers in the sample are severely credit constrained.²⁸
As noted above, there is a constant return to scale technology between amount of
cherries purchased by farmers and sales volumes. It is, therefore, interesting to
decompose the eﬀects on input purchases and output sales into volumes and prices
eﬀects. Column Ǎ shows that the price of cherries purchased from farmers went up by
Ǌǈƻ, implying that the volume of purchases only increased by Ǌǈƻ. ĉe increase in
prices paid to farmers is large, but not surprising. At the time of harvest, the aggregate
supply of cherries in a given location is inelastic. Stations, which are likely to hold
some degree of market power in their local markets, compete with other buyers
(mainly traders) to purchase cherries from the farmers. ĉe increase in the price of
cherries purchased means that local farmers unambiguously beneėt from a station in
their area receiving larger loans. ĉis externality is a crucial consideration from a
policy perspective, as further discussed below.
Column ǎ explores the sale price. ĉere is no reason why the sale price is expected
to increase following a larger loan. First, the terms of the sales to the buyer for which
the sale contract is used as collateral is either agreed in advance (under ‘ėxed price’
contracts) or at a later date (under ‘diﬀerential’ contracts) at which point the price is
determined by market movements. ĉe stations use the additional loans also to
²⁸ĉe analysis on station level outcomes can only be performed when information on the ėnancial
results for the year in which the loan is disbursed are available. ĉis, essentially, restrict the sample
to loans for which the station had a continued relationship with the lender the following year. ĉis
introduces sample selection. It is, however, not entirely obvious how this sample selection would
bias the results. ĉe sample selects beĨer stations that repaid the loans. ĉese stations might be less
credit constrained than defaulting stations, but might be more credit constrained than non-repeating
borrowers.
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expand sales in the market but then, again, the eventual price of the sale is not directly
aﬀected by the size of the loan. Column ǎ conėrms that the additional loan had no
impact on the average sale price for the station.
Returns on the Additional Loans and Value of Relationship with Lender
ĉe additional loans received by ėrms was largely spent to purchase cherries from
farmers. ĉe quantity of cherries purchased only went up by about Ǌǈƻ, because the
price of cherries purchased from farmers went up by Ǌǈƻ. Still, a Ǌǈƻ increase in
cherry quantity led to a large increase in proėts for the stations. ĉe additional
Ǌǉǈ,ǈǈǈ USD received was translated into an additional ǎǌ,ǈǈǈ USD in proėt,
representing a rate of return of about ǋǊƻ. ĉis rate of return is signiėcantly higher
than the (marginal) interest rate paid on loans.
We can also use these estimate to assess the importance of the relationship with the
lender. As a benchmark, imagine that the value of the relationship with the lender is
given by net present value of the future (additional) proėts the station obtains from
the loans. Conditional on repayment, the probability of loan renewal is around ǏǍƻ
and a discount factor of ǈ.Ǒ (which seems reasonable given interest rates). ĉis gives
an eﬀective discount factor equal to ǈ.ǎǏǍ. An increase in loan of approximately ǉǊǈK
Ʈ translates into an increase in proėts of approximately. ǋǈK Ʈ., a return of
approximately. ǊǍƻ on the loan. Given linear technology, it is relatively safe to
extrapolate this returns to the average loan size. Since, on average, a loan is worth ǎǈƻ
of the value of the contract with the buyer, we have that the loan gives proėts worth
Ƥ:ƦƩ Ƥ:ƪ = Ƥ:ƥƩ of the value of the contract, implying an associated discounted
value equal to Ƥ:ƪƫƩ= (ƥ  Ƥ:ƪƫƩ) Ƥ:ƥƩ ' Ƥ:Ƨ: Recalling that for the average
repaying borrower the value of the relationship with the buyer and the seller was
approximately Ǎǈƻ of the value of the contract, we have that at least ǎǈƻ of the value
of informal enforcement derives from the relationship with the lender.
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ǋ.Ǎ PŃŀĽķŏ DĽňķŊňňĽŃł
Despite the contractual arrangements set-up by our lender, the evidence shows that
ex-post moral hazard is an important driver of default and, consequently, credit
constraints among coﬀee washing stations. Strategic default is intimately connected
to i) imperfect enforcement of international trade contracts, and ii) (unanticipated)
Ěuctuations in the international price of coﬀee. ĉese forces are, however, by no
means speciėc to the environment under consideration. Waves of defaults in the
international trade of commodities are oěen triggered by swinging international
prices. For example, an unprecedented wave of broken contracts has upended the
coĨon marketplace following volatile price swings: the number of arbitration cases
handled by the International CoĨon Agreement has soared during the recent coĨon
price boom from an average of seventy per year to more than two hundred cases.²⁹
Most of the disputes end up with contracts being renegotiated. Even aěer winning
arbitration cases, however, companies struggle to enforce awards in foreign courts
especially in developing countries as it is diﬃcult to prevent blacklisted defaulters
from continuing to do business under new names or through intermediary trading
houses.
Strategic default is intimately connected to the use of ėxed price contracts. ĉis
raises the question as of why foreign importers agree to enter ėxed price contracts
with exporters at times of high price volatility. ĉe answer most likely lies in
asymmetric access to insurance and hedging markets between the contractual parties.
With ėxed price contracts, buyers guarantees availability of coﬀee and typically insure
themselves through hedging on features markets. Sellers eliminate both price and
quantity risk. Fixed price contracts, however, expose parties to counterpart risk:
²⁹For a recentdiscussion see, e.g., hĨp://online.wsj.com/article/SBǉǈǈǈǈǐǏǊǋǑǎǋǑǈǌǌǌǏǏǊǐǈǌǍǏǏǎǊǋǍǋǊǉǎǏǍǎǍǎǌǎ.html
(accessed on-line November ǉǊth ǊǈǉǊ).
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buyers renege when prices falls and sellers renege when prices raise. A natural
solution would be to try to extend access to hedging markets to exporters from
developing countries. ĉis is, however, complicated by the diﬃculties in aggregating
relatively small producers as well as by the large collateral requirements necessary to
undertake hedging transactions. ĉe evidence in the paper suggests that
strengthening relationships with buyers can facilitate access to working capital
ėnance, i.e., there might be a role for export promotion and association black-listing
defaulters to be played.³⁰
Finally, we have documented contractual externalities along the chain: farmers
beneėt from larger loans given to the stations in the form of higher prices. Since
stations cannot pledge farmers’ surplus to obtain loans, not just the station, but the
chain as a whole is credit constrained. ĉese contractual externalities can be
mitigated by fostering integration along the chain. Integration can be achieved by
private processors integrating (backward) into coﬀee growing by acquiring an estate.
In many context, however, this option is likely to be limited by the same type of credit
constraints we have documented as well as by other constraints working against
consolidation in land markets. Cooperatives, in which farmers own processing units,
could in principle provide an alternative form of (forward) integration.
ǋ.ǎ CŃłķŀŊňĽŃł
In sum, the study provides evidence on the sources (ex-post moral hazard) and
consequences (credit constraints along the supply chain) of credit market
³⁰Commodity price stabilization has featured prominently in development debates, thoughmostly
from a macro point of view. Keynes (ǉǑǌǋ), Prebisch (ǉǑǍǈ) and Singer (ǉǑǍǈ) have been among
the most inĚuential supporters of unilateral and multilateral stabilization programs for commodity
prices. Bauer and Parish (ǉǑǍǊ), Friedman (ǉǑǍǌ), McKinnon (ǉǑǎǏ) and Stiglitz and Newbury
(ǉǑǐǉ) argued against price stabilizationmechanisms and in favour of market-based solutions, which
have been followed since the mid ’ǐǈs in most countries.
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imperfections among relatively large ėrms in developing countries. As discussed
above, the contractual practices adopted by our lender already mitigate sources of
credit market imperfections, including those for which we ėnd direct evidence.
ĉerefore, our study identiėes a lower bound to the cost of credit market
imperfections.
Moreover, we tie the presence of these imperfections to underlying features of the
environment, particularly the lack of access to hedging instruments. Exploring in
greater details the determinants of contractual choices in this environment is leě for
future research.
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Table 3.6.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Observations
Panel A: Station-Years
Total Assets ǉ,ǍǌǏ,ǎǎǏ Ǌ,ǌǏǉ,ǋǍǏ ǎǍǏ
Total Liabilities ǉ,ǈǈǑ,ǈǊǈ ǉ,ǐǌǐ,ǐǑǍ ǎǋǎ
Net Equity ǍǏǊ,ǈǑǎ ǐǋǌ,ǏǉǑ ǎǍǐ
Financial Debt ǐǉǉ,ǌǐǊ ǉ,ǌǑǎ,ǍǏǉ ǌǏǈ
Working Capital ǉǐǋ,ǐǋǈ ǌǋǎ,ǋǏǍ ǎǍǋ
Total Income Ǌ,ǐǈǎ,Ǒǌǐ Ǎ,ǉǏǏ,ǌǐǑ ǎǌǐ
Cost of Goods Sold Ǌ,ǌǌǉ,ǋǎǊ ǌ,ǎǐǐ,ǎǐǍ ǎǌǊ
Net Proėt ǌǑ,ǉǉǈ ǉǌǋ,ǉǑǑ ǎǍǉ
Permanent Employees ǋǎ.Ǐ ǉǎǑ.Ǒ ǌǉǋ
Seasonal Employees ǐǑ.ǌ ǊǑǉ.Ǐ ǌǉǊ
Panel B: Loans
Loan Amount ǋǌǌ,ǎǑǏ ǋǑǈ,ǍǐǑ ǏǍǋ
Interest Rate ǈ.ǈǑǐ ǈ.ǈǉǉ ǏǍǋ
Previous Loan with Lender ǈ.ǊǑ ǈ.ǌǍ ǏǍǋ
Numerical Score ǋ.ǎǈ ǈ.Ǌǌ Ǌǐǐ
Length of Loan (Days) ǋǈǈ ǋǈǊ ǏǍǋ
Write-Oﬀ ǈ.ǈǊǏ ǈ.ǉǎǉ ǏǍǋ
Write-Oﬀ of Restructured ǈ.ǈǊǑ ǈ.ǉǎǑ ǏǍǋ
Write-Oﬀ, Restructured or ǋǈ days without payment ǈ.ǈǎǉ ǈ.Ǌǌ ǏǍǋ
Write-Oﬀ, Restructured or ǎǈ days without payment ǈ.ǈǍ ǈ.ǊǉǑ ǏǍǋ
Write-Oﬀ, Restructured or Ǒǈ days without payment ǈ.ǈǌǐ ǈ.Ǌǉǌ ǏǍǋ
World Price at Closing ǋǌǎ.ǌǍ ǉǊǋ.ǎǋ ǏǍǋ
World Price at Maturity ǋǏǐ.ǐǍ ǉǋǋ.ǎǍ ǏǍǋ
Price Change Over Life of Contract ǉ.ǉǋǏ ǈ.ǊǎǊ ǏǍǋ
Notes: ĉe sample of station years is a constructed panel based on ėnancial statements for the ǋ years prior to a loan being given. For ėrms
with loans in multiple years, the panel includes ėnancials for both before and aěer loans were given. ĉe sample of contracts is all coﬀee
contracts from our lender. We have a leĨer score for all contracts, but a numerical score for only a subset of contracts, as the numerical
score system was introduced by the lender partway through the sample. ĉe sample also only includes contracts that were closed at the
time of receiving the data. Open loans were omiĨed as they did not have the same opportunity for default.
Table 3.6.2: International Prices and Default
Dependant Variable: Write-oﬀ, restructured or
no payment aěer Ǒǈ days late
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ) (Ǎ)
Price Ratio ǈ.ǉǉǌ*** ǉ.ǌǍǑ** ǈ.ǌǊǑ*** ǈ.ǈǏǑǌ** ǈ.ǉǉǉ***
(ǈ.ǈǌǈǎ) (ǈ.ǎǉǐ) (ǈ.ǈǐǉǉ) (ǈ.ǈǋǏǎ) (ǈ.ǈǌǉǈ)
Model OLS Probit OLS OLS OLS
Sample Full Full Numerical Full Full
Score Only
Futures Price (maturity) at Closing Date Y Y Y N Y
LeĨer Score Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y Y
Country Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y Y
Closing Month Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y Y
Previous Relationship Y Y Y N N
Number of Loans to Client Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y N N
Observations ǎǑǑ Ǎǐǐ ǊǐǑ Ǐǈǌ ǎǑǑ
R-squared ǈ.Ǌǐǈ N/A ǈ.ǋǍǉ ǈ.ǊǏǋ ǈ.ǊǏǑ
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical signiėcance at the ǉƻ, Ǎƻ and ǉǈƻ level respectively.
Description: ĉe table reports the estimated diﬀerence in mean rates of default when the world price of coﬀee doubles during the life of the
contract. ĉe price ratio here is deėned as the price at maturity over the price at closing. Robust standard errors clustered by country are
reported in parentheses.
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Table 3.6.3: Out of Season Price Increases and Default Robustness
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ)
Write-Oﬀ, Restructured Write-Oﬀ, Restructured Write-Oﬀ, Restructured
no payment aěer ǋǈ days no payment aěer ǎǈ days no payment aěer Ǒǈ days
t-test: Ǌ Month Window ǈ.ǈǎǋǎ** ǈ.ǈǍǍǑ** ǈ.ǈǌǐǎ**
(ǈ.ǈǊǍǑ) (ǈ.ǈǊǋǏ) (ǈ.ǈǊǊǐ)
Observations ǌǉǑ ǌǉǑ ǌǉǑ
t-test: ǋ Month Window ǈ.ǈǌǍǐ** ǈ.ǈǌǈǋ** ǈ.ǈǋǌǋ*
(ǈ.ǈǊǉǌ) (ǈ.ǈǉǑǌ) (ǈ.ǈǉǐǏ)
Observations ǍǍǊ ǍǍǊ ǍǍǊ
t-test: ǌ Month Window ǈ.ǈǌǑǏ** ǈ.ǈǌǉǑ** ǈ.ǈǋǎǎ**
(.ǈǉǑǑ) (.ǈǉǏǑ) (.ǈǉǏǌ)
Observations ǎǉǎ ǎǉǎ ǎǉǎ
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical signiėcance at the ǉƻ, Ǎƻ and ǉǈƻ level respectively. ĉe number of months from one of the top ǊǍ monthly price increases
is the grouping variable, and we restrict the sample to contracts ǉ month before and one month aěer to be sure results above are driven by contracts around the
threshold. For contracts that end in the month of an event, we assign the contract to the ‘before’ group if the contract matures in the ėrst half of the month and
the ‘aěer’ group if the contract matures in the second half of the month.
Description: Estimates show that out-of season price increases have a positive impact on default through the strategic default mechanism. When the price of
coﬀee increases but the price of inputs does not, strategic default is most likely. ĉe results are almost identical to the results using the discontinuitymethodology.
Table 3.6.4: International Prices and Default - Robustness
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
Write-Oﬀ Write or Write-Oﬀ, Restructured Write-Oﬀ, Restructured
Restructured or no pmt aěer ǋǈ days or no pmt aěer Ǒǈ days
Optimal Bandwidth ǈ.ǈǋǐǍ* ǈ.ǈǌǌǐ* ǈ.ǈǑǐǎ** ǈ.ǈǍǈǈ***
(ǈ.ǈǊǊǋ) (ǈ.ǈǊǋǉ) (ǈ.ǈǌǐǍ) (ǈ.ǈǉǏǋ)
ǏǍƻ Optimal Bandwidth ǈ.ǈǉǐǏ* ǈ.ǈǊǍǈ** ǈ.ǈǍǌǈ** ǈ.ǈǍǈǈ***
(ǈ.ǈǉǈǐ) (ǈ.ǈǉǊǌ) (ǈ.ǈǊǌǑ) (ǈ.ǈǉǏǋ)
ǉǊǍƻ Optimal Bandwidth ǈ.ǈǋǑǍ* ǈ.ǈǌǎǊ** ǈ.ǉǈǈǈ** ǈ.ǈǑǉǑ***
(ǈ.ǈǊǊǉ) (ǈ.ǈǊǊǑ) (ǈ.ǈǌǐǋ) (ǈ.ǈǋǊǉ)
Observations ǏǍǍ ǏǍǍ ǏǍǍ ǏǍǍ
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical signiėcance at the ǉƻ, Ǎƻ and ǉǈƻ level respectively. ĉe estimates are calculated using a regression discontinu-
ity design using the kernel density method. A triangle kernel was used and the optimal bandwidth was calculated as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(ǊǈǉǊ). ĉe number of months from one of the top ǊǍ monthly price increases is the running variable.
Description: ĉe table reports the estimated diﬀerence in mean rates of default when the world price of coﬀee increases immediately before the
contract matures as opposed to immediately aěer. It shows that in-season world price increases do not have a signiėcant impact on default, and
if anything reduce default by reducing credit constraints. Out of season price increases have a positive impact on default through the strategic
default mechanism. When the price of coﬀee increases but the price of inputs does not, strategic default is most likely.
Table 3.6.5: International Prices and Default, Heterogeneity
Dependent Variable: Write-Oﬀ, Restructured or No payment for Ǒǈ Days
(ǉ) (Ǌ)
Mature aěer P jump x Mature aěer P jump x
(No) relationship history Fixed price contract
Optimal ĉreshold ǈ.ǈǏǍǌ** ǈ.ǈǍǉǎ***
(ǈ.ǈǋǏǉ) (ǈ.ǈǉǏǑ)
ǏǍƻ Optimalĉreshold ǈ.ǈǏǍǌ** ǈ.ǈǍǉǎ***
(ǈ.ǈǋǏǉ) (ǈ.ǈǉǏǑ)
ǉǊǍƻ Optimalĉreshold ǈ.ǈǏǍǌ** ǈ.ǈǑǌǌ***
(ǈ.ǈǋǏǉ) (ǈ.ǈǋǊǑ)
Observations ǏǍǎ ǏǍǎ
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical signiėcance at the ǉƻ, Ǎƻ and ǉǈƻ level respectively. Due to complications with the
ėxed price coding, we only know that a subset of ėrms do not have ėxed price contracts. We deėne a ėxed price contract
as a contract where a percentage of the contract is not tied to the world coﬀee price. ĉe estimates are calculated using a
regression discontinuity design using the kernel density method. A triangle kernel was used and the optimal bandwidth
was calculated as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (ǊǈǉǊ). Each speciėcation controls individually for each element of the
interaction.
Description: ĉis table shows heterogeneity in strategic default, showing that default is driven by ėrms that got smaller
loans, ėrms without a prior history with the lender and ėrms with ėxed prices.
ǉǈǉ
Table 3.6.6: Regression Discontinuity Results, Loan Outcomes
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ) (Ǎ) (ǎ)
log(Loan Amount) log(Interest Rate)
Pooled B to A A to AA Pooled B to A A to AA
Optimal Bandwidth ǈ.Ǐǉǋ** ǈ.ǎǏǍ** ǈ.ǎǍǑ* -ǈ.ǈǉǌǈ -ǈ.ǈǈǎǉǈ -ǈ.ǈǉǌǏ
(ǈ.ǊǐǏ) (ǈ.ǋǈǋ) (ǈ.ǋǎǌ) (ǈ.ǈǉǎǏ) (ǈ.ǈǊǌǈ) (ǈ.ǈǉǌǊ)
ǏǍƻ Optimal Bandwidth ǈ.Ǐǎǌ** ǈ.ǏǏǈ** ǈ.ǏǍǉ* -ǈ.ǈǉǍǋ ǈ.ǈǉǊǐ -ǈ.ǈǉǑǈ
(ǈ.ǋǊǌ) (ǈ.ǋǎǍ) (ǈ.ǋǑǌ) (ǈ.ǈǉǐǌ) (ǈ.ǈǊǍǏ) (ǈ.ǈǉǎǊ)
ǉǊǍƻ Optimal Bandwidth ǈ.ǎǉǎ** ǈ.ǎǊǋ** ǈ.Ǎǎǋ -ǈ.ǈǈǑǑǈ -ǈ.ǈǉǋǍ -ǈ.ǈǉǌǌ
(ǈ.ǊǎǍ) (ǈ.Ǌǐǌ) (ǈ.ǋǌǏ) (ǈ.ǈǉǍǐ) (ǈ.ǈǊǊǋ) (ǈ.ǈǉǋǎ)
Observations ǉǑǏ ǉǑǏ ǉǑǏ ǉǐǑ ǉǐǑ ǉǑǉ
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical signiėcance at the ǉƻ, Ǎƻ and ǉǈƻ level respectively.ĉe estimates are calculated using a regression
discontinuity design using the kernel density method. A triangle kernel was used and the optimal bandwidth was calculated as in Im-
bens and Kalyanaraman (ǊǈǉǊ). ĉe distance in numerical score points to the threshold is the running variable in each speciėcation.
Controls include the amount requested, and renewals.
Description: ĉe table shows that geĨing a score just above the threshold results in a ǎǍƻ higher loan at each threshold. ĉis is con-
sistent with what was told to us by the lender. ĉe lender typically lends between ǌǈƻ-Ǐǈƻ of the working capital deėcit, depending
on the leĨer score and loan size. If the ǌǈƻ - Ǐǈƻ diﬀerence was a hard rule this would result in an estimate of ǈ.ǏǍ. While there is a
very sharp increase in the loan amount at the threshold, there is no diﬀerence in the interest rate given to the client.
Table 3.6.7: Regression Discontinuity Results, Firm Outcomes
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ) (Ǎ) (ǎ)
Spent/Earned Prices
log(Purchases) Sales log(Labour) Other Loans log(Purch. P) log(Sales P)
Optimal Bandwidth ǈ.ǌǏǏ* ǉ,ǍǐǏ,ǋǌǍ** ǈ.Ǌǉǐ Ǌǉ.ǐǎ ǈ.ǊǊǉ** ǈ.ǊǍǌ
(ǈ.Ǌǎǋ) (Ǐǋǈ,ǐǎǉ) (ǈ.ǌǌǉ) (Ǌǐǈ.ǋ) (ǈ.ǉǈǊ) (ǈ.ǊǊǏ)
ǏǍƻ Optimal Bandwidth ǈ.ǋǈǈ* ǉ,ǐǏǊ,ǎǌǑ** ǈ.Ǌǉǐ -ǎǐ.Ǒǈ ǈ.Ǌǎǌ** ǈ.ǌǊǈ
(ǈ.ǍǉǊ) (ǐǉǐ,ǋǑǑ) (ǈ.ǍǈǑ) (ǋǉǊ.ǈ) (ǈ.ǉǉǍ) (ǈ.ǊǑǍ)
ǉǊǍƻ Optimal Bandwidth ǈ.ǌǊǑ* ǉ,ǋǉǊ,Ǌǉǐ* ǈ.ǊǉǑ ǎǏ.ǎǍ ǈ.ǊǉǊ** ǈ.ǉǈǋ
(ǈ.ǊǍǎ) (ǎǐǉ,ǌǍǏ) (ǈ.ǌǉǍ) (ǊǎǏ.Ǌ) (ǈ.ǈǑǏǌ) (ǈ.ǊǈǑ)
Observations ǉǎǏ ǉǐǑ ǉǐǈ ǉǉǊ ǉǐǑ ǉǐǑ
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical signiėcance at the ǉƻ, Ǎƻ and ǉǈƻ level respectively.ĉe estimates are calculated using a regression discontinuity design
using the kernel density method. A triangle kernel was used and the optimal bandwidth was calculated as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (ǊǈǉǊ). ĉe distance
in numerical score points to the threshold is the running variable in each speciėcation. In some cases, due to many missing values, similar variables are used to
predict missing observations. For example, cost of goods sold is sometimes used to predict spending on cherries, when observations are missing. In these cases
the variables used to predict the missing observations (e.g. cost of goods sold) are included as controls.
Description: ĉe table shows that ėrms are credit constrained. GeĨing a score just above the threshold results in a ǌǈƻmoremoney spent purchases, almost Ǌǈƻ
of which is from increased quantity purchased. ĉe additional purchases in cherries results in almost ǎǍ,ǈǈǈ higher proėt, strong evidence of credit constraints.
ĉe additional money helps farmers, as prices for cherries increase by over Ǌǈƻ.
ǉǈǊ
TĵĶŀĹň
Table 3.6.8: Regression Discontinuity Robustness: Test for Manipulation of Sub-scores
Running Variable: Distance toĉreshold (Overall Score)
Dependent Variable Estimate Standard Error Observations
Entity Score ǈ.ǉǈǐ (ǈ.ǉǈǑ) ǋǉǍ
Accounting Quality ǈ.ǊǊǉ (ǈ.ǊǊǎ) ǋǉǍ
Planning Systems ǈ.ǊǍǈ (ǈ.ǉǍǎ) ǋǉǍ
Liquidity Risk -ǈ.ǈǍǎǉ (ǈ.Ǌǈǎ) ǋǉǍ
Leverage ǈ.ǉǍǎ (ǈ.ǉǏǐ) ǋǉǍ
Proėtability ǈ.ǈǑǋǌ (ǈ.ǉǐǑ) ǋǉǍ
Credit History (RC) ǈ.ǉǍǍ (ǈ.Ǌǈǋ) ǋǉǊ
Asset Quality ǈ.ǊǈǍ (ǈ.ǉǎǐ) ǋǈǋ
Product Score ǈ.ǈǌǈǏ (ǈ.ǈǑǎǈ) ǋǉǍ
Processing ǈ.ǉǍǎ (ǈ.ǉǋǉ) ǋǉǍ
Supply Security -ǈ.ǈǎǋǈ (ǈ.ǉǈǋ) ǋǉǍ
Management Score ǈ.ǈǉǏǎ (ǈ.ǉǉǌ) ǋǉǍ
General Manager -ǈ.ǈǎǌǑ (ǈ.ǉǎǐ) ǋǉǍ
Finance Accounting ǈ.ǈǏǑǍ (ǈ.ǉǑǈ) ǋǉǍ
Internal Controls ǈ.ǉǍǎ (ǈ.ǉǎǑ) ǋǉǌ
Marketing Sales -ǈ.ǉǋǊ (ǈ.ǉǎǊ) ǋǉǍ
Staﬀ Retention ǈ.ǉǌǊ (ǈ.ǉǏǈ) ǋǈǋ
Report Quality ǈ.ǈǈǎǑǉ (ǈ.ǉǌǊ) ǋǉǌ
Report Punctuality ǈ.ǈǈǋǉǐ (ǈ.ǉǍǉ) ǋǈǊ
Email Promptness ǈ.ǉǋǈ (ǈ.ǉǎǐ) ǋǉǌ
Email Quality ǈ.ǈǎǐǊ (ǈ.ǉǍǐ) ǋǈǊ
Buyer Score ǈ.ǉǉǎ (ǈ.ǈǑǈǉ) ǋǉǍ
Buyer Quality ǈ.ǉǍǐ (ǈ.ǉǉǑ) ǋǉǍ
Buyer Relationship ǈ.ǉǏǈ (ǈ.ǉǎǍ) ǋǉǍ
Buyer Mix ǈ.ǎǈǏ** (ǈ.Ǌǐǐ) ǋǉǍ
Type of Contract ǈ.ǉǉǌ (ǈ.ǉǎǈ) ǋǈǈ
Context Score -ǈ.ǈǋǊǐ (ǈ.ǈǌǏǋ) ǋǉǍ
Weather -ǈ.ǈǌǊǊ (ǈ.ǉǌǎ) ǋǉǍ
Country Stability ǈ.ǈǎǊǉ (ǈ.ǉǊǐ) ǋǉǌ
Sales Price Volatility ǈ.ǈǐǑǏ (ǈ.ǊǊǊ) ǋǈǈ
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical signiėcance at the ǉƻ, Ǎƻ and ǉǈƻ level respectively. ĉis table shows the placebo
for the manipulation of the sub-scores which make-up the numerical score that is used in the RD estimates. Only one
out thirty sub-scores shows any diﬀerence on either side of the overall score threshold, but at least one of thirty would is
expected as a false positive. We interpret this as evidence supporting the assumption that there was no manipulation or
sorting of scores in order to give preferred clients beĨer contractual terms.
ǉǈǋ
Figure 3.6.1: Timing of Events (Rwanda Example)
ĉe Figure depicts the typical timing of events in the case of Rwandan contracts.
ǉǈǌ
Figure 3.6.2: Seasonal Distribution of Contract Timing
ĉe Figure shows seasonality paĨerns in the closing and maturity dates of loan contracts in the sample. ĉe closing date (blue lines) refers to the month in
which the loan contract is signed. ĉe maturity date (red line) refers to the date at which the loan is supposed to be repaid. ĉe Figure illustrates the bi-modal
distribution in the distributions of both closing and maturity dates. ĉe two picks in each distribution are driven by asynchronous coﬀee harvest seasons across
countries and altitude ranges. Contracts tend to be closed just ahead of, or in the early phases, of the harvest season. For example, most contracts in Peru
(which represents ǋǌƻ of the loans in the sample) are closed in May ￿ June, in Nicaragua (which accounts for ǉǉƻ of the loans in the sample) most contracts are
closed in October ￿ December, in Rwanda (which accounts for ǐƻ of the loans in the sample) most contracts are closed in March ￿ April.
ǉǈǍ
Figure 3.6.3: Unanticipated Price Increases and Defaults (Part I)
ĉe Figure shows the relationship between unanticipated increases in international coﬀee prices and loan defaults. ĉe red line shows the distribution of the
ratio of New York C Arabica coﬀee price at the maturity date divided by the future price for delivery closest to the maturity date at the time the contract was
closed. During the sample periods international coﬀee prices have tended to increase, i.e., relatively more contracts have ratios above one. ĉe blue line plots
the density of loan defaults conditional on a given price ratio. Defaults, measured as [insert details] are disproportionately concentrated among contracts that
have witnessed sharp unanticipated price increases.
ǉǈǎ
Figure 3.6.4: Unanticipated Price Increases and Defaults (Part II)
ĉe Figure shows the relationship between unanticipated increases in international coﬀee prices and loan defaults. ĉe red line shows the distribution of the
ratio of New York C Arabica coﬀee price at maturity date divided by the same price at closing date, normalized by the same ratio for the previous year. During
the sample periods international coﬀee prices have tended to increase, i.e., relatively more contracts have ratios above one. ĉe blue line plots the density of loan
defaults conditional on a given price ratio. Defaults, measured as [insert details] are disproportionately concentrated among contracts that have witnessed sharp
unanticipated price increases.
ǉǈǏ
Figure 3.6.5: Regression Discontinuity Graph - Price Increase Event Study
ĉe ėgure shows the increase in default for contracts that mature just before rather than just aěer a large price increase. Default is measured as any contract
wriĨen-oﬀ, restructured or for which no payment was received for Ǒǈ days aěer maturity. A window of ǌ months before and aěer the price increase is shown in
the ėgure. ĉe ėgure is the graphical version of the estimates in table ǌ, and shows that the eﬀect is not driven by a large decline before the threshold, or other
odd functional form issues. ĉe slight spike before the threshold is expected due to the imperfect coding of contracts that mature in the same month as a large
price increase, and this eﬀect is expected to downward bias the estimates, as demonstrated by the graph. A triangle kernel was used and the optimal bandwidth
was calculated as in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (ǊǈǉǊ). ĉe number of months from one of the top ǊǍ monthly price increases is the running variable.
ǉǈǐ
Figure 3.6.6: The Value of Informal Enforcement for Defaulters and Non-Defaulters
ĉe ėgure shows the relationship between relationship value (relative to sales) and the distribution of default. ĉe red line shows the relationship values of ėrms
that did not default, while the blue line shows the relationship values of ėrms that did default. Firms that default have lower relationship values throughout the
distribution, suggesting that informal enforcement is an eﬀective mechanism in managing default. Relationship value is calculated as
(Pmarket   Pexpected)=Pexpected + factor (see text for explanation).
Table 3.6.9: Informal Punishment for Default by the Lender
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
Dependent Variable: Future Contracts From Lender
Write-oﬀ -ǈ.ǎǑǐ***
(ǈ.ǈǎǑǎ)
Write-oﬀ or restructured -ǈ.ǏǈǊ***
(ǈ.ǈǎǑǈ)
Write-oﬀ, restructured or no payments for Ǒǈ days -ǈ.ǋǍǊ***
(ǈ.ǉǊǊ)
Write-oﬀ, restructured or no payments for ǋǈ days -ǈ.ǊǎǍ**
(ǈ.ǉǈǋ)
World Price and Futures Y Y Y Y
LeĨer Score Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Country Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Closing Month Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y
New Client Dummy Y Y Y Y
Number of Loans to Client Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Observations ǏǈǊ ǏǈǊ ǏǈǊ ǏǈǊ
R-squared ǈ.ǎǎǉ ǈ.ǎǎǋ ǈ.ǎǋǐ ǈ.ǎǋǊ
Notes:*** p<ǈ.ǈǉ, ** p<ǈ.ǈǍ, * p<ǈ.ǉ. Standard errors are clustered by Country. ĉe table shows that stations are punished for de-
faulting on contracts. If a station has a contract wriĨen oﬀ, they are about Ǐǈƻ less likely to receive a loan from the lender in the future.
ǉǈǑ
Figure 3.6.7: Regression Discontinuity Graph - Sorting Around the Threshold
ĉe ėgure shows that he lender did not manipulate scores around the threshold to give larger loans to preferred clients.
ǉǉǈ
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Culture andContraČs: ĉeHiﬆorical
Legacy of Forced Labour
ǌ.ǉ IłŉŇŃĸŊķŉĽŃł
ĉere is widespread agreement that colonial extractive institutions play a role in
explaining current economic development. More contentious has been explaining
why this association exists. In this study we focus on how colonial extractive
institutions can inĚuence development through a cultural channel, over and above the
persistence of these institutions (Acemoglu et al. (Ǌǈǈǉ)) or their eﬀect on human
capital (Glaeser et al. (Ǌǈǈǌ)). Despite being prominently discussed as a potentially
important mechanism (Nunn (ǊǈǉǊ)), there is currently liĨle evidence that colonial
institutions continue to inĚuence economic outcomes through culture. Although
there is good reason to believe that this mechanism is important, as historical events
have been shown to still shape current aĨitudes (Nunn andWantchekon (ǊǈǉǊ))¹.
ĉis paper provides a concrete example of how colonial extractive institutions can
¹For a link between economics and culture see Knack and Keefer (ǉǑǑǏ), Guiso et al. (Ǌǈǈǌ),
Algan and Cahuc (Ǌǈǉǈ), Hjort (Ǌǈǉǉ). For a review of the literature on trust and economic activity,
see Alesina and LaFerrara (ǊǈǈǍ).
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impact economic development through culture by examining the lasting economic
impact of one speciėc colonial institution, through one dimension of culture.
We study the colonial era introduction of forced labour in Rwanda and Burundi,
and the impact that it had on interethnic aĨitudes between the Hutu-Tutsi. In the
post-colonial era the Hutu and Tutsi have been sharply divided, with Hutu extremists
killing ǉ,ǈǈǈ,ǈǈǈ Tutsi and Tutsi sympathizers in the ǉǑǑǌ Rwandan genocide. ĉese
tensions are thought to have been exacerbated by Belgian colonial policy in the coﬀee
sector. In particular, the Belgians allowed the Tutsi chiefs to recruit Hutu coﬀee
farmers into forced labour. We use this policy to investigate the origins of ethnic
tensions, and quantify their importance for maintaining successful agreements. We
ėnd that a family history of forced labour worsens interethnic aĨitudes, and increases
the reliance on within ethnicity economic relationships, which leads to worse partner
matches and increases contractual default.
Forced labour was introduced aěer Belgium assumed control of Rwanda and
Burundi and was related to coﬀee production. One of Belgium’s ėrst colonial policies
was to encourage the production of coﬀee with subsidies so that they could integrate
the region into the monetary economy and tax the proėts from coﬀee². Aěer these
initial programs were unsuccessful, the Belgians introduced coﬀee quotas in ǉǑǋǉ,
under which, each Chief was responsible for the maintenance of ǉ,ǈǈǈ healthy coﬀee
trees. Maintaining these trees was a large burden on the Chiefs in some regions, so in
these regions the Belgians allowed the use of Hutu forced labour. Each Chief was
Tutsi, and only Hutu farmers were eligible for the program³. ĉis is expected to have
contributed to interethnic tensions:
²Prior to this much of the economy relied on the trade of caĨle which was not easily taxable by
colonists
³ĉis was rationalized by arguing that the policy was less harmful to Hutu communities since tra-
ditionally taxation could be paid for with labour in these communities, but the same traditional insti-
tution did not exist in Tutsi communities. Forced labour was deemed more culturally acceptable to
Hutu than to Tutsi.
ǉǉǊ
“ĉe looting and the forced labour continued unabated and, even if the
massacres and amputations stopped, the punishments imposed in their
place were almost equally vicious...While ‘kiboko’ is Kiswahili for
hippopotamus, Belgians had adopted ‘ikiboko’ as the name for a strip of
hippo hide that was used as a lash...ĉe humiliating part came with
having to bare the boĨom, while lying on the ground, face down, which
was calculated to inĚict maximum pain. As for the divisive part, the
colonialist administered those eight lashes on the chief, out of sight of
his citizens, and then directed the chief to do the same on the
oﬀenders...ĉat way, the [Hutu] citizens blamed their [Tutsi] chief, not
the colonial master.” - Butamire (ǊǈǉǊ)
To evaluate the impact of colonial era forced labour on economic relationships I
bring together data from several sources: (ǉ) a ėeld survey on contracts fromHutu
and Tutsi farmers. Contracts in the data are inter-household crop insurance, where
transfers are made between households producing diﬀerent crops when one of the
crops experiences a bad harvest⁴. I collect information on the number of defaults and
agreements, the value of the agreements, and the reasons for default. (Ǌ) Trust game
data between people both within and between ethnicities, and across ǉǌǋ villages⁵.
Due to the sensitivity of the issue, data on interethnic trust⁶ is rarely available where
tensions are highest⁷. ĉe trust game allows me to construct a measure of interethnic
tensions without making ethnicity salient⁸. (ǋ) Constructed data on historical forced
⁴ĉis type of agreement is also discussed in Kinnan, Ǌǈǈǐ
⁵see Berg et al. (ǉǑǑǍ), Barr (Ǌǈǈǋ), Glaeser et al. (Ǌǈǈǈ) for more on the trust game, and Barr
(Ǌǈǈǋ), Fehr and GoeĨe (ǊǈǈǍ) for the trust game implemented in the ėeld.
⁶ĉe aĨitudinal change measured could be distrust, resentment, indignation, anger, retribution,
vengeance, etc. I remain agnostic about the speciėc change in aĨitude.
⁷Yet these are the regions where observing the economic implications of tensions is most impor-
tant
⁸ĉe trust game has been used to measure interethnic aĨitudes before (Fershtman and Gneezy
(Ǌǈǈǉ))
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labour from historical reports and archival sources. While local forced labour is very
diﬃcult to observe, crop proėtability allows us to back out village level exposure,
which was directly associated with the ability of the Chiefs to meet coﬀee quotas.
ĉis measure is constructed using archival data on national crop prices, and GIS
estimates of crop suitability. ĉe ėnal dataset consists of over ǎǈǈ individuals, and I
observe historical family location from one of ǋǋǊ forced-labour era villages from the
(uniėed) colonial state of RuandaUrundi.
My empirical approach uses a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences and regression kink design
to investigate whether (a) forced labour on coﬀee farms impacted Hutu resentment
towards Tutsi, and (b) this Hutu-Tutsi resentment inĚuences economic relationships.
First, I show that forced labour inĚuenced Hutu resentment of Tutsi by comparing
the trust game oﬀers fromHutu to Tutsi, between twoHutu living in the same village,
but with diﬀerent forced labour family histories. Hutu whose grandparents parents
worked on coﬀee farms in forced labour villages make signiėcantly lower oﬀers to
Tutsi in the trust game than other Hutu. ĉey don’t, however, make lower oﬀers to
other Hutu, and Tutsi do not make lower return oﬀers in these regions. ĉis shows
that historical interethnic mistrust was passed from grandparent to parent to child,
throwing light on the theoretical mechanism advanced by Tabelini (Ǌǈǈǐ) about the
transmission of cultural traits.
I proceed by documenting that the increased interethnic resentment causes a
greater economic reliance on the ethnic community. I show that Hutu with a family
history of mistreatment are ǉǈƻmore likely to pass up on potentially proėtable
opportunities with Tutsi business partners. ĉis increased ethnic network reliance
has economic implications, but those implications are theoretically ambiguous. On
the one hand, doing business within a closed community improves information,
ǉǉǌ
coordination and enforcement imperfections⁹. On the other hand though, the Hutu
were historically more agrarian and the Tutsi were more pastoral (Destexhe (ǉǑǑǍ)),
so restricting these agreements within networks could reduce inter-household crop
insurability, and increase default.
Our data on economic agreements resolves this ambiguity. Hutu with a history of
mistreatment experience Ǌǐƻmore contractual default than Hutu without a family
forced labour history in inter-household crop insurance agreements. Tutsi, who were
not eligible for forced labour, do not experience more default if their families were
from a forced labour village. ĉis is consistent with the idea that restricting economic
activity within communities constrains the ability to ėnd a good match. People that
partner with less well matched individuals experience more contractual default.
Following this logic, it should be true that the increase in defaults was the result of
a worse partner match rather than dishonesty or low eﬀort on behalf of the partner.
Data was collected on the perceived reasons of default, and analysis of this data
reinforces the idea that default was due to worse partner matching. Hutu from
mistreated families were ǌǍƻmore likely to experience contractual default due to the
ability of their partner to make an insurance transfer, but no more likely to experience
default due to the eﬀort of their partner. Tutsi from forced labour villages were no
more likely to experience an increase in default due to either their partners ability or
eﬀort.
Finally, I show the implications of this mechanism on income. ĉose whose
grandparents were exposed to forced labour on coﬀee farms earn ǉǍƻ less income
than other Hutu. ĉis is consistent with an income loss estimate that relies only on
the default rate and value of defaulted contracts. ĉis data reveals that if all of the
⁹We know that culture is especially important when information is incomplete - it has be deėned
as rules of thumb that evolve to avoid costly information acquisition (Boyd and Richardson (ǉǑǐǍ);
Gilboa and Schmeidler (ǉǑǑǍ); Gigerenzer and Goldstein (ǉǑǑǎ); Boyd and Richardson (ǊǈǈǍ);
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (ǊǈǈǏ). Also, see Karlan et al. (ǊǈǈǑ) and Karlan (ǊǈǈǏ)
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decrease in income came from an increase in defaults, we should expect a ǉǊƻ
reduction in income.
ĉis helps to resolve one identiėcation concern: that the forced labour caused a
direct reduction in income, and low income, not trust, impacts the sustainability of
economic relationships. I interpret the similarity of the two income estimates as
evidence that very liĨle of the direct eﬀect of forced labour on income is unaccounted
for. ĉis seems reasonable as in each speciėcation the direct eﬀect of income on
forced labour is instrumented for, using a predicted income variable based on
grandparent land characteristics. ĉis variable is highly correlated with current
income so it is likely capturing the bulk of the direct historical income eﬀect.
A second identiėcation concern may be that trust develops to overcome
imperfections in the contracting environment (McMillan andWoodruﬀ (ǉǑǑǑ);
Macchiavello andMorjaria (Ǌǈǉǋ)). ĉis is potentially true in Rwanda and Burundi,
however the empirical speciėcations control for this, so it is not an alternative
interpretation of these results. Every speciėcation includes current village ėxed
eﬀects, which accounts for diﬀerences in the current contracting environment.
More challenging is accounting for the eﬀect of the historical contracting
environment. It may be a concern that grandparent contractual environment could
have been related to altitude through institutions or historical shocks (e.g. Nunn and
Puga (ǊǈǉǊ)), which is also correlated with coﬀee proėtability and therefore forced
labour. To resolve this concern I test both a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences speciėcation
and a regression kink speciėcation. ĉe regression kink design relies on the fact that
wherever coﬀee was a primary crop, forced labour was banned by the Belgians. And
when it was secondary or third crop, forced labour was allowed, but only enough was
allowed to close the gap between the current production and the quotas. ĉis means
that there was a sharp change in the slope of forced labour with respect to coﬀee
ǉǉǎ
proėtability around the threshold at which coﬀee became the most proėtable crop.
ĉis strategy identiėes the eﬀect of forced labour by comparing people from villages
just on either side of the threshold. ĉat is, it compares people from historical villages
with nearly identical land characteristics. Because of this feature, the regression kink
strategy is able to control for the eﬀect of historical contracting environment. ĉe
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates and the regression kink estimates are very similar.
Other concerns may also exist. For example, the eﬀect of the genocide could
reduce interethnic trust and confound estimates. Genocide era village ėxed eﬀects
can account for this eﬀect, but to as an additional check, I run the main results for the
Burundi-only sample where there was no genocide, and the results are nearly
identical. Yet another concern may be migration. On one hand migration helps
identiėcation, because it allows for the separation of current contractual environment
from historical events using current village ėxed eﬀects. Because of the ėxed eﬀects,
identiėcation relies on a comparison between migrants. However diﬀerential
migration could be problematic. For example, there may have been more migration
among mistreated Hutu three generations ago, and recent migrants may be treated
diﬀerently than third generation migrants. Diﬀerential historical migration seems
unlikely, since Ěeeing forced labour was very diﬃcult and was brutally punished
(Gourevitch (ǉǑǑǐ)). However, the collection of extensive family migration data
allows this mechanism to be explicitly tested. I ėnd no diﬀerences in migration rates
at any generational level among Hutu since the colonial era, so migration is not a
threat to identiėcation.
ĉe remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section the historical
seĨing surrounding forced labour in Rwanda and Burundi is described. In section ǋ I
explain the data that I collected to analyze the impact of forced labour on interethnic
trust and economic relationships. Section ǌ explains the empirical strategies pursued,
ǉǉǏ
and how any remaining identiėcation concerns are dealt with. Section Ǎ outlines the
main results and discusses the robustness and falsiėcation tests. Finally, section ǎ
concludes.
ǌ.Ǌ HĽňŉŃŇĽķĵŀ BĵķĿĻŇŃŊłĸ
Prior to German colonial reign (ǉǐǑǏ-ǉǑǉǎ) the Hutu and Tutsi had liĨle conĚict and
lived in segregated communities (Nyirubugara (Ǌǈǉǋ))¹⁰. Communities relied on
prominent local lineages for public goods, and non-monetary goods were voluntarily
exchanged for protection and representation (Newbury (ǉǑǐǐ)). ĉe lineage system
traditionally served in lieu of a functioning government (Maquet (ǉǑǎǉ)) and caĨle
played a prominent role, serving as the primary medium of exchange (Destexhe
(ǉǑǑǍ)). ĉere were three types of traditional chief-farmer relationships (clientship),
and clientship was ubiquitous¹¹. I focus on one type - the payment of taxes using
labour. ĉis was exclusive to the Hutu, who did not historically own caĨle (Newbury
(ǉǑǐǐ))¹².
Traditional clientship transformed under the ėrst RuandaUrundian king
¹⁰Two factors are responsible for the change in Hutu - Tutsi relations. ĉe ėrst is a rinderpest
based famine in the early Ǌǈth century, which caused migration, increasing interactions, and tensions
over good land. ĉis raised tensions in general, but when a Tutsi community would migrate to Hutu
community or vice-versa, they weremore likely to be seen as outsiders. ĉis eﬀect interacted with the
second eﬀect: the beginning of the Rwabugiri era.
¹¹ĉe ėrst type was Umuheto, whereby a client would purchase protection in exchange for a cow.
Protection was exchanged in each of the clientship types. It involved physical protection, protection
of property and legal protection from a patron associatedwith a prominent lineage. Umuheto seems to
have been more common in regions of low population density. ĉe second type wasUbuhake, which
involved the loan of pasture land for the caĨle of a prominent lineage in exchange for protection. ĉe
patrons caĨle would be taken care of by the client, and all ėnancial gains would go to the patron while
all land/labour costs would be bourn by the client. Finally, for people with no land suitable for caĨle
or any caĨle to trade for protection, Ubureetwa, the third type of clientship was available (Newbury
(ǉǑǐǐ)).
¹²CaĨlewas culturally important inRwandaUrundi as a status of wealth, and nearly all Tutsi owned
caĨle. Hutu were traditionally agriculturalists, but some prominent Hutu did own caĨle. ĉe caĨle
divide was so prominent between Hutu and Tutsi that many sources claim that a Hutu could claim
Tutsi status if (s)he wanted once (s)he had acquired enough cows (e.g. Destexhe (ǉǑǑǍ))
ǉǉǐ
Rwabugiri (r. ƥƬƪƧ  ƥƬƭƩ)¹³. Rwabugiri created the ėrst army and appointed district
chiefs to oﬀer many of the services traditionally oﬀered by lineages (Bourgeois
(ǉǑǍǏ)). ĉis increased economic burdens on lineages, and changed the nature of
chief-farmer relationships (Newbury (ǉǑǐǐ)). Lineages became obsolete as
(mandatory) taxation for government services was introduced (Kagame (ǉǑǏǊ)).
Rwabugiri was Tutsi. Tutsi chiefs became the norm and preferential treatment
towards Tutsi citizens meant the Hutu took a subservient role in society for the ėrst
time (Nyirubugara (Ǌǈǉǋ)). Rwabugiri implemented mandatory taxation. Payments
were, for the most part, made with caĨle, but Hutu didn’t traditionally keep caĨle so
payment with labour (Ubureetwa) became a requirement for Hutu. ĉe policy
represented a newfound Tutsi dominance and was despised among Hutu. “Of the
various services performed for chiefs,Ubureetwa ‘was the most hated and
humiliating.’ It symbolized the servitude of the Hutu vis-a-vis the dominant
minority.” (Newbury (ǉǑǐǐ)).
When Belgium took control of the colony aěerWorldWar I, they made changes
that inadvertently impacted Hutu-Tutsi relations. ĉey pursued an aggressive export
strategy, imposing agricultural requirements on each chief, sub chief and farmer
(Bonaventure (Ǌǈǉǈ)). ĉemost aggressive of these policies was the coﬀee
program¹⁴. A regulation in ǉǑǋǉ made coﬀee a required crop, stating that all chiefs
had to grow one thousand trees, sub chiefs were responsible for two-hundred and
ėěy, while farmers were required to grow ėěy-four (Newbury (ǉǑǐǐ)). Coﬀee is
highly varying in suitability in Rwanda and Burundi (ėgure Ǒ). ĉe quotas therefore
¹³Hewas the ėrst king to aĨempt to govern the entire nation. Prior to this kings typically governed
only their own territory and received giěs from prominent lineages when lineage chiefs visited. ĉe
change in philosophy was partly due to Rwabugiri’s own ambition and partly due to the beginning of
a cooperation with Germany in ǉǑǈǈ.
¹⁴Some of these programs were fairly innocuous, for example manioc was made a required crop
on all farm land. ĉis was to avoid famine, as manioc is robust to various environments and climate
changes but manioc for the most part was already being produced on all farms as a subsistence crop.
ǉǉǑ
varied in severity throughout the country.
Coﬀee quotas inĚuenced agriculture dramatically aěer ǉǑǋǉ (ėgure ǌ.Ǌ.ǉ). Coﬀee
went from being one of twenty modestly produced crops to dominating the
industry¹⁵. ĉe quotas replaced subsistence crops, mainly manioc and maize¹⁶. ĉe
true cost of the quotas was therefore related not only to the proėtability of coﬀee, but
the opportunity cost of coﬀee as well. Regions where manioc and maize were very
proėtable would have been disproportionately aﬀected by the introduction of the
quotas. ĉe new requirements pressured chiefs, who, had no knowledge of coﬀee
production in some regions, and were instead proėtably growing manioc or maize.
Chiefs were displeased with the changes, and plead with Belgium for compromise
(Bonaventure (Ǌǈǉǈ)). ĉe Belgians were in the process of abolishing non-monetary
taxation (including forced labour) but pressure from the chiefs delayed the
abolishment of forced labour in some regions (Newbury (ǉǑǐǐ)).
Figure 4.2.1: Crop production and prices around the introduction of coﬀee quotas
Source: Author calculation based on Belgian colonial publications.
Description: ĉis ėgure shows that the crop quotas were a binding constraint in at least some regions. Aěer coﬀee quotas were introduced in the early ǉǑǋǉ the
amount of land devoted to coﬀee increased dramatically relative to other export crops. Coﬀee replaced subsistence crops, and most of the decline came from
subsistence manioc and substance maize.
¹⁵Most of the coﬀee was of fairly low quality at the time, in stark contrast to the current state of the
industry, as the sole focus was on meeting the quotas
¹⁶ĉese data series are only available starting in ǉǑǋǋ
ǉǊǈ
Belgium allowed forced labour in regions where chiefs were not already producing
coﬀee and abolished it, along with other traditional institutions in regions where
coﬀee was proėtable. ĉe use of Hutu forced labour (called corvée) therefore
increased in regions where coﬀee was unproėtable but not where it was proėtable
(Bonaventure (Ǌǈǉǈ)). ĉis meant that, in theory there was no correlation in villages
with proėtable coﬀee, but where coﬀee was unproėtable, forced labour was
decreasing in coﬀee proėtability.
ĉis paĨern is empirically useful, but only if people couldn’t Ěee areas with forced
labour. Otherwise the diﬀerential selection out of treatment would undermine the
strategy. However, the punishments for rejecting or Ěeeing forced labour were
signiėcant, suggesting that sorting was limited. ĉe standard punishment was ikiboko,
which means whips with a hippo hide (Butamire, ǊǈǉǊ¹⁷). ĉe Belgians saw the
lashings as a traditional punishment, and deemed it acceptable within the culture;
“￿Tutsi overlords [were] being told ‘You whip the Hutu or we will whip you.’”
(Gourevitch (ǉǑǑǐ)). Between the threat of violence and the humiliation associated
with forced labour, it is reasonable to expect that Hutu aĨitudes towards Tutsi
changed for those that were mistreated¹⁸;¹⁹.
¹⁷New Times web article accessed at http://www.newtimes.co.rw/news/views/article_print.
php?ƥƨƭƥƦ&a=ƩƤƩƪƩ&icon=Print on September ǊǍ, Ǌǈǉǋ
¹⁸Near the endof the colonial era, ethnic tensions anddistrustwere volatile. Hutuproverbs demon-
strate the extent of the mistrust and stereotypes towards Tutsi (Erny (ǊǈǈǍ)):
a. When you lodge a Tutsi in your house, he chases you out of your bed
b. What is in the heart of a Tutsi is known only to God and to himself
c. When you heal the teeth of a Tutsi, he bites you as soon as he gets ėt
Each statement characterizes the level of mistrust towards Tutsi that the years of dominance and
exploitation, at least partly associated with coﬀee forced labour caused. Each statement implies that
Tutsi are opportunistic and untrustworthy (ie. they’ll sleep with your wife; are liars; are ungrate-
ful/opportunistic).
¹⁹ĉis sentiment led to an active anti-Tutsi political movement in Rwanda (PAĆHUTU), who
took control of the country immediately aěer independence, and in many places chased Tutsi out
of the country. In the early ǉǑǎǈs, Paul Kagame’s (Tutsi) family was chased out of Rwanda by
PAĆHUTU and he lived as a refugee north of the Rwandan border until the genocide in the early
ǉǑǑǈs, when he returned and eventually took control of the country, ending ǋǈ years of Hutu rule.
Kagame is still in power today. In Burundi, tensions have remained high, but violence has been con-
siderably less; Burundi has not had a genocide. Hutu have remained in power in Burundi since inde-
ǉǊǉ
ǌ.ǋ Dĵŉĵ
To evaluate the impact of colonial era forced labour on economic relationships I have
matched a ėeld survey on contracts, lab games between people from ǉǌǋ villages, data
historical forced labour, and GIS data on the historical potential of all major crops in
Rwanda and Burundi to construct a dataset that includes detailed information on
family history, interethnic trust, economic partnerships and contractual default.
Data on interethnic trust is rarely available to researchers in regions where tensions
are especially high because of the sensitivity of the issue. For example, neither the
Afrobarometer or theWVS contain trust or ethnicity data from Rwanda because the
issue is taboo. Yet observing the economic implications of ethnic tensions is most
important in regions with the most contentious ethnic relationships. To overcome
this problem, I play the trust game between people, both within and between
ethnicities. ĉis allows me to construct a measure of interethnic tensions without
making ethnicity salient
Contract data came from a survey done on Hutu and Tutsi coﬀee farmers. ĉe
contracts in the data are insurance agreements which can be of two types. ĉe ėrst is
crop insurance, where transfers are made between households producing diﬀerent
crops when one of the crops experiences a bad harvest. ĉese contracts were chosen
because we should expect there to be incentives for Hutu and Tutsi to make these
contracts with each other. Hutu and Tutsi engage in diﬀerent types of agriculture -
Hutu keep less livestock and growmore crops, while Tutsi keep livestock over
allocating land to crop production. Because of this Hutu and Tutsi are less likely to
have correlated agricultural shocks when contracts are made across ethnicity than
within ethnicity. Because of this insurance is more easily achieved in Hutu-Tutsi
pendence.
ǉǊǊ
contracts.
Forced labour occurred at the village level, and each respondent was matched to
their family location during the forced labour era. I construct a measure of village
level forced labour exposure in two-steps. First I construct a village level measure of
the burden that the quotas had on the village Chiefs, since this was directly related to
the use of forced labour. ĉis measure combines data collected on the historical prices
of all crops grown in the colonial era with GIS estimates of potential crop proėtability
per hectare at the village level to construct an opportunity cost weighted measure of
coﬀee proėtability. Second, I show the coﬀee proėtability measure is related to
Provincial forced labour data, and normalize coﬀee proėtability using it’s relationship
to forced labour to generate a village level measure of forced labour exposure.
Each of these sources of data is described in detail.
ǌ.ǋ.ǉ FĽĹŀĸ DĵŉĵOŋĹŇŋĽĹŌ
Field data was collected in Ǌ rounds, one in Burundi and the other in Rwanda. In total,
the sample consisted of Ǌǌǈ respondents from Rwanda and ǋǐǈ from Burundi, from
ǉǌǋ diﬀerent villages. Each round consisted of a number of sessions where people in
the same session were potential partners for lab games²⁰. Respondents in each session
were bussed into the district centre, from between ǋ to ǎ villages, which were chosen
to be as far away from each other as possible, to ensure that potential lab partners
didn’t know each other. People from the same village were not allowed to be partners.
Participants were surveyed in the local language: Kinyarwandan in Rwanda, and
Kirundi in Burundi. Due to dialect diﬀerences, diﬀerent enumeration teams were
hired in each country²¹. ĉe surveys, though, were the same in each country, except
²⁰Onmost days, two sessions were completed in a day in both countries, and in each country there
were Ǌǈ respondents in a session. A session of Ǌǈ people took on average ǋ hours to complete.
²¹Enumeration trainingwasdone in the sameway for both teams: I provided supervisor training for
both teams. In both cases, supervisors were trained in french. French is widely spoken in urban areas
ǉǊǋ
for one diﬀerence due to national culture. Ethnicity is a sensitive topic in Rwanda but
not Burundi, so supplementary questions were added in Rwanda to estimate ethnicity.
Each survey had ǋ modules, one on the respondents background, a second about
their contracts, and a ėnal module for the lab games.
ǌ.ǋ.Ǌ FĽĹŀĸ Dĵŉĵ: BĵķĿĻŇŃŊłĸMŃĸŊŀĹ
ĉe background module was used to collect information on education, age,
occupation²², income, land value, migration and ethnicity. ĉemajority of the
questions were standard. ĉere were two exceptions: one was related to the problem
with asking about ethnicity in Rwanda; the second involved the collection of
extensive migration histories, which was a requirement of the empirical strategy.
ĉe larger complication was that ethnicity couldn’t be discussed in Rwanda. It has
been taboo since the genocide. Instead, in Rwanda, people were asked about various
aid programs. For each program they were asked whether they (a) were aware of it
(b) were eligible for it, and (c) received money from it. One of the programs was a
genocide survivors fund. ĉis is a reparations fund for Tutsi in genocide regions²³. All
respondents were aware of the fund, and since genocide took place in all regions
surveyed, diﬀerences in responses were not due to genocide exposure²⁴. Respondent
eligibility for the fund was used as a proxy for Tutsi status.
ĉe other complication was the requirement of family migration histories. For
each respondent I collected information on all moves they made throughout their
lifetime, as well as the birth place of their parents and grandparents. ĉeir parents
of both countries due to a shared colonial history. Supervisors were from either Bujumbura or Kigali,
and spoke Ěuent french. Supervisors then trained their teams in the local language: Kinyarwandan in
Rwanda, and Kirundi in Burindi.
²²By which I mean primary, secondary crops, percentage of business received from each crop, etc.
since they are all farmers in some respect
²³ĉe speciėc fund is called F.A.R.G. for “Fonds d’Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide”, which
translates to Funds for the Assistance of Genocide Survivors.
²⁴ĉis claim is explicitly tested in the robustness section.
ǉǊǌ
birthplace gave a good sense of where their grandparents were farming during the
colonial era²⁵. ĉe treatment variable was matched to this location.
ǌ.ǋ.ǋ FĽĹŀĸ Dĵŉĵ: GĵŁĹňMŃĸŊŀĹ
As respondents entered the session, they were given a leĨer-number combination as
an ID tag. ĉe leĨer always corresponded with the village that they were from, and
the number uniquely identiėed within-village respondents. One enumerator was
tasked with the job of ensuring that respondents did not play games against other
people from their village. We chose villages far enough away from each other that
people from each villages would not have met. Aěer completing the survey,
respondents played the trust game with the partners that they were assigned. Partners
sat down at a table with the enumerator to play the trust game face-to-face.
ĉe trust game worked as follows: People were given ǎǈǈRWF (Ʈǉ)²⁶, which they
could share with their partner or keep to themselves. Mean daily wage for the sample
was slightly less than ǐǍǈRWF (Ʈǉ.ǋǋ). ĉey were given ǎ Ʈǉǈǈ notes (ƮǊǈǈ in
Burundi) of Monopoly money, and asked to pass as much money as they wanted to
their partner. Whatever they chose to share was doubled by the enumerator, given to
their partner, who then decided on how to share that sum. On average ǊǑǈRWF out
of ǎǈǈRWF was shared with opponents (Table ǌ.ǎ.ǉ).
Before playing the games, everyone was asked about their partner preferences.
ĉey were told that they would play with someone for real money, and that the
amount of money they earned would depend on how well they and their partner
²⁵Parents of the father are used in all cases where the village provided by the respondent could be
mapped. In some instances, villages given did not appear on any ofmaps I had available. ĉis could be
due to enumerator typo/error, poor respondent recollection or change in administrative boundaries
and names over time. In a very few cases the respondent did not recall the name of the village and
gave the name of the chief or sub-chief in charge of the village instead, and I had no way to properly
geocode this information. In these cases, where the father’s parents location could not be geocoded,
the location of the parents of the mother was used.
²⁶Represented byMonopoly money. ĉis is ǉǊǈǈBUF in Burundi
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could work together. ĉey were not allowed to choose partners from their village or
people they had already met²⁷. ĉese preferences were used to test for diﬀerential
ethnic sorting.
ǌ.ǋ.ǌ FĽĹŀĸ Dĵŉĵ: CŃłŉŇĵķŉňMŃĸŊŀĹ
ĉe contracts module started with respondents identifying, from a list, an important
business relationship to them. ĉis was done to get some consistency in responses
among a heterogeneous population. By far the most common selections were an
inter-household insurance scheme (ǐǌƻ) and land sharing agreements (ǉǈƻ).
‘Other’ was one of the options, but everyone identiėed one of the options from the
list.
Respondents were asked questions about these agreements. ĉemain real world
outcome used throughout the analysis was default. ĉe default question asked
“Between now and the beginning of the last harvest season, howmany times has
someone you’ve had this type of business agreement with failed to live up to their end
of the agreement?”. ĉemean number of defaults was ǈ.Ǒǋ (table ǉ), ranging from ǈ
to ǉǍ. ǋǏƻ of respondents reported at least ǉ default, and conditional on any default
being reported, the mean number of defaults was Ǌ.Ǎ.
People were also asked about the perceived reasons for these defaults. ĉe options
included: inability due to sickness or illness; inability due to ėnancial hardship;
unwillingness due to lack of interest; and unwillingness due to having found another
deal elsewhere that served the same purpose. ĉe vast majority of responses were one
of these four²⁸.
²⁷In each session a few people played a game against one of the partners they identiėed. ĉis is
controlled for in all speciėcations.
²⁸ĉere were ǋ respondents that did not choose one of these options. One said that their business
partner did not live up to their end of the agreement because thewriĨen contract was lost, and neither
party could remember exactly what the terms were, so the contract was dissolved. A second respon-
dent answered that a business relationship ended mid-contract, due to unrelated family conĚict. ĉe
ǉǊǎ
Information collected about the value of these agreements was is used as a
benchmark to determine the plausibility of the default estimates. If the estimated lost
income was similar to the default rate times the agreement value, it would suggest that
the magnitude of the estimates was plausible. ĉe agreement value question asks
respondents howmuch money changed hands in the agreement under consideration.
ǌ.ǋ.Ǎ FAO ĸĵŉĵ Ńł ķŇŃń ńŃŉĹłŉĽĵŀ
Crop potential data came from the FAO, who provided GIS data on the potential
produceable tonnes per hectare for each crop across the globe. ĉe estimate of crop
potential was calculated using data on climate, soil and terrain. ĉis considered factors
such as precipitation, temperature, wind speed, sunshine hours, and relative humidity.
Estimates were available for various input levels. To match historical conditions for
Rwanda-Burundi, data chosen were for low-input and rain-fed conditions. ĉe
resolution was at the Ǎ arc-minute level, which is ǉǈkm x ǉǈkm in Rwanda and
Burundi²⁹. An example of the crop potential data is shown in ėgure ǌ.ǎ.ǋ, which
displays the FAO estimates from yield potential for coﬀee.
ǌ.ǋ.ǎ CŃŀŃłĽĵŀ PŇĽķĹ Dĵŉĵ
Colonial price data for RuandaUrundi was retrieved from Belgian colonial yearbooks.
Summaries varied in what they included by year, but for main crops a yearly quantity
and value produced was available. ĉe available crops included: maize, rice, sorghum,
manioc, potato, sweet potato, banana, peas, vegetables, sugarcane, peanut, sesame,
coĨon, jute, coﬀee, cocoa. All crops except for jute were available from the FAO data.
ĉese tables were transcribed for all available crops to build a crop-year panel
third gave an answer that I could not decipher, and it is not clear that they understood the question.
ĉese three observations are excluded from the analysis.
²⁹Since they straddle the equator and are both very small countries, geographically
ǉǊǏ
containing ǋǎǐ observations between ǉǑǊǍ and ǉǑǍǈ. ĉis data was matched to the
FAO data to generate an input-controlled potential revenue number. Because of the
input controls in the FAO data, I interpret this measure as potential proėt. An
example of one of the pages from one of the years is shown in ėgure ǌ.ǎ.ǌ.
ǌ.ǋ.Ǐ FŃŇķĹĸ LĵĶŃŊŇ
ĉe FAO data and the archival price data is used to generate a measure of forced
labour. Because chiefs recruited candidates for forced labour, a direct village level
measure on the extent of forced labour use does not exist. To resolve this issue I use
the relative proėtability of other crops to coﬀee, which was associated with forced
labour use.
A web-scrape demonstrated this as a validation of the constructed measure. ĉe
algorithm searched the content of the ǋǈ million books and colonial era reports³⁰.
ĉe procedure ėrst searched only for the name of a colonial RuandaUrundian
province to get the total number of reports and books mentioning the province. It
performed a second search for all reports and books that mentioned both the
RuandaUrundian province as well as the word “corvée” to get a sense of the number
of books about forced labour in that province³¹.
³⁰Web-scrape was last run on Friday September Ǌǈ, Ǌǈǉǋ at approximately Ǐ:ǋǈPMGMT
³¹ĉis will no doubt over count the instances of corvée that are speciėcally linked to the province
in question, as some books will mention several provinces and mention corvée in reference to only a
subset of those provinces. However this issue is expected to apply equally to all provinces, and in all
likelihood a greater percentage of over counts will occur in the non-corvée provinces indicating that
the kink in corvée is under-estimated.
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Figure 4.3.1: Relationship between assignment variable and reported provincial forced labour
Source: Author calculation based on a web-scrape algorithm.
Figure ǌ.ǋ.ǉ plots this data against the relative proėtability of coﬀee (solid) and one
over the proėtability of coﬀee (dashed). ĉe y-axis represents the number of books
mentioning both the province name and “corvée” over the number of books
mentioning the province name. ĉe relationship shows precisely the association
between crop proėtability and forced labour described in the historical accounts.
Where coﬀee was proėtable - to the leě of abut ǉ on the graph on the right - there is
no obvious relationship between coﬀee proėtability and forced labour. Where coﬀee
was a primary crop - to the right of ǉ on the boĨom x-axis - forced labour was
decreasing in coﬀee. I use the relative proėtability measure (solid line) for the analysis
to account for opportunity cost, as ėgure ǌ.Ǌ.ǉ clearly implies that it’s important.
Although either measure would be suitable.
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Figure 4.4.1: Assignment of forced labour
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Description: ĉe ėgure shows the assignment of forced labour. ĉe the theoretical kink exists at the industry-location level. Hutu in the coﬀee industry were
eligible for forced labour while Hutu or Tutsi in other industries were not. Forced labour was less heavily used in regions where it was not needed, because there
was a cost in terms of political capital both with the Belgians who only reluctantly encouraged it, and with citizens who despised it.
ǌ.ǌ EŁńĽŇĽķĵŀ ňŉŇĵŉĹĻŏ
ǌ.ǌ.ǉ OŋĹŇŋĽĹŌ
Two strategies are pursued to identify the eﬀect of history and culture on the strength
of ethnic ties. ĉe ėrst is a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences design. ĉe ėrst diﬀerence is in
intensity between historical villages and the second diﬀerence is in eligibility for
forced labour based on coﬀee experience. To test the robustness to the possibility that
historical contracting environment was related to historical forced labour through
institutions, I use an RKD, which can control for historical village characteristics³².
ĉis design makes use of the abolishment of forced labour in regions where coﬀee was
proėtable.
³²ĉe RKD is aĨractive due to its ability to identify the treatment on the treated parameter that
is identiėed in a randomized experiment. It, like the regression discontinuity design (RDD), uses a
control function approach to account for unobservables, and in doing so can reliably estimate causal
eﬀects (Card et al. (ǊǈǈǑ)). ĉe diﬀerence between the RKD and the RDD is simply that the RKD
looks for a kink in the outcome which is associated with a kink in the assignment variable, while the
RDD looks for a discontinuity in the outcome which is associated with a discontinuity in the assign-
ǉǋǈ
ĉis relationship is illustrated in ėgure ǌ.ǌ.ǉ. In the graph the point at which coﬀee
becomes proėtable is normalized to ǉ. To the leě of ǉ coﬀee is proėtable, and forced
labour was abolished by the Belgians. To the right of ǉ, where coﬀee is unproėtable,
forced labour was allowed up to the point that the quotas were met. Identiėcation in
the RKD comes from the change in slope that occurs at ǉ on the x-axis, while in the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences design, the line at ǉ simply needed to roughly delineate
where forced labour was and was not abolished.
With the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences design, I rely on the fact that individuals in the
coﬀee industry would have been the ėrst ones recruited for forced labour. ĉe
speciėcation identiėes the diﬀerence in outcomes (interethnic aĨitudes, Tutsi
partnership, contractual default, etc) between people with grandparents living in
forced labour regions and working in the coﬀee industry, relative to everyone else. I
deėne Hutu grandparents in the coﬀee sector as eligible for forced labour on coﬀee
farms.
ĉe following assignment variable allows me to determine which villages
experienced forced labour:
λg =
MaxfOtherCropπgg
Coffeeπg
(ǌ.ǉ)
MaxfOtherCropπg varies at the grandparent-village (g) level, and is the maximum
of the proėt among crops other than coﬀee. Coffeeπ is the proėt from coﬀee and also
varies at the grandparent-village level (g). Proėt was calculated by taking the average
of the prices from the forced labour period, and multiplying by the input-controlled
measure of tonnes per hector for each crop. ĉis variable allows me to determine
where forced labour took place. Informed by ėgure ǌ.ǋ.ǉ, I deėne a forced labour
region as one where λg > ƥ. ĉese regions can be seen from ėgure ǌ.ǌ.Ǌ. ĉe ėgure
ment variable.
ǉǋǉ
shows regions with and without forced labour, and superimposes the villages of the
grandparents of the respondents on top of that. It shows that slightly more than one
quarter of respondents had grandparents that were exposed to forced labour. ǉǊǈ of
ǌǈǈ Hutu respondents had grandparents who were both eligible for forced labour and
lived in forced labour villages.
Figure 4.4.2: Forced Labour Regions and Respondent Locations
Source: Author calculation based on data from FAO GAEZ ǋ.ǈ
Description: ĉe map shows the regional breakdown of forced labour. Dots represent the locations of respondents families in the colonial era, and therefore
represents family level exposure to a forced labour. About one quarter of respondents in the sample are from a forced labour village
ĉis threshold allows me to deėne a forced labour intensity variable.
FLIntensityg =
8>><>>:
Ƥ; if λ < ƥ
λ; otherwise
(ǌ.Ǌ)
ĉe forced labour intensity is then interacted with an eligibility for forced labour
variable in the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences speciėcation. Any individual that was a
member of the coﬀee sector is deėned as being eligible for forced labour. ĉe
ǉǋǊ
diﬀerences in diﬀerences design is fairly simple.
Outcomeivg = βƤ + βƥFLIntensityg  Eligibleig + βƦFLIntensityg
+ βƧEligibleig + αXi + γv + εivg
Where i is an individual, v is a the village the respondent currently lives in, and g is
the village the respondents grandparents lived in. Xi represents a vector of controls
which includes education, age, gender and enumerator ėxed-eﬀects³³. Eligiblei
captures the idea that only coﬀee farmers would have been selected for forced labour,
and represents the share of grandparent agriculture devoted to coﬀee. βƥ was the
variable of interest because it distinguishes individuals whose grandparents were
most exposed to forced labour, being both in in a forced labour village and being in
the coﬀee industry.
ĉemain identiėcation concern with this speciėcation is the historical contractual
environment. ĉe worry was that historic contractual environment was related to
coﬀee proėtability through altitude since colonial penetration has been linked to
ruggedness (Nunn and Puga, Ǌǈǉǉ). ĉis issue is addressed in two ways using the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences design.
ĉe ėrst uses Tutsi as a falsiėcation group, as Tutsi were not eligible for forced
labour. If the Hutu sample results are replicated using the Tutsi sample, this would be
a strong indication that the estimates were not due to forced labour, but rather to
³³ĉe concern is that behaviours or answers regarding interethnic trust may have diﬀered when a
Tutsi enumerator interviewed a Hutu respondent than when a Hutu enumerator interviewed a Hutu
respondent. ĉe ethnicity of the enumerator is captured by the enumerator ėxed eﬀects. It is illegal in
Rwanda to ask employees their ethnicity, so controlling simply for enumerator ethnicity is not possi-
ble. Enumerators were assigned to respondents randomly. ĉe same enumerators always interviewed
the same ID numbers and ID numbers were assigned randomly. ĉey only deviated from this sys-
temwhen sessions got signiėcantly behind schedule, and enumerator supervisors picked up the slack
in these cases. Given the random assignment of ID number, controlling for enumerator ėxed eﬀects
should not be picking up any selection eﬀects or introducing any other endogeneity.
ǉǋǋ
historical institutional quality. ĉe second strategy controls for coﬀee productivity
directly, so that identiėcation relies solely on the opportunity cost of coﬀee. Since the
concern was that institutional quality was related to the amount of coﬀee that could
be produced (i.e. the ǉ,ǈǈǈRWF), controlling for coﬀee, and identifying an eﬀect
solely from the proėtability of the next best crop, alleviates this concern.
Another strategy to overcome this issue is to test a RKD, which compares people
with nearly identical historical family locations. If this assignment variable were
applied to a classical RKD speciėcation³⁴, the speciėcation would be:
Outcomeivg = βƤ + βƥλg  [λg > ƥ] + βƦλg + βƧ[λg > ƥ] + βƨλƦg + βƩλƧg + βƪ(λg  [λg > ƥ])Ʀ
+ βƫ(λg  [λg > ƥ])Ƨ + αXi + γv + λe + εivg (ǌ.ǋ)
ĉis would still rely on the change in slope in regions where coﬀee was
unproėtable, but would also include a control function which would imply that
identiėcation would come from observations on either side of the ‘kink’. In this case
the comparison would be between people whose grandparents lived in nearly
identical villages, so that historical contractual environment would not confound
estimates. βƥ would be the variable of interest because the interaction term λ  [λ > ƥ]
would capture the change in the correlation between λ and y aěer the ‘kink’, which
occurred at λ = ƥ.
ĉis speciėcation, however, can be improved on. It doesn’t take advantage of all of
the data. By doing so, the identiėcation assumption required can be weakened.
Information is available about people with, and without, forced labour histories on
the right side of the ‘kink’ because there are people in forced labour villages that aren’t
eligible for forced labour. Like in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences design, I can take
³⁴Which it is in the genocide table as well as a main eﬀect robustness table in the online appendix.
ǉǋǌ
advantage of the fact that only those with knowledge of coﬀee were chosen for forced
labour. Non-coﬀee farming Hutu can act as an additional ‘control-group’ to the right
of the kink. Instead of just measuring the kink, I can measured the diﬀerential kink
between those with and without a family coﬀee history³⁵. To measure the diﬀerential
kink between those likely and unlikely to have been selected into forced labour, I ran
the following regression:
yiveg = βƤ + βƥλg  Eligiblei  [λg > ƥ] + βƦλg  Eligiblei + βƧλg  [λg > ƥ]
+ βƨEligiblei  [λg > ƥ] + βƩλg + βƫEligiblei + βƬ[λg > ƥ] + βƭλƦg (ǌ.ǌ)
+ βƥƤλ
Ƨ
g + βƥƥ(λg  [λg > ƥ])Ʀ + βƥƦ(λg  [λg > ƥ])Ƨ + αXi + γv + εivg
ĉis ‘diﬀerential RKD’ (equation ǌ.ǌ) measures the diﬀerence in the kink between
people with and without grandparents in the coﬀee industry. It takes the ‘classic RKD’
(equation ǌ.ǋ) variable of interest λg  [λg > ƥ] and interacts it with the Eligiblei
variable, making the speciėcation a hybrid between a regression kink design and a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence design. Eligiblewas added on its own and interacted with
each of λ and [λ > ƥ], as in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences design. ĉe parameter of
interest was βƥ.
ǌ.ǌ.Ǌ OŉļĹŇ IĸĹłŉĽĺĽķĵŉĽŃł CŃłķĹŇłň
IłķŃŁĹ
It could be that the income reduction due to quotas was stronger in the coﬀee sector
than in the non-coﬀee sector. Just as chiefs disproportionately chose people in the
³⁵ĉemain results were tested using both the variation in the RKD and the classic RKD and the re-
sults are similar. ĉe variation has implications for the confounding eﬀects of income, and strengthen
the design. ĉis will be discussed later.
ǉǋǍ
coﬀee sector for forced labour, they may have placed more of the coﬀee quota burden
on coﬀee farmers in places where the quotas were especially unpopular. To account
for this possibility, income was separately instrumented for using predicted income.
ĉe prediction was based on grandparent land characteristics and was included in the
control vector X. Predicted income was:
^incg = α + ρ[Suitabilityg] + ωg (ǌ.Ǎ)
Predicted income is highly correlated with income (ρ = Ƥ:Ƭƥƨ). All results are
robust to speciėcations with and without the control, suggesting that a direct income
eﬀect resulting from forced labour is not driving estimates.
MĽĻŇĵŉĽŃł
Other identiėcation concerns that are dealt with using falsiėcation tests. For example,
while migration allows for the current village ėxed eﬀects, diﬀerentialmigration may
be problematic. People with a family history of forced labour may have been more
likely to migrate three generations ago. Identiėcation relies on migrants because of
the ėxed eﬀects, so a migrant vs. non-migrant comparison will not harm
identiėcation. But if recent migrants were treated diﬀerently from third generation
migrants, this could potentially be an alternative explanation for the estimates.
To address this concern, I tested for diﬀerential migration at each generation since
the forced labour era. ĉis falsiėcation test revealed no signiėcant diﬀerences in
migration among grandparents, parents or respondents themselves. I also looked at
the relatedMcCrary density test. If people Ěed from forced labour, the density of
Hutu whose grandparents grew coﬀee would not have been smooth at the kink. I
found no evidence that this was the case.
ǉǋǎ
OŉļĹŇ ĽĸĹłŉĽĺĽķĵŉĽŃł ĽňňŊĹň
ĉere were a number of other identiėcation issues that were addressed. ĉe evidence
ruled out diﬀerences at the industry level confounding results. I found no diﬀerence
using treatment at the current village level as a placebo. ĉere was no diﬀerence in
estimates when looking at Burundi only, so the eﬀect was not due to the measurement
error associated with ethnicity in Rwanda or the Rwandan genocide.
ǌ.Ǎ RĹňŊŀŉň
First I document a source of exogenous variation in interethnic aĨitudes. I show this
variation is associated with economically relevant behaviour in the lab as ‘treated’
people are more likely to sort along ethnic lines into potentially proėtable
partnerships. I then analyze real world default which is consistent with this behaviour,
suggesting a relationship between culture and income. Evidence suggests that this
mechanism reduced income by the expected amount.
ǌ.Ǎ.ǉ EŉļłĽķĽŉŏ ĵłĸ ĵŔĽŉŊĸĹň
I start by documenting interethnic resentment, measured using oﬀers in the trust
game. Trust game oﬀers by the three factors that determined forced labour eligibility
are shown in ėgure ǌ.ǎ.Ǌ: (ǉ) ethnicity, (Ǌ) agricultural industry and (ǋ) coﬀee
proėtability. ĉere are no obvious diﬀerences in these distributions. ĉe variance is
higher for people whose grandparents were out of the coﬀee industry and people
whose grandparents were in a forced labour village, but not signiėcantly so.
Diﬀerences are more apparent when looking at mean oﬀers jointly by ethnicity and
region. Hutu in forced labour regions made slightly lower oﬀers than everyone else
(table ǌ.ǎ.ǉ). But these include oﬀers to same and opposite ethnicities, and don’t
ǉǋǏ
Figure 4.5.1: Interethnic attitudes and grandparent forced labour
control for local institutions, so they’re only partially revealing. Figure ǌ.Ǎ.ǉ beĨer
illustrates that these diﬀerences are due to forced labour.
ĉe ėgure reveals the expected relationship for the subsample of Hutu respondents
that played the trust game against a Tutsi. ĉe graph demonstrates the change in
interethnic aĨitudes associated with diﬀerences in forced labour intensity. To the leě
of ǉ are villages where coﬀee is a primary crop and there would have been no forced
labour in these villages. To the right of ǉ are forced labour villages. Within these
villages some people would have been selected into forced labour and some would
not have been. ĉose likely to have been exposed to forced labour are denoted with a
dot, while the control group is denoted with a plus. Forced labour intensity is
increasing for the exposed group to the right of ǉ, and this is associated with a sharp
decrease in interethnic trust game oﬀers fromHutu to Tutsi.
ĉe estimates of these diﬀerences are in table ǌ.ǎ.ǌ, which presents the eﬀect of
forced labour on interethnic aĨitudes. ĉe table splits the estimates by sample, into
Hutu-Tutsi games with Hutu oﬀers (Panel A), Tutsi return oﬀers (Panel B) and
Hutu-Hutu games (Panel C). Columns (ǉ)-(Ǌ) show the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
ǉǋǐ
speciėcations with and without the coﬀee proėtability control. Controlling for coﬀee
proėtability directly helps to account for the possibility that historical institutions
were related to altitude and therefore correlated with coﬀee proėtability. It means that
identiėcation comes from solely from the opportunity cost of growing other crops.
Columns (ǋ)-(ǌ) show the RKD using a cubic (column ǋ) and quintic (column ǌ)
control function.
Both designs consistently estimate that Hutu aĨitudes towards Tutsi worsened due
to forced labour. All estimates were normalized by the standard deviation of reported
forced labour, and the RKD estimates were normalized by the kink in the forced
labour data, as described in Card et al. (ǊǈǈǑ), to generate estimates whose
magnitudes can be compared to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences magnitudes. ĉe
standard deviation in the forced labour data was about ǈ.ǋ and the estimated kink was
about ǉǍ. ĉese normalizations mean that the estimates in table ǌ.ǎ.ǌ can be
interpreted as the eﬀect of a ǉSD increase in forced labour on interethnic trust game
oﬀers. Hutu oﬀered ǐǍ-ǉǉǍRWF less to Tutsi in the trust game when their
grandparents were exposed to ǉSDmore forced labour.
ĉis reduction in trust was unjustiėed since Tutsi did not return signiėcantly less
when partnered with someone whose grandparents were likely to have been exposed
to forced labour (Table ǌ.ǎ.ǌ, Panel B). Panel B includes an additional control for the
amount initially oﬀered, so that returns were not lower simply because there was less
to share. Oﬀers were slightly lower, but are consistently about half of the magnitude
of the Hutu eﬀect.
ĉe impact on mistreated Hutu was not a general trust eﬀect (Table ǌ.ǎ.ǌ, Panel
C).ĉis would have been problematic for the interpretation. If the eﬀect was a
general one, there would be less reason to expect a change in partner types. In this
case though, the oﬀers from (mis)treated Hutu to other Hutu was positive. ĉis is
ǉǋǑ
consistent with the idea that (mis)treated Hutu became more reliant on their ethnic
network as resentment towards Tutsi increased. ĉe eﬀect was not signiėcant, but the
magnitude was relatively large, averaging about Ǌ/ǋ of the main interethnic games
estimate.
ĉe increase in resentment towards Tutsi may have impacted the economic
relationships of other Hutu³⁶. If mistreated Hutu sort away from potentially proėtable
relationships with Tutsi because of their resentment, then this should have important
economic ramiėcations. ĉe next section tests whether Hutu with a family history of
mistreatment are more likely to discount proėtable opportunities with Tutsi in favour
of another Hutu.
ǌ.Ǎ.Ǌ EŉļłĽķ SŃŇŉĽłĻ
I focus on the economic implications of trust, starting with partner selection. ĉe test
for sorting in economic relationships relies on lab decisions about partner preference.
Participants were asked to select ėve individuals that they wanted to be partnered
with in the trust game. Enumerators told them that whether or not they would be
partnered with any of their selections would be randomly determined.
ĉemeasure identiėed the ethnicity, income and occupation of each selection.
Tutsi averaged ǋǎƻ of each session, but on average only Ǌǈƻ of partner selections
were Tutsi. So unsurprisingly given the context, ethnicity was a factor in people’s
decisions. I test whether this ethnic sorting was more likely among people with
grandparents that were mistreated. ĉis would be consistent with evidence showing
³⁶ĉis table also compliments some of other literatures. It conėrms that aĨitudes are historically
determined. Nunn andWantchekon (ǊǈǉǊ) have previously documented that trust is correlated with
the slave trade. ĉe table shows the same result is robust to a smaller scale event. ĉe slave trade
took place from the ǉǎth to ǉǑth centuries, whereas forced labour in the coﬀee industry lasted from
ǉǑǋǈ until about ǉǑǍǍ. Even an episode that lasted only ǊǍ years persists more than Ǎǈ years later.
ĉis evidence also contributes as it is speciėc to interethnic aĨitudes, uses incentive compatible mea-
sures, and explicitly measures family level exposure. ĉe evidence conėrms theoretical ėndings from
Tabellini (Ǌǈǈǐ) that elements of culture are transmiĨed within families, across generations.
ǉǌǈ
that resentment towards Tutsi was greater among mistreated Hutu families.
ĉe tendency of people frommistreated families to sort ion Hutu-only
partnerships was conėrmed in table ǌ.ǎ.ǋ panel A.ĉe diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimates in column (ǉ) and (Ǌ) of table ǌ.ǎ.ǋ show that forced labour caused a ǉǈƻ
decrease in the probability of selecting a Tutsi partner. ĉe RKD estimates were
higher, with an estimate over ǋǈƻ using the cubic polynomial control function in
column (ǋ) and an estimate of about ǉǍƻ using a quintic polynomial control function
in column (ǌ). Regardless of speciėcation the eﬀect does not seem to be driven by
historical institutions.
One worry with this result was that it was possible that ethnicity and income were
correlated, and that people were trying to choose other low income partners rather
than Hutu partners. ĉis hypothesis was tested in table ǌ.ǎ.ǋ panel B.ĉe outcome is
similar to the Panel A outcome. It’s a binary variable measuring the percentage of
partners selected that had an income above the median. None of these estimates were
statistically signiėcant, although the magnitudes were positive and fairly large. People
may have preferred higher income partners if their grandparents were exposed to
forced labour. Positive estimate were not be as worrisome as if the estimates were
negative, as a positive estimate goes in the opposite direction of the potentially
confounding eﬀect. If the estimates were negative it would have been diﬃcult to
separate whether economic consequences were due to sorting on ethnicity or sorting
on low income.
A similar exercise tested for sorting by occupation. Panel C shows that people were
slightly less likely to sort into partnerships with other coﬀee farmers though. ĉe
estimates are close to ǈ and statistically insigniėcant. It would have been problematic
if the treated group were more likely to be coﬀee farmers, sorted into relationships
with other coﬀee farmers, and coﬀee farmers were poor economic partners.
ǉǌǉ
Since ethnic sorting existed in the lab, it may also have existed in the real world.
ĉis would have implications for economic relationships, and could help explain the
tendency to rely on ethnic economic networks, as well as the implications of this for
the sustainability of these relationships. When some Hutu discount a potential Tutsi
business partner, they may choose a less good match on average, increasing default at
the margin. ĉis hypothesis is testable. Next, I examine whether the people with
diﬀerent aĨitudes and behaviour in the lab experiencedmore default in the real world.
ǌ.Ǎ.ǋ DĹĺĵŊŀŉ
Due to the ethical concerns I don’t observe whether real world relationships were
same or mixed ethnicity. However, I can observe whether default is more likely for
Hutu than for Tutsi with grandparents from forced labour villages. While
documenting the number of real world interethnic relationships would have been
useful, the mechanism causing diﬀerences in default operates through defaults on
same ethnicity relationships.
I start by individually examining the three factors that determined forced labour
eligibility: (ǉ) ethnicity (Ǌ) family crop history and (ǋ) grandparent location. ĉere
are liĨle to no diﬀerences in these comparisons as, within each factor, people with and
without a forced labour history existed. ĉe distribution of default for each of these
three factors with respect to default is shown in ėgure ǌ.ǎ.Ǌ. ĉe distributions were
nearly identical in all three cases.
Comparing Hutu from families exposed to forced labour with everyone else, the
eﬀect becomes more clear (Table ǌ.ǎ.ǉ). Default for Hutu in regions where forced
labour was prevalent is about ǉǍƻ higher than everyone else. Each of the other
groups experienced nearly identical default rates. ĉis comparison doesn’t account
for a coﬀee history though, and doesn’t control for current village eﬀects.
ǉǌǊ
Figure 4.5.2: Contractual default and grandparent forced labour
ĉe ėgure reveals the expected relationship for the subsample of Hutu
respondents. ĉe graph demonstrates the change in contractual default associated
with diﬀerences in forced labour intensity. To the leě of ǉ are villages where coﬀee is a
primary crop and there would have been no forced labour in these villages. To the
right of ǉ are forced labour villages. Within these villages some people would have
been selected into forced labour and some would not have been. ĉose likely to have
been exposed to forced labour are denoted with a dot, while the control group is
denoted with a plus. Forced labour intensity is increasing for the exposed group to
the right of ǉ, and this is associated with a sharp increase in default among Hutu.
ĉe analogous estimates, are in table ǌ.ǎ.ǌ. ĉe sample was separated by ethnicity
to show that the increase in default was speciėc to Hutu (Panel A) and not Tutsi
(Panel B) who were not exposed to forced labour. Estimates were consistent with the
hypothesis that grandparent forced labour increased default. Column (ǉ) and (Ǌ)
tested the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates while columns (ǋ) and (ǌ) tested the
cubic and quintic polynomial in the RKD speciėcation shown in equation (ǌ.ǌ). ĉe
estimates were nearly identical³⁷ and each speciėcation estimated that a ǉSD increase
³⁷All estimates were also run both with and without education, age, gender, grandparent country
ǉǌǋ
in forced labour resulted in a Ǌǐƻ increase in contractual default. ĉe similarity of the
estimates reinforces the idea that estimates are not driven by historical diﬀerences in
contracting environment.
ĉis same paĨern was not present for the Tutsi subsample, further conėrming that
the eﬀect was unlikely to be due to other historical village characteristics. Tutsi from
forced labour regions were actually less likely to experience contractual default, with
estimates about as large as the Hutu estimates, but going in the opposite direction.
ĉis could be for a number of reasons. ĉere were reports in the history literature that
Tutsi were especially favoured in forced labour regions, so the eﬀect could be related
to that. Alternatively, it could be that Tutsi were able to pick up more proėtable
opportunities when (mis)treated Hutu sorted out of these opportunities. Or it could
simply be due to outliers, as the eﬀect is not signiėcant.
ĉe evidence implies that the lab measures reĚect behaviours that exist in real
economic relationships. Forced labour altered resentment, and default. ĉe evidence
suggests that this occurred as (mis)treated people ethnically sorted and chose poorly
suited contractual partners. If this was true, the majority of defaults would have been
due to a low ability of contractual partners.
ǌ.Ǎ.ǌ DĹĺĵŊŀŉ ĸŊĹ ŉŃ ĵĶĽŀĽŉŏ
I infer real world ethnic sorting by analyzing the reasons for default. If ability is the
primary reason driving default, it implies that people who discriminated selected
business partners from a shallower ability pool. Ex ante, we might instead believe that
default is driven by the eﬀort of the contractual partner. Suppose ethnic sorting does
not exist in the real world. It seems plausible that Tutsi would be less motivated to
controls, and are robust to all combinations of controls. Estimates presented are with controls. Stan-
dard errors are presented clustered by assignment-variable bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) as well as grandparent village
location. Results are robust to both.
ǉǌǌ
provide high eﬀort in economic relationships with people who discriminate against
them. Both the sorting mechanism, and the eﬀort mechanism are tested separately. I
ėnd evidence that defaults come fromHutu-Hutu relationships, since partner match
is the dominant reason for default. I ėnd no evidence for the eﬀort mechanism.
If the proposed ethnic sorting mechanism is true, default should be generated by
low ability to fulėll a particular contract, rather than poor eﬀort. To measure this,
respondents identiėed an instance of default during the past harvest season, and
information was collected on whether they experienced defaulted due to low ability
or low eﬀort. ĉey were given speciėc options: (a) found a beĨer deal elsewhere; (b)
no longer have the ėnancial ability to continue with the agreement; (c) no longer
have the ability to continue with the agreement due to illness or injury; (d) simply
lost interest in the agreement; (e) other (specify).
Options (a) and (d) were categorized as low eﬀort. While option (a) is not
precisely low eﬀort, it is typically classiėed as ex-post moral hazard, or strategic
default³⁸. Options (b) and (c) are both related to low ability, and were used in the test
for poor partner selection³⁹.
ĉe ėgure reveals the expected relationship for the subsample of Hutu
respondents. ĉe graph demonstrates the change in contractual default due to the
ability of the contractual partner to make a transfer, associated with diﬀerences in
forced labour intensity. To the leě of ǉ are villages where coﬀee is a primary crop and
³⁸Diﬀerentiating between ex-post and ex-antemoral hazard is not a focus of this study (see: Blouin
and Macchiavello (Ǌǈǉǋ)), but to ensure that both types were not driving default, these were exam-
ined separately in the next subsection.
³⁹ĉis method is not without fault. When default occurs, excuses are certainly more likely to in-
volve aspects out of the defaulters control, to avoid suspicions ofmalice. ĉiswill bias excuses towards
ability and away from eﬀort. However, it seems unlikely that this source of bias would diﬀerentially
impact those whose grandparents were eligible for coﬀee forced labour. Furthermore, villages in the
sample are very small. It seems fairly plausible to assume that proėt related lies would be diﬃcult to
successfully pursue due to the density of within village networks in small communities. Regardless,
the potential for bias does exist, and interpretations should proceed with caution.
ǉǌǍ
Figure 4.5.3: Default due to partner ability and grandparent forced labour
there would have been no forced labour in these villages. To the right of ǉ are forced
labour villages. Within these villages some people would have been selected into
forced labour and some would not have been. ĉose likely to have been exposed to
forced labour are denoted with a dot, while the control group is denoted with a plus.
Forced labour intensity is increasing for the exposed group to the right of ǉ, and this is
associated with a sharp increase in default due to ability among Hutu, suggesting that
these Hutu are engaged in partnerships of lower quality.
Panel A of table ǌ.ǎ.Ǎ shows that Hutu from forced labour families diﬀerentially
perceived the biggest reason for default as being ability. Columns (ǉ)-(Ǌ) show the
estimates from the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciėcation and columns (ǋ)-(ǌ) show
the RKD estimates. Again, results are extremely robust to the various speciėcations
which test the robustness to historical village characteristics in diﬀerent ways. All
estimates produce large magnitudes for default due to ability at around ǌǍƻ. ĉe
mean of both ability and eﬀort based defaults were similar in the data, with
respondents averaging about ǈ.Ǎǎ ability based defaults and ǈ.ǎǑ eﬀort based defaults
(Table ǉ) in the past harvest season. Comparing the ǌǍƻ estimate with the Ǌǐƻ
increase in default of any type, this means that almost all of the defaults identiėed in
ǉǌǎ
the previous table were due to the ability of the partner to fulėll their end of an
agreement. ĉe estimate would be about ǎǈƻ (Ƥ:ƦƬ= Ƥ:ƩƪƤ:Ʃƪ+Ƥ:ƪƭ) if all of the overall
defaults were driven by ability defaults, which is within the conėdence intervals of the
actual estimate.
Panel B shows estimates for the Tutsi subsample. One concern was that the eﬀect
was not speciėc to those eligible for forced labour, but instead related to an
interaction between the coﬀee industry and grandparent village institutions. ĉe
Tutsi subsample rules out this concern. Absolute magnitudes were all about ǉ/ǋ of
the Hutu sample counterparts, and the sign goes in the opposite direction for two of
the ǌ estimates. All Tutsi estimates are imprecisely estimated and not signiėcantly
diﬀerent from ǈ. Panel B of table ǌ.ǎ.Ǎ showed that there’s no concern that
grandparent village characteristics are confounding Hutu estimates.
If the partner match was the mechanism driving diﬀerences in default, then there
should not be an increase in eﬀort based defaults. I tested this directly in panel C,
which conėrms the hypothesis. All estimates are less than ǉ/ǌ the magnitude of the
ability estimates, and are highly imprecise. Still though, it could have been that eﬀort
was a problem, but we don’t see low eﬀort in equilibrium because contract type
adjusts to overcome the concern. If incentive based contracts increased, this could
mean that there was an increased threat of low eﬀort. However, panel D shows that
this was not the case. Incentive based contracts were not more likely to be used by
people with a family history of forced labour. Like the eﬀort based estimates in panel
C, all estimates are close to ǈ and highly insigniėcant.
While real world ethnic sorting data was not possible to collect, a strong inference
can be made that sorting was aﬀected by forced labour, and the changes in aĨitudes
that it created. Hutu with historically induced resentment towards Tutsi chose
diﬀerent partners in the lab, and experienced more default. All of the additional
ǉǌǏ
defaults came from the ability of their contractual partners to fulėll their end of an
agreement. ĉis strongly suggests that the strength of economic ties can be due to
history and culture rather than solely determined by contractual environment. In this
case the causal direction was reversed. History and culture altered the contractual
environment for some, through their partner decisions, which led to an increase in
defaults.
ǌ.Ǎ.Ǎ OŉļĹŇ EķŃłŃŁĽķ OŊŉķŃŁĹň
Given strong evidence of poor partner selection and the resulting default, I expected
lower income for Hutu. I estimate the impact on income. Table ǌ.ǎ.ǎ shows the eﬀect
on income, of a grandparent being exposed to forced labour.
ĉe estimates in Panel A show the main eﬀects for the Hutu subsample. As
expected these individuals had lower income, by between ǉǍƻ and ǊǏƻ. ĉe
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model (columns (ǉ) and (Ǌ)) produce the larger ǊǏƻ
estimates, with the RKD estimates (columns (ǋ) and (ǌ)) averaging about ǉǍƻ. ĉe
ǊǏƻ number seems too large, but the ǉǍƻ number may be reasonable. ĉe concern is
that there was a direct eﬀect on income which was not related to the change in culture
or defaults.
To get a sense of what would be a reasonable magnitude, I benchmarked the
estimates against the default estimates and the agreement values which are solely used
for external validity, value was not included in any of the empirical models. ĉe
average agreement value is about ƮǎǏ, and the estimated increase in defaults was about
ǋǈƻ. If all of the estimated income eﬀect came from an increase in defaults, this would
represent about ƮǊǈ (ƪƫ  Ƥ:Ƨ) per harvest season, which would be a ǉǊƻ reduction in
average income. ĉe ǉǍƻ estimate is therefore more reasonable than the ǊǏƻ.
ĉe ǋƻ diﬀerence between the benchmark and the model estimate could be due to
ǉǌǐ
the Tutsi opportunities that are not taken and not substituted with Hutu contracts. I
expect the income estimate to be larger than the benchmark estimate because
resentment has two eﬀects on income. First, it increases defaults, which can be
benchmarked. Second, it means that some opportunities are lost, and not replaced
with similar Hutu opportunities. ĉis is not captured by the default estimates but is
captured by the direct income estimate. So if missed opportunities had as large an
eﬀect on income as increased defaults from substituted opportunities, then the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates may be reasonable, otherwise the RKD are more
reasonable. All I can say on this is that lost income due to missed opportunities is
estimated as being between ǋƻ and ǉǍƻ of income.
One reason that could be driving diﬀerences between the RKD and diﬀerence in
diﬀerences estimates could be the historical village characteristics. ĉerefore, it may
only be reasonable to believe that the change in resentment was the only source of
economic change with the RKD estimates.
ǌ.Ǎ.ǎ RŃĶŊňŉłĹňň ĵłĸ ĺĵŀňĽĺĽķĵŉĽŃł ŉĹňŉň
MĽĻŇĵŉĽŃł ķĵŊňĹĸ Ķŏ ĺŃŇķĹĸ ŀĵĶŃŊŇ
One identiėcation concern is that forced labour caused migration, and migrants may
have been treated diﬀerently from non-migrants. But the village-ėxed eﬀects ensure
that the comparisons were made between individuals who have migrated at some
point in the past three generations. Still, recent migrants may have been treated
diﬀerently than third generation migrants, so I test for diﬀerential migration at each
generation.
ĉemigration variable I use measures whether the seĨlement locations diﬀered
between (a) grandparent and respondent; (b) parent and respondent; and (c) the
length of time the respondent has lived in their current location (controlling for age).
ǉǌǑ
Each measure is analyzed using the full sample, and the Hutu-only sample.
Columns (ǉ) and (Ǌ) of table ǐ show that both for the diﬀerence and diﬀerences
design and RKD, mistreated Hutu were less no more or less likely than average to
migrate. Both estimates are very close to ǈ and highly insigniėcant, and they go in
opposite directions. If forced labour caused migration the Hutu estimate in column
(Ǌ) would be positive and signiėcant. Columns (ǋ) and (ǌ) perform a similar exercise
but at the parental level. Again, estimates are very small and insigniėcant, although
those whose grandparents were exposed to forced labour had parents that were
slightly more likely than average to move. In columns (Ǎ) and (ǎ) I investigated
mobility by the respondent, by analyzing the amount of time they have lived in their
village. ĉe estimates from the two samples are very similar, both showing that
respondents with grandparents from forced labour villages in the coﬀee industry were
about Ǌ years newer to their village than others. ĉis estimate is very small, and
unlikely to make much of a diﬀerence. On average, respondents have been living in
their current village for over ǊǍ years.
ĉere was liĨle worry that forced labour caused diﬀerential migration paĨerns. ĉe
causal interpretation of the relationship between culture and default is strengthened
by the small, imprecise migration estimates.
FĵŀňĽĺĽķĵŉĽŃł - SŃŇŉĽłĻ ĵŇŃŊłĸ ŉļĹ ŉļŇĹňļŃŀĸ
A related check is the McCrary (Ǌǈǈǐ) test for selection out of treatment. Given the
migration results this is an unlikely explanation for the results. Historically, prior to
the introduction of quotas, there was no selection on coﬀee land due to the
insigniėcance of the coﬀee industry in the region. Farmers did not want to grow
coﬀee intensely, and would therefore not have selected into (or out of) land that was
suitable for coﬀee production. Once forced labour was introduced, it would have
ǉǍǈ
been diﬃcult for those who were eligible to move to new regions, by the forced nature
of the policy. ĉere were strict and brutal punishments for trying to avoid forced
labour, which chiefs and sub chiefs had strong incentives to enforce.
ĉat said, there were also strong incentives to avoid forced labour. To address this,
the standardMcCrary test for sorting at the threshold was run, and is presented in
table ǌ.ǎ.ǐ. ĉe test divided the sample into bins based on the assignment variable,
and tested the density of respondents within each bin on either side of the threshold.
ĉe idea behind the test is most easily seen in ėgure ǌ.ǎ.ǉ. ĉe ėgure shows the
density of Hutu on the right and the leě of the threshold. ĉe panel on the leě shows
that there was no change in slope in the density of Hutu on either side of the
threshold, and the graph on the leě shows that there was no discontinuity in the slope
either.
Both the table and ėgure show that no sorting⁴⁰ took place. Columns (ǋ) and (ǌ)
of table ǌ.ǎ.ǐ show that if anything there is a small increase in density to the right of
the threshold. On the overall sample, the sign Ěips direction, indicating that it is very
unlikely that Hutu Ěed from forced labour regions. If anything Tutsi were more likely
to Ěee forced labour regions than Hutu. ĉis is understandable. ĉere would not have
been punishments to the Tutsi for ‘Ěeeing’, and it would have been costly to continue
to farm on land unsuited to coﬀee production.
Based on this, I concluded that there was no Hutu selection out of treatment.
Given the sudden, unexpected and arbitrary nature of assignment, the variable used
was appropriate for the two designs.
⁴⁰or related sampling problems
ǉǍǉ
GĹłŃķĽĸĹ Ľł RŌĵłĸĵ
Another concern is the eﬀect of the genocide on answers to the ethnicity proxy in
Rwanda. It may have been possible that Tutsi were more likely to identify as such in
regions where genocide violence was more prominent. ĉis could cause
measurement error which was correlated with the change in slope. If forced labour
did impact resentment, it may have inĚuenced interethnic violence. To address this I
employed the classic RKD (equation ǌ.ǋ) to see whether forced labour is associated
with the genocide.
ĉe data was based on prosecutions by theGacaca courtswhich were established
aěer the genocide to deal with genocide crimes⁴¹. ĉere were three categories of
violent crimes associated with theGacaca courts. Category ǉ was for people who
planned the genocide, or who commiĨed especially horrible crimes, like murder, rape
or sexual torture. Category Ǌ was for people who commiĨed violent crimes with the
intent to murder, rape or sexually torture, but whose actions did not necessarily result
in these outcomes. Category ǋ was for people who commiĨed violent crimes, but
without the intent to murder, rape or sexually torture. ĉe data came at the village
level⁴² and was aggregated to the level of cells in the FAO crop data⁴³. Population data
at the village level came fromGeoDynamics, and were matched by village name to the
violence data⁴⁴.
ĉe columns of table ǌ.ǎ.Ǒ Panel A were split into categories based on the severity
of the crime. Column (ǉ) shows the worst crimes (category ǉ), column (Ǌ) shows
category Ǌ crimes and column (ǋ) shows the least severe crimes. ĉe colonial policy
had a signiėcant positive impact on each of the three categories of crime, so there is a
⁴¹ĉis was done so as to not overwhelm the traditional court system.
⁴²Village elders are oěen placed as judges in these courts.
⁴³ĉere are over ǉǍǈǈ villages, and only ǊǏǎ geographic cells, so the coarser geographic cell is used
as the unit of analysis.
⁴⁴ĉese are the same genocide data used in Yanigazawa-DroĨ (forthcoming)
ǉǍǊ
legitimate concern regarding the impact of the genocide on measurement error.
To deal with this the main speciėcation is tested on the Burundi sample in Panel B.
ĉe ėrst two columns test the diﬀerence in diﬀerences design, and columns ǋ and ǌ
test the RKD. In Burundi there was no genocide, and ethnicity could be asked directly
so there was no measurement-error concern. ĉe estimate was nearly identical to the
combined Rwanda/Burundi estimate, ranging from -Ǐǈ to -ǑǊ, and remain highly
signiėcant (despite halving the sample size) suggesting that the assignment of
ethnicity in Rwanda was not considerably diﬀerent from the assignment of ethnicity
in Burundi.
Colonial forced labour was a contributing factor to the genocide in Rwanda. A full
analysis of this is beyond the scope of this paper and leě for future work, but this
ėnding contributes to a literature on the causes of conĚict⁴⁵. ĉe evidence shows that
this is not confounding estimates.
FĵŀňĽĺĽķĵŉĽŃł - AŀŉĹŇłĵŉĹ ķŇŃńň ĵłĸ ŀŃķĵŉĽŃł
A third concern could be that the results are not speciėc to the coﬀee industry, but
derive from the insular nature of more specialized industries. People with less diverse
production, may have required less socialization outside a small network of other
highly specialized people. ĉis could have altered aĨitudes. To account for this
possibility, I ran the same speciėcation on other prominent crops in the region which
are, in some areas, highly proėtable⁴⁶.
ĉe diﬀerential RKD based on equation ǌ.ǌ using relative proėtability to each of
⁴⁵See BlaĨman andMiguel (Ǌǈǉǈ) for a review. Much of the debate regarding ethnic conĚict cen-
tres around the “primordialist” versus “modernist” views which pit deep biological or psychological
roots against power struggles, respectively. ĉe evidence that forced labour caused genocide con-
tributes by demonstrating that in at least some cases, the modernist argument prevails.
⁴⁶ĉis speciėcation can only be run on the subset of crops that were, in some regions, the most
proėtable crops. ĉis is because of the nature of the assignment variable, which calculates the relative
proėtability of a crop, and measures a kink around the point at which a given crop becomes the most
proėtable in a region.
ǉǍǋ
these crops as the assignment variable is shown in table ǌ.ǎ.ǉǈ. ĉere were Ǎ other
crops that were, in some regions, the most proėtable crop to produce. ĉey were:
manioc (column ǉ), coĨon (column Ǌ), sugarcane (column ǋ), rice (column ǌ), and
banana (column Ǎ). None of the other crops was close to showing a similar
relationship to the coﬀee industry. Every estimate was close to ǈ and highly
insigniėcant⁴⁷. Each of the estimates restricted the sample to those playing mixed
ethnicity games and use a cubic polynomial, so estimates were analogous to their
coﬀee counterpart in table ǌ.ǎ.ǌ column (ǉ).
A ėnal concern is that while there is something unique about the coﬀee industry,
there is nothing unique about the family location around the time of forced labour.
Historical family location may simply be correlated with current location aĨributes
that cause diﬀerences in aĨitudes⁴⁸. To address this concern, the diﬀerential RKD
(equation ǌ.ǌ) was analyzed with the modiėcation that suitabilities associated with
current respondent location were used instead of historical family location⁴⁹.
ĉese results are shown in table ǌ.ǎ.ǉǉ. Again, the estimates are close to ǈ and
highly insigniėcant implying that there is something unique about the family location
during the colonial era. ĉe results are not driven by any correlation with
contemporary crop suitabilities.
ǌ.ǎ CŃłķŀŊňĽŃłň
ĉis paper uses the historical exposure to forced labour as exogenous variation in
Hutu aĨitudes towards of Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi to show that resentment can
⁴⁷ĉe only other crop which even shows a negative estimate is manioc, which is the other crop to
have been associated with quotas, although not nearly on the same scale.
⁴⁸Due low fairly lowmobility in the area, it is very likely that historic relative proėtability is highly
correlated with current relative proėtability.
⁴⁹To analyze the regression in this way, the village ėxed eﬀects are removed and replaced with his-
torical family location ėxed eﬀects to capture the eﬀect of historical forced labour.
ǉǍǌ
have costly economic consequences. While culture has been thought to be important
in a variety of economic outcomes, this may be a surprising result due to the highly
plausible alternative that default is the causal driver of any observed correlation
between cultural aĨitudes and default.
ĉe evidence suggests that poor partner selection is, in part, a cultural
phenomenon. Resentment based on ethnicity causes sorting into same-ethnicity
economic relationships. ĉis causes indignant Hutu to pass over high quality
prospective Tutsi business partners in favour of less reliable Hutu partners that are
more likely to default. ĉere is, perhaps surprisingly, liĨle evidence supporting the
idea that resentment can induce low eﬀort from a business partner and cause default.
ĉis could be, in part because sorting is so prominent that there are not enough
Hutu-Tutsi relationships in (mis)treated regions to observe reductions in default due
to low eﬀort.
ǉǍǍ
TĵĶŀĹň
Table 4.6.1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Outcomes - Forced Labour Regions
Hutu Tutsi
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
log(Default) ǈ.ǌǏǉ ǈ.ǎǊǎ ǉǌǎ ǈ.ǌǈǍ ǈ.ǎǉǑ Ǎǎ
Income (USD) ǊǎǍ.Ǐǋ ǍǏǌ.ǐǑ ǉǌǊ ǋǈǊ.ǋǌ ǎǉǉ.ǈǐ Ǎǎ
Trust Game Oﬀer ǊǏǊ.Ǎ ǉǈǍ.ǉǐ ǉǌǑ Ǌǐǈ.ǌ ǉǊǊ.Ǐ Ǎǎ
Tutsi Selections ǈ.Ǌǋǉ ǈ.ǊǍǍ ǉǌǏ ǈ.Ǌǋǐ ǈ.ǊǏǍ Ǎǎ
Panel B: Outcomes - No Forced Labour Regions
log(Default) ǈ.ǌǉǊ ǈ.ǎǉǏ Ǌǐǌ ǈ.ǌǉǊ ǈ.ǍǑǍ ǉǋǉ
Income (USD) ǊǏǋ.ǏǏ ǍǊǊ.ǍǑ Ǌǐǈ Ǌǉǉ.Ǌǉ ǋǏǌ.ǈǎ ǉǊǏ
Trust Game Oﬀer ǊǐǑ.ǉ ǉǉǎ.ǌ Ǌǐǌ ǊǑǍ.Ǎ ǉǊǋ.Ǐ ǉǊǑ
Tutsi Selections ǈ.ǉǐǍ ǈ.Ǌǋǉ Ǌǐǌ ǈ.Ǌǋǌ ǈ.ǊǎǏ ǉǋǉ
Panel C: Controls
Gender: Female ǋǉƻ ǈ.ǌǎǎ ǌǋǈ ǍǍƻ ǈ.ǌǑǑ ǉǐǏ
Country: Burundi ǈ.ǎǉǑ ǈ.ǌǐǎ ǌǋǈ ǈ.ǍǑǌ ǈ.ǌǑǊ ǉǐǏ
Age ǌǍ.Ǐ ǉǈǐ.Ǐ ǌǋǈ ǌǊ.ǌ ǉǊ.ǐ ǉǐǏ
Education Years Ǎ.Ǐ ǋ.ǌ ǌǊǑ ǎ.Ǌ ǋ.ǐ ǉǐǏ
ǉǍǎ
Table 4.6.2: Eﬀect of forced labour on interethnic trust
Dependent variable: oﬀer in trust game
Panel A: Hutu to Tutsi Oﬀers
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences Regression Kink
No cof. control Cof. control Cubic Quintic
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
Forced Labour x Eligible -ǐǋ.ǌǐ -ǐǊ.ǐǎ
(ǊǍ.ǋǑ)*** (ǊǍ.ǊǏ)***
[ǊǊ.ǉǎ]*** [Ǌǉ.Ǒǌ]***
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] -ǉǉǐ.Ǐ -ǉǊǏ.Ǐ
(ǊǑ.ǋǐ)*** (Ǌǎ.Ǒǎ)***
[ǊǏ.Ǐǈ]*** [Ǌǐ.ǉǈ]***
Observations ǉǑǉ ǉǑǉ ǉǑǉ ǉǑǉ
R-squared ǈ.ǎǊǉ ǈ.ǎǉǏ ǈ.ǎǊǐ ǈ.ǎǊǎ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǉǏ ǉǉǏ ǉǉǏ ǉǉǏ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) Clusters ǌǌ ǌǌ ǌǌ ǌǌ
Panel B: Tutsi to Hutu Return Oﬀers
Forced Labour x Eligible -ǊǏ.ǋǊ -ǉǍ.ǊǏ
(ǌǐ.ǍǊ) (ǍǑ.ǏǑ)
[ǍǊ.Ǌǐ] [Ǎǋ.ǌǋ]
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] -Ǎǋ.ǊǍ -Ǌǎ.ǉǈ
(ǎǋ.ǉǏ) (ǌǏ.ǐǊ)
[ǏǑ.ǌǍ] [ǍǏ.ǌǈ]
Observations ǉǑǉ ǉǑǉ ǉǑǉ ǉǑǉ
R-squared ǈ.ǍǐǍ ǈ.Ǎǐǋ ǈ.ǍǐǊ ǈ.ǍǑǋ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǉǏ ǉǉǏ ǉǉǏ ǉǉǏ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) Clusters ǌǌ ǌǌ ǌǌ ǌǌ
Panel C: Hutu to Hutu Oﬀers
Forced Labour x Eligible ǎǎ.ǈǎ Ǐǉ.ǋǈ
(ǎǋ.ǏǑ) (ǎǌ.ǉǈ)
[ǍǏ.Ǐǐ] [ǍǏ.ǋǊ]
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] ǎǉ.ǋǋ ǎǌ.ǋǋ
(ǎǎ.ǑǏ) (ǎǎ.ǑǑ)
[ǎǉ.Ǒǐ] [ǎǊ.ǉǈ]
Observations ǊǊǋ ǊǊǋ ǊǊǋ ǊǊǋ
R-squared ǈ.ǍǊǋ ǈ.ǍǊǍ ǈ.Ǎǋǋ ǈ.Ǎǋǋ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǈǏ ǉǈǏ ǉǈǏ ǉǈǏ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) Clusters ǌǍ ǌǍ ǌǍ ǌǍ
Notes: Standard errors in round brackets are clustered at the grandparent village level.
Standard errors in square brackets are clustered at the treatment-bin level, with bins
sized ǈ.ǈǉ of a unit of treatment. Controls include gender, age, ageƦ, grandparent coun-
try and interviewer ėxed eﬀects. *, **, *** represent signiėcance at the ǉǈƻ, Ǎƻ, ǉƻ lev-
els respectively. λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] represents the change in slope around the thresh-
old, and is the variable of interest in the regression kink design.
Description: ĉe table shows the estimates of the the eﬀect of forced labour on in-
terethnic trust. It identiėes that forced labour decreased interethnic trust amongHutu
but not generalized trust. ĉe eﬀect is not due to a Tutsi trustworthiness eﬀect, since
those not exposed to forced labour (Tutsi) do not treat other Tutsi diﬀerent in forced
labour regions.
ǉǍǏ
Table 4.6.3: Eﬀect of forced labour on partner selections
Panel A: ƻ Tutsi Chosen as Partner
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences Regression Kink
No cof. control Cof. control Cubic Quintic
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
Forced Labour x Eligible -ǈ.ǈǑǍǉ -ǈ.ǈǐǏǌ
(ǈ.ǈǍǉǎ)* (ǈ.ǈǍǉǊ)*
[ǈ.ǈǌǍǈ]** [ǈ.ǈǌǏǌ]*
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] -ǈ.ǋǌǐ -ǈ.ǉǍǍ
(ǈ.ǉǋǐ)** (ǈ.ǈǍǐǌ)***
[ǈ.ǉǎǍ]** [ǈ.ǈǍǏǏ]***
Observations ǌǈǉ ǌǈǉ ǌǈǉ ǌǈǉ
R-squared ǈ.ǌǍǋ ǈ.ǌǍǋ ǈ.ǋǋǊ ǈ.ǌǎǎ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǐǉ ǉǐǉ ǉǐǉ ǉǐǉ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) Clusters Ǎǉ Ǎǉ Ǎǉ Ǎǉ
Panel B: ƻHigh Income Chosen as Partner
Forced Labour x Eligible ǈ.ǉǉǑ ǈ.ǉǈǎ
(ǈ.ǉǈǋ) (ǈ.ǉǈǎ)
[ǈ.ǉǈǌ] [ǈ.ǉǉǈ]
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] ǈ.ǉǊǏ ǈ.ǉǌǋ
(ǈ.ǉǉǐ) (ǈ.ǉǉǐ)
[ǈ.ǉǈǍ] [ǈ.ǉǈǎ]
Observations ǌǈǊ ǌǈǊ ǌǈǊ ǌǈǊ
R-squared ǈ.ǋǐǐ ǈ.ǋǐǐ ǈ.ǋǑǊ ǈ.ǋǑǏ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǐǊ ǉǐǊ ǉǐǊ ǉǐǊ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) Clusters Ǎǉ Ǎǉ Ǎǉ Ǎǉ
Panel C: ƻ Coﬀee Farmers Chosen as Partner
Forced Labour x Eligible -ǈ.ǈǎǐǉ -ǈ.ǈǋǑǋ
(ǈ.ǈǑǌǌ) (ǈ.ǈǑǏǎ)
[ǈ.ǈǏǋǏ] [ǈ.ǈǏǋǉ]
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] -ǈ.ǉǉǉ -ǈ.ǉǊǊ
(ǈ.ǉǈǉ) (ǈ.ǉǈǋ)
[ǈ.ǈǐǍǐ] [ǈ.ǈǐǎǊ]
Observations ǌǈǊ ǌǈǊ ǌǈǊ ǌǈǊ
R-squared ǈ.ǌǉǎ ǈ.ǌǉǑ ǈ.ǌǉǑ ǈ.ǌǊǈ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǐǊ ǉǐǊ ǉǐǊ ǉǐǊ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) Clusters Ǎǉ Ǎǉ Ǎǉ Ǎǉ
Notes: Standard errors in round brackets are clustered at the grandparent village level.
Standard errors in square brackets are clustered at the treatment-bin level, with bins
sized ǈ.ǈǉ of a unit of treatment. Controls include gender, age, ageƦ, grandparent coun-
try and interviewer ėxed eﬀects. *, **, *** represent signiėcance at the ǉǈƻ, Ǎƻ, ǉƻ lev-
els respectively. λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] represents the change in slope around the thresh-
old, and is the variable of interest in the regression kink design.
Description: ĉe table shows thatHutu sort along ethnic lines but not alongother lines
which have been correlated with ethnicity. Hutu have had historically low income, but
sorting does not occur based on class (deėned as above or below the mean income
level). Mistreated Hutu were also not more likely to sort along occupational lines, as
they were not diﬀerentially more likely to choose to partner with another member of
the coﬀee industry.
ǉǍǐ
Table 4.6.4: Eﬀect of forced labour on default
Dependent Variable: log(default)
Panel A: Hutu subsample
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences Regression Kink
No cof. control Cof. control Cubic Quintic
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
Forced Labour x Eligible ǈ.ǊǑǎ ǈ.ǋǈǋ
(ǈ.ǈǑǌǌ)*** (ǈ.ǈǑǏǏ)***
[ǈ.ǈǐǍǏ]*** [ǈ.ǈǑǊǏ]***
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] ǈ.Ǌǐǎ ǈ.Ǌǐǐ
(ǈ.ǉǉǉ)** (ǈ.ǉǉǊ)**
[ǈ.ǈǑǉǊ]*** [ǈ.ǈǑǉǏ]***
Observations ǌǈǐ ǌǈǐ ǌǈǐ ǌǈǐ
R-squared ǈ.ǊǑǈ ǈ.ǊǑǉ ǈ.ǋǈǈ ǈ.ǋǈǉ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǐǏ ǉǐǏ ǉǐǏ ǉǐǏ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) Clusters ǍǊ ǍǊ ǍǊ ǍǊ
Panel B: Tutsi subsample
Forced Labour x Eligible -ǈ.ǋǊǍ -ǈ.ǋǋǉ
(ǈ.ǊǉǊ) (ǈ.Ǌǉǌ)
[ǈ.ǉǑǐ] [ǈ.Ǌǈǈ]*
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] -ǈ.ǊǊǍ -ǈ.Ǌǌǈ
(ǈ.ǊǊǐ) (ǈ.ǊǊǎ)
[ǈ.Ǌǉǉ] [ǈ.ǊǉǊ]
Observations ǉǏǐ ǉǏǐ ǉǏǐ ǉǏǐ
R-squared ǈ.ǎǌǊ ǈ.ǎǌǊ ǈ.ǎǌǐ ǈ.ǎǌǐ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǊǋ ǉǊǋ ǉǊǋ ǉǊǋ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) Clusters ǍǊ ǍǊ ǍǊ ǍǊ
Notes: Standard errors in round brackets are clustered at the grandparent village level. Standard errors in square brackets
are clustered at the treatment-bin level, with bins sized ǈ.ǈǉ of a unit of treatment. Controls include gender, age, ageƦ,
grandparent country and interviewer ėxed eﬀects. *, **, *** represent signiėcance at the ǉǈƻ, Ǎƻ, ǉƻ levels respectively.
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] represents the change in slope around the threshold, and is the variable of interest in the regression
kink design.
Description: ĉis table shows that the expected increase in forced labour had liĨle lasting impact on the contractual
outcomes of Tutsi but did impact the contractual outcomes for Hutu. ĉis is consistent with the idea that there is a causal
link between trust and default, if it is true that forced labour caused a change in Hutu resentment, but no other factors
relevant for default. Estimates with and without income controls are nearly identical, suggesting that the estimated eﬀect
is not operating through a direct income eﬀect. Furthering this argument is the fact that historical income was reduced
in a kinked paĨern for both Hutu and Tutsi, but only Hutu that were exposed to forced labour experience more default.
ǉǍǑ
Table 4.6.5: Eﬀect of forced labour on ability based default
Dependent Variable: log(AbilityDefault)
Panel A: Hutu subsample
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences Regression Kink
No cof. control Cof. control Cubic Quintic
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
Forced Labour x Eligible ǈ.ǌǋǉ ǈ.ǌǌǊ
(ǈ.ǉǋǌ)*** (ǈ.ǉǌǉ)***
[ǈ.ǉǉǉ]*** [ǈ.ǉǉǏ]***
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] ǈ.ǌǍǎ ǈ.ǌǎǈ
(ǈ.ǉǑǋ)** (ǈ.ǉǑǎ)**
[ǈ.ǉǋǏ]*** [ǈ.ǉǋǐ]***
Observations ǌǈǐ ǌǈǐ ǌǈǐ ǌǈǐ
R-squared ǈ.ǋǈǋ ǈ.ǋǈǌ ǈ.ǋǉǏ ǈ.ǋǉǏ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǐǏ ǉǐǏ ǉǐǏ ǉǐǏ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) Clusters ǍǊ ǍǊ ǍǊ ǍǊ
Dependent Variable: log(AbilityDefault)
Panel B: Tutsi subsample
Forced Labour x Eligible -ǈ.ǉǊǏ -ǈ.ǉǋǈ
(ǈ.ǊǌǍ) (ǈ.Ǌǌǎ)
[ǈ.ǊǌǊ] [ǈ.Ǌǌǌ]
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] ǈ.ǉǉǐ ǈ.ǈǑǊǍ
(ǈ.ǊǊǎ) (ǈ.ǊǊǏ)
[ǈ.ǊǊǍ] [ǈ.ǊǊǊ]
Observations ǉǏǐ ǉǏǐ ǉǏǐ ǉǏǐ
R-squared ǈ.ǎǈǋ ǈ.ǎǈǋ ǈ.ǎǉǊ ǈ.ǎǉǋ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǊǋ ǉǊǋ ǉǊǋ ǉǊǋ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) Clusters ǌǑ ǌǑ ǌǑ ǌǑ
Dependent Variable: log(EffortDefault)
Panel C: Eﬀort based defaults among Hutu
Forced Labour x Eligible ǈ.ǈǐǋǍ ǈ.ǈǐǌǉ
(ǈ.ǉǊǋ) (ǈ.ǉǊǋ)
[ǈ.ǉǊǐ] [ǈ.ǉǊǐ]
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] ǈ.ǈǍǏǊ ǈ.ǈǏǌǋ
(ǈ.ǉǌǌ) (ǈ.ǉǌǑ)
[ǈ.ǉǌǈ] [ǈ.ǉǌǋ]
Observations ǌǈǐ ǌǈǐ ǌǈǐ ǌǈǐ
R-squared ǈ.ǌǊǌ ǈ.ǌǊǌ ǈ.ǌǊǎ ǈ.ǌǊǏ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǐǏ ǉǐǏ ǉǐǏ ǉǐǏ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) Clusters ǍǊ ǍǊ ǍǊ ǍǊ
Dependent Variable: Incentives
Panel D: Use of incentives among Hutu
Forced Labour x Eligible -ǈ.ǈǉǊǑ ǈ.ǈǈǋǊǋ
(ǈ.ǈǌǑǍ) (ǈ.ǈǌǑǋ)
[ǈ.ǈǌǎǐ] [ǈ.ǈǌǐǊ]
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] ǈ.ǈǍǎǎ -ǈ.ǈǊǊǊ
(ǈ.ǈǏǈǊ) (ǈ.ǈǎǊǎ)
[ǈ.ǈǏǉǈ] [ǈ.ǈǍǍǊ]
Observations ǌǈǐ ǌǈǐ ǌǈǐ ǌǈǐ
R-squared ǈ.ǋǌǏ ǈ.ǋǍǌ ǈ.ǋǍǊ ǈ.ǋǎǋ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǐǏ ǉǐǏ ǉǐǏ ǉǐǏ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) Clusters ǍǊ ǍǊ ǍǊ ǍǊ
Notes: Standard errors in round brackets are clustered at the grandparent village level. Standard errors in square brackets are clustered at the treatment-bin level,
with bins sized ǈ.ǈǉ of a unit of treatment. Controls include gender, age, ageƦ , grandparent country and interviewer ėxed eﬀects. *, **, *** represent signiėcance
at the ǉǈƻ, Ǎƻ, ǉƻ levels respectively. λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] represents the change in slope around the threshold, and is the variable of interest in the regression
kink design.
Description: ĉis table conėrms that ability is the mechanism driving contractual default among Hutu whose grandparents were exposed to forced labour,
consistent with evidence that these respondents draw partners from a more shallow talent pool. While ability is much more cited as the reason for default among
those with a history of forced labour in both the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences and RKD design, neither speciėcation estimates any diﬀerence for eﬀort based reasons
or diﬀerences in the use of incentives.
ǉǎǈ
Table 4.6.6: Eﬀect of forced labour on income
Dependent Variable: log(income)
Panel A: Hutu subsample
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences Regression Kink
No cof. control Cof. control Cubic Quintic
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
Forced Labour x Eligible -ǈ.ǊǍǑ -ǈ.Ǌǎǉ
(ǈ.ǈǍǏǑ)*** (ǈ.ǈǍǑǍ)***
[ǈ.ǈǌǉǑ]*** [ǈ.ǈǌǉǏ]***
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] -ǈ.ǉǍǋ -ǈ.ǉǍǈ
(ǈ.ǈǏǑǐ)* (ǈ.ǈǏǑǌ)*
[ǈ.ǈǍǏǐ]*** [ǈ.ǈǍǎǐ]***
Observations ǌǉǑ ǌǉǑ ǌǉǑ ǌǉǑ
R-squared ǈ.Ǎǎǉ ǈ.Ǎǎǉ ǈ.ǍǎǑ ǈ.ǍǏǌ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǑǉ ǉǑǉ ǉǑǉ ǉǑǉ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) Clusters ǍǊ ǍǊ ǍǊ ǍǊ
Panel B: Tutsi subsample
Forced Labour x Eligible ǈ.ǉǈǍ ǈ.ǉǈǉ
(ǈ.ǉǉǎ) (ǈ.ǉǉǎ)
[ǈ.ǉǉǑ] [ǈ.ǉǊǈ]
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] ǈ.ǉǏǋ ǈ.ǉǏǐ
(ǈ.ǉǈǎ) (ǈ.ǉǉǈ)
[ǈ.ǉǉǉ] [ǈ.ǉǉǌ]
Observations ǉǏǐ ǉǏǐ ǉǏǐ ǉǏǐ
R-squared ǈ.ǏǑǌ ǈ.ǏǑǍ ǈ.ǏǑǏ ǈ.ǏǑǏ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǌǋ ǉǌǋ ǉǌǋ ǉǌǋ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) Clusters ǌǑ ǌǑ ǌǑ ǌǑ
Notes: Standard errors in round brackets are clustered at the grandparent village level. Standard errors in square brackets
are clustered at the treatment-bin level, with bins sized ǈ.ǈǉ of a unit of treatment. Controls include gender, age, ageƦ,
grandparent country and interviewer ėxed eﬀects. *, **, *** represent signiėcance at the ǉǈƻ, Ǎƻ, ǉƻ levels respectively.
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] represents the change in slope around the threshold, and is the variable of interest in the regression
kink design.
Description: ĉis table shows that a family history of forced labour predicts income today for Hutu but not for Tutsi.
ǉǎǉ
AńńĹłĸĽŎ: OŉļĹŇ TĵĶŀĹň ĵłĸ FĽĻŊŇĹň
Table 4.6.7: Eﬀect of forced labour on the decision to migrate
Diﬀerent Village Diﬀerent Village Time in
FromGrandparents From Parents Current Village
DiD RKD DiD RKD DiD RKD
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ) (Ǎ) (ǎ)
Forced Labour x Eligible ǈ.ǈǑǏǑ ǈ.ǈǉǋǎ -Ǌ.ǐǏǎ
(ǈ.ǈǑǋǎ) (ǈ.ǈǏǑǍ) (ǋ.ǈǋǑ)
[ǈ.ǈǐǍǉ] [ǈ.ǈǏǈǋ] [Ǌ.ǌǈǎ]
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] -ǈ.ǈǊǏǊ ǈ.ǈǌǎǉ -Ǌ.ǊǎǏ
(ǈ.ǉǈǈ) (ǈ.ǈǐǑǈ) (ǋ.ǊǑǉ)
[ǈ.ǈǑǋǍ] [ǈ.ǈǐǋǐ] [Ǌ.ǐǊǊ]
Observations ǎǈǋ ǌǉǐ ǍǑǌ ǌǉǈ ǎǈǉ ǌǉǎ
R-squared ǈ.ǊǎǑ ǈ.ǋǋǉ ǈ.ǋǉǐ ǈ.ǋǏǐ ǈ.ǍǐǑ ǈ.ǎǋǏ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǊǏǉ ǉǑǈ ǊǏǉ ǉǐǑ ǊǏǉ ǉǑǈ
Bin Clusters (ǈ.ǈǉ) ǎǎ Ǎǌ ǎǎ Ǎǌ ǎǎ Ǎǌ
Notes: Standard errors in round brackets are clustered at the grandparent village level. Standard errors in square brackets are clustered at
the treatment-bin level, with bins sized ǈ.ǈǉ of a unit of treatment. Controls include gender, age, ageƦ, grandparent country and interviewer
ėxed eﬀects. *, **, *** represent signiėcance at the ǉǈƻ, Ǎƻ, ǉƻ levels respectively. λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] represents the change in slope
around the threshold, and is the variable of interest in the regression kink design.
Description: ĉis table shows that a family history of forced labour has liĨle inĚuence in migration decisions over multiple generations.
Table 4.6.8: McCrary Test for Sorting Around the Threshold
Dep. Variable: Density (bins=ǈ.ǈǉ)
All Hutu
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] -ǋǋ.Ǒǐ -ǉǐ.ǋǋ ǋǌ.ǑǍ Ǎǌ.ǐǍ
(ǌǉ.Ǐǐ) (ǋǏ.Ǐǋ) (Ǎǈ.ǏǏ) (Ǎǐ.ǉǑ)
[ǌǈ.Ǐǉ] [ǋǌ.ǉǐ] [ǊǑ.Ǌǐ] [ǋǊ.ǈǍ]*
λ Polynomial Y Y Y Y
λ [λ >ǉ] Polynomial Y Y Y Y
Triple Diﬀerence Interactions Y Y Y Y
Village Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Controls N Y N Y
Observations ǎǈǌ ǎǈǋ ǌǈǊ ǌǈǉ
R-squared ǈ.ǌǎǍ ǈ.ǌǑǍ ǈ.ǍǏǌ ǈ.ǎǈǍ
Grandfather Village Clusters Ǌǎǋ Ǌǎǋ ǉǐǌ ǉǐǌ
Bin Clusters (ǈ.ǈǉ) ǎǎ ǎǎ Ǎǌ Ǎǌ
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the grandparent village level. Controls include gender, age, ageƦ ,
country and interviewer ėxed eﬀects. *, **, *** represent signiėcance at the ǉǈƻ, Ǎƻ, ǉƻ levels respec-
tively. λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] represents the change in slope around the threshold, and is the variable of
interest in the regression kink design.
Description: ĉis table shows that there is no sorting around the kink threshold, which is themain identi-
fying assumption associated with the RKD.ĉis is not surprising given the nature of forced labour. ĉere
was no selection on land type prior to coﬀee forced labour because coﬀee was not an important crop in
the region and the knowledge required to produce it was low. Aěer the introduction of forced labour
selection would be impossible, as chiefs and sub chiefs had a lot to gain by not allowing people to get out
of their ‘duties’ and punishments for non-compliance were harsh.
ǉǎǊ
Figure 4.6.1: McCrary Test for Sorting Around the Threshold
Description: ĉis ėgure shows graphically that there was no sorting around the threshold. ĉere is neither a discontinuity on either side of the threshold, nor a
change in slope to the right of the threshold. ĉis means that there was no selection from a coﬀee forced labour region to a non forced labour region and that
there was no selection from a high forced labour region to a low forced labour region.
Figure 4.6.2: Diﬀerences in trust and default between ethnicities, coﬀee history and coﬀee suitabil-
ity
Description: ĉese graphs show the distribution of the three main factors causing someone to be eligible for forced labour. Individually distributions are
identical in each case meaning that unobservable diﬀerences in any particular factor are unlikely to be driving results.
ǉǎǋ
Figure 4.6.3: Coﬀee Proﬁtability
Description: ĉis ėgure shows the growing potential of coﬀee and other relevant crops in Rwanda and Burundi in tonnes per hectare. Coﬀee is more robust to
elevation than most other crops, which reĚects the fact that the two largest forced labour regions were in the east where Manioc, coĨon, etc. are proėtable. Even
in the mountains though potato is proėtable so forced labour wasn’t simply related to elevation.
ǉǎǌ
Figure 4.6.4: One page of imports/exports section from 1937 list of goods produced in RwandaU-
rundi
ǉǎǍ
Table 4.6.9: The impact on the Rwandan genocide, and the robustness to this eﬀect
Panel A: Classic RKD speciėcation
log(genocide violence per person)
Cat ǉ Cat Ǌ Cat ǋ
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ)
λ  [λ > ƥ] ǈ.ǈǌǋǊ ǈ.ǈǐǍǎ ǈ.ǈǐǈǏ
[ǈ.ǈǊǈǋ]** [ǈ.ǈǋǌǊ]** [ǈ.ǈǋǋǉ]**
Observations ǊǏǎ ǊǏǎ ǊǏǎ
R-squared ǈ.ǉǐǉ ǈ.ǉǎǉ ǈ.ǉǊǍ
Panel B: Burundi Only Sample
Hutu to Tutsi trust game oﬀer
FLIntensity x Eligible -ǏǊ.ǐǌ*** -Ǐǈ.ǊǏ***
(Ǌǋ.ǋǊ)*** (Ǌǌ.Ǌǎ)***
[ǉǎ.ǎǉ]*** [ǉǏ.ǌǏ]***
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] -ǑǊ.ǎǈ -ǐǈ.ǐǎ
(Ǌǎ.ǉǈ)*** (Ǌǎ.ǉǈ)***
[Ǌǐ.ǈǐ]*** [Ǌǐ.ǈǐ]***
Observations ǊǈǏ ǊǈǏ ǊǈǏ ǊǈǏ
R-squared ǈ.ǋǑǐ ǈ.ǌǊǉ ǈ.ǌǍǏ ǈ.ǌǎǈ
Grandparent Village Clusters ǉǋǉ ǉǋǉ ǉǋǉ ǉǋǉ
Bin (ǈ.ǈǉ) clusters ǌǎ ǌǎ ǌǎ ǌǎ
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the grandparent village level in columns ǌ and Ǎ. Heteroskedasticity robust stan-
dard errors are included in columns ǉ, Ǌ, ǋ. In column ǉ, Ǌ, ǋ the unit of observation is a geographic cell in Rwanda . In
columns ǌ and Ǎ a unit of observation is a lab game respondent in Burundi. Controls include gender, age, ageƦ, country
and interviewer ėxed eﬀects. *, **, *** represent signiėcance at the ǉǈƻ, Ǎƻ, ǉƻ levels respectively. λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ]
represents the change in slope around the threshold, and is the variable of interest in the regression kink design.
Description: ĉe table shows that while historic forced labour is associated with more genocide violence, it is not con-
founding estimates. Columns ǉ, Ǌ and ǋ show the eﬀect of forced labour on diﬀerent categories of violence, with category
ǉ being the most serious crimes, and category ǋ being relatively less serious. Columns ǌ and Ǎ show that the estimates
do not operate through the genocide by restricting the sample to Hutus in Burundi. In Burundi there was no genocide,
so it could not be inĚuencing estimates in this sample. ĉe estimates are similar to the estimates in the full sample and
remain signiėcant at the ǉƻ level. ĉis implies that the village ėxed eﬀects in the full sample do a reasonably good job of
capturing the impact of the genocide on trust.
ǉǎǎ
Table 4.6.10: Diﬀerences in trust for the relative proﬁtability of crops other than coﬀee
Other Crops: Manioc CoĨon Sugarcane Rice Banana
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ) (Ǎ)
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] -Ǌxǉǈ ƪ ǋxǉǈ ƪ Ǌxǉǈ ƪ Ǌxǉǈ ƪ ǋxǉǈ ƪ
(ǎxǉǈ ƪ) (Ǌxǉǈ ƪ) (ǋxǉǈ ƪ) (Ǌxǉǈ ƪ) (Ǌxǉǈ ƪ)
[ǎxǉǈ ƪ] [ǋxǉǈ ƪ] [ǋxǉǈ ƪ] [ǋxǉǈ ƪ] [Ǌxǉǈ ƪ]
λ Polynomial Y Y Y Y Y
λ [λ >ǉ] Polynomial Y Y Y Y Y
Triple Diﬀerence Interactions Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Village Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y Y
Observations ǊǍǎ ǊǍǎ ǊǍǎ ǊǍǎ ǊǍǎ
R-squared ǈ.Ǎǎǉ ǈ.Ǎǐǈ ǈ.ǍǎǊ ǈ.Ǎǎǈ ǈ.ǍǍǎ
Grandparent village clusters ǉǋǉ ǉǋǉ ǉǋǉ ǉǋǉ ǉǋǉ
Bin clusters (ǈ.ǈǉ) ǌǎ ǌǎ ǌǎ ǌǎ ǌǎ
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the grandparent village level. Controls include gender, age, ageƦ, country and
interviewer ėxed eﬀects. *, **, *** represent signiėcance at the ǉǈƻ, Ǎƻ, ǉƻ levels respectively. λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ]
represents the change in slope around the threshold, and is the variable of interest in the regression kink design.
Description: ĉis table shows that there is something unique about the coﬀee industry, and it results are not driven by
factors associated bymarket dominance in any particular industry. It rejects the idea that low trust may be associated with
intensity of production because when production is very homogeneous, the beneėts of diverse networks may decrease.
Coﬀee is the only crop for which regional suitability dominance implies lower trust.
Table 4.6.11: Diﬀerences in current location rather than historical family location for trust and de-
fault
Trust GameOﬀer log(Default)
(ǉ) (Ǌ) (ǋ) (ǌ) (Ǎ) (ǎ)
λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] ǋxǉǈ ƫ Ǌxǉǈ ƫ Ǎxǉǈ ƪ ǉxǉǈ ƭ ǐxǉǈ ƥƤ Ǒxǉǈ ƥƤ
(Ǌxǉǈ ƫ) (ǌxǉǈ ƫ) (ǎxǉǈ ƪ) (ǐxǉǈ ƥƤ) (Ǎxǉǈ ƭ) (Ǐxǉǈ ƥƤ)
[ǋxǉǈ ƫ] [ǌxǉǈ ƫ] [ǎxǉǈ ƪ] [ǉǈxǉǈ ƥƤ] [Ǎxǉǈ ƭ] [Ǒxǉǈ ƥƤ]
λ Polynomial Y Y Y Y Y Y
λ [λ >ǉ] Polynomial Y Y Y Y Y Y
Triple Diﬀerence Interactions Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Grandfathers Village Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations ǊǎǊ ǉǑǎ Ǐǐ ǌǉǑ ǉǐǉ ǎǈǈ
R-squared ǈ.ǐǊǉ ǈ.ǐǈǋ ǈ.ǐǏǊ ǈ.ǏǏǏ ǈ.ǑǋǏ ǈ.ǏǍǊ
Grandparent village clusters ǐǍ ǏǍ ǋǍ ǐǏ ǍǏ ǉǈǋ
Bin clusters (ǈ.ǈǉ) ǍǊ ǌǌ ǋǑ ǍǊ Ǎǈ ǎǋ
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Controls include gender, age, ageƦ, country and interviewer ėxed eﬀects. *, **, ***
represent signiėcance at the ǉǈƻ, Ǎƻ, ǉƻ levels respectively. λ Eligible  [λ >ǉ] represents the change in slope around the threshold, and is the
variable of interest in the regression kink design.
Description: ĉis table shows that there is something unique about family history during the forced labour era. While it seems unlikely that
current location would be driving the main results due to village ėxed eﬀects, this table conėrms that there are no interaction type eﬀects driving
results.
ǉǎǏ
5
Conclusions
TļĽň dissertation has outlined the importance of culture and economicrelationships for the development process. Chapter Ǌ showed thatinsular cultures have a reduced capacity to adopt technologies, chapter ǋ
outlined some causes and consequences of low relationship values, and chapter ǌ
analyzed the origins and economic consequences of low trust.
ĉis area of research is growing, but far from complete. ĉe importance of a number
of diﬀerent related questions have become apparent, and these issues will be dealt
with in future works. One clear question is whether policy can inĚuence cultural
outcomes in the short run. It is clear from chapter ǌ that policy can inĚuence culture
over the long-term, but if culture is very slowmoving, then there may not be
incentives for leaders to inĚuence policy. If however, culture can be shiěed within a
leaders term, then culture plausibly inĚuences the re-election of policy makers, and
the implications of this could be signiėcant.
A number of projects are currently underway to address this issue:
ĉe ėrst, a project underway (withMukand andMajumdar) examines national
ǉǎǐ
versus tribal identity following colonial independence in Africa. Preliminary results
show that nationalistic policies are much more inĚuential on contemporary national
identity immediately aěer independence, than contemporary policy. Once a identity
is established it is very diﬃcult to change.
On the other hand, evidence from Rwanda (withMukand) shows that
discrimination in Rwanda may have been inĚuenced in the short-run aěer the
genocide. Paul Kagame implemented immediate social policies aiming to make
mentions of Hutu/Tutsi taboo. As a result, ethnicity is not currently discussed in
Rwanda. Reconciliation, at least on the surface, seems to have taken place faster than
aěer any other large episode of violence throughout history. Data has been collected
with the intention of analyzing post-genocide reconciliation, another avenue for
future research that seems promising.
Another promising avenue for future work is investigating other consequences of
low trust. Using unique and detailed coﬀee washing station data (withMacchiavello
andMorjaria) preliminary results show a large negative correlation between marginal
costs and general trust. ĉis could be the result of cooperation between stations. ĉis
would provide some of the ėrst ėrm level evidence on the reasons why low
generalized trust inĚuences economic activity.
ĉese projects all contribute to the literature examining the relationship between
culture and economic relationships. ĉey investigate the origins of trust and show
why history inĚuences current economic outcomes through culture. It is currently
unclear how culture changes over time, and this is a pressing concern for future work.
But the work presented in this dissertation has hopefully underscored the importance
of both culture and relationships for economic development, and has has hopefully
advanced current understanding of how and why these factors are so important.
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